A, a Mohammedan kills a cow in open place in presence of 4-5 Hindus. One B, out of them starts for lodging report to police, but instead goes to his house. What offence A and B have committed?

A's Act: Killing a Cow in an Open Place in the Presence of Hindus

The first question to resolve is whether A has committed any offence at all, and if so, under which provision. The answer requires careful attention to judicial precedent and the precise mental element required by each relevant section.

The Act is Not Illegal per Se

The slaughter of a cow is not by itself an unlawful act in the absence of a specific local law or regulation prohibiting it. The courts have consistently held that the mere fact that cow slaughter hurts the religious sentiments of Hindus does not make it an offence, if the act is done privately, without any wanton disregard for the feelings of those around. The Allahabad High Court in Jasnami v. Emperor (AIR 1936 All 534) held that where a Muslim who killed a cow before sunrise, unobserved by Hindus, was not liable under Section 153 IPC — the killing was neither malignant nor wanton since it was not done in a manner likely to cause a riot. The Patna High Court in Abdullah v. Emperor (AIR 1919 All 307) affirmed the same principle. Thus, killing a cow by itself, in private or unobserved, is not a criminal act under the general criminal law in the absence of statutory prohibition.

However — and this is the critical distinction — A in our problem does not kill a cow in private. He kills it in an open place, in the presence of 4-5 Hindus. The character of the act changes entirely when it is done openly and in the presence of members of a community for whom the cow holds profound religious significance.

Section 192 BNS (= Section 153 IPC): Wanton Provocation

Discussing Section 192 BNS, it is stated that a person who kills or sacrifices a cow in an open place exposed to the view of the public must obviously be held to have done it recklessly, thoughtlessly, and without regard to the sentiments of those who do not approve of such an act — and which needlessly offends them. Such an act obviously amounts to a wanton act.

Section 192 BNS (corresponding to Section 153 IPC) reads in relevant part:

"Whoever malignantly, or wantonly by doing anything which is illegal, gives provocation to any person intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause the offence of rioting to be committed..."

Here is where the law introduces an important caveat that must be honestly confronted: Section 192 BNS requires that the provocative act must be something illegal. The act of killing a cow — in the absence of any cow slaughter prevention legislation applicable to the relevant jurisdiction — is not per se illegal. The sources acknowledge this forthrightly: "Nevertheless, the act is not an offence under this section since such sacrifice would not be illegal in the absence of any provision of law prohibiting the killing of a cow." The Patna High Court in Kari v. State of Bihar (AIR 1952 Pat 138) held that Section 153 IPC was not attracted where a person killed a cow in the presence of Hindus, since the mere fact that the act was wanton and offensive did not make it illegal as required by the section.

Therefore, Section 192 BNS cannot be applied to A unless there is a specific law in the relevant jurisdiction prohibiting cow slaughter.

Section 302 BNS (= Section 298 IPC): Wounding Religious Feelings

The section that courts have actually applied in factually similar circumstances is Section 302 BNS (corresponding to Section 298 IPC), which punishes whoever with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of any person, makes any gesture in the sight of that person or places any object in the sight of that person. The killing of a cow in the open and visible presence of Hindus — who are involuntary witnesses — falls squarely within this framework.

The Patna High Court in Mir Chittan v. Emperor (AIR 1937 All 13) held that where the accused killed a cow for a wedding feast, he was liable under Section 298 IPC — the court reasoning that the accused must know that the killing of a cow in the presence of Hindus would lead to wounding of their religious feelings, and he must be supposed to have intended the necessary consequence of his acts. The fact that he wanted the meat for a wedding feast, and had no desire to wound the feelings of anyone, is of little value. If a man knows that a certain consequence will follow from his act, it must be presumed in law that he intended that consequence.

The Allahabad High Court in Queen Empress v. Rahman (1893 13 AWN 144) convicted an accused under Section 298 IPC where, after sacrificing a cow on the occasion of Bakrid, he carried the flesh around the village in an uncovered condition. The court held that this deliberate exposure of cow flesh to the Hindu fellow-villagers — who had previously objected to cow slaughter — was deliberately intended to wound their religious feelings.

The Tripura High Court in Kitab Ali Munshi v. Santi Ranjan Deb (AIR 1965 Tripura 22) held that where the accused persons caused the slaughter of a bullock in an open public place in spite of protests by a Hindu complainant and in the presence of other Hindu witnesses, the facts clearly established that the accused deliberately intended to offend the religious feelings of the complainant and the other Hindus.

These cases, taken together, establish with confidence what A's liability is: A is guilty under Section 302 BNS (= Section 298 IPC) of the offence of deliberately wounding the religious feelings of the 4-5 Hindus present. The killing is done openly, in their sight — not furtively or privately. A knows, and must be presumed to know, that the sight of a cow being slaughtered before Hindus would wound their religious feelings. The deliberate intention is inferred not from any stated purpose to insult, but from the very nature of the act and the circumstances in which it is performed.

The punishment under Section 302 BNS is imprisonment of either description for a term that may extend to one year, or fine, or both. The offence is non-cognizable and bailable, triable by any Magistrate.

B's Act: Starting for the Police Station but Returning Home Instead

B witnesses an act that he believes warrants police attention. He sets out for the police station — and then turns back and goes home. The question is whether this amounts to any criminal offence.

The Governing Principle: No General Duty to Inform Police

The answer demands precision. There is, under Indian criminal law, no general duty imposed on every citizen to report every crime he witnesses to the police. The law does not treat every private citizen as an officer of the law, obligated to run to the nearest police station whenever a cognizable offence is committed in his presence. Such an obligation exists only where the law expressly imposes it — and the provisions that impose it are specific, not general.

Section 179 BNS (= Section 176 IPC) punishes a person who, being legally bound to give notice or information on a particular subject, omits to do so. The key phrase is "legally bound" — and a private citizen standing on a public road watching a cow being slaughtered is, in the absence of a specific statutory obligation, not legally bound to report it to the police. He may be morally obligated; he may wish to report it; he may have started for the police station in good faith. But the absence of a legal duty means that his return home is not an omission of a legal obligation.

Section 215 BNS (= Section 202 IPC) punishes whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed, and being under a legal obligation to give information about it, intentionally omits to do so. Once again, the critical requirement is a legal obligation to give information — and no such obligation attaches to B as a private citizen in these circumstances.

Had the situation involved a riot, an unlawful assembly, or had B been the owner or occupier of the land on which the incident occurred, the position might have been different. Under Section 193 BNS (= Sections 154–156 IPC), the owner or occupier of land on which a riot or unlawful assembly takes place is under a specific duty to give the earliest notice to the officer in charge of the nearest police station. But B is merely a witness — a bystander. He is neither an owner nor occupier of the land, nor a public official, nor a person occupying any special position that creates a legal duty to report.

Conclusion on B's Liability

B has committed no offence. His initial movement towards the police station was a voluntary act of civic responsibility — not the discharge of a legal duty. His change of mind and return home is, at most, a failure of civic virtue. The criminal law does not penalise such moral failures unless they are accompanied by a breach of a legal obligation. Since B is under no legal compulsion to inform the police — no statute, no special relationship, no public office demands it of him — he cannot be prosecuted under any provision of the BNS or the IPC for his omission.

Consolidated Analysis

The Governing Principle

The law that emerges from this problem reflects two mature and considered principles. First, as the courts held in Mir Chittan and Kitab Ali, when a person performs an act knowing that its necessary consequence is the wounding of another's religious feelings — and performs it in the very sight of those persons — the law presumes the intention from the act itself. The accused cannot escape liability by pleading a different purpose, such as providing meat for a feast, when he knows full well the effect his act will produce on those watching. Second, as the absence of liability in B's case demonstrates, the criminal law is not a comprehensive code of civic morality — it imposes obligations selectively, only where specific legal duties exist. The law will not imprison a man for failing to be a good neighbour; it will only punish him for failing to perform a duty that the law itself has expressly laid upon him. The distinction between a moral obligation and a legal one is, in criminal law, always the difference between virtue and compulsion — and that difference the law jealously preserves.