A, a Police Station Officer takes down the First Information Report orally given by B about the offence of murder in his village. A asks B to sign the statement. B refuses. Is this an offence?

The Governing Provision: Section 180 IPC and Section 215 BNS

The applicable provision is Section 180 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, now replaced by Section 215 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, which reads:

"Whoever refuses to sign any statement made by him, when required to sign that statement by a public servant legally competent to require that he shall sign that statement, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to three thousand rupees, or with both."

At first glance, this section seems perfectly tailored to the situation at hand. A made a statement; the Police Station Officer — a public servant — asked him to sign it; A refused. But the law has never been as simple as it looks on the surface. The critical question that the courts have consistently insisted must be answered before invoking this section is: Was A legally competent to be required to sign? Or, put differently: Was A legally bound to sign this particular statement?

The Crux: Is the Informant Legally Bound to Sign the FIR?

The provisions governing the First Information Report are contained in Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, now corresponding to Section 173 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. Under this provision, when information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence — and murder is undoubtedly one — is given orally to the officer in charge of a police station, the officer must reduce it to writing and read it over to the informant. The section further provides that every such information shall be signed by the person giving it.

This is not a mere procedural nicety. The signature of the informant is a statutory requirement under the very section that constitutes the foundation of the FIR. The purpose is self-evident — the law requires the informant to formally own and authenticate the information he has laid before the police, so that there is no subsequent repudiation and the entire edifice of investigation rests on a verified foundation.

The position, therefore, is entirely different from the earlier discussion concerning a summons. There, signing the duplicate was merely an acknowledgment of receipt — not a legal obligation enforceable under the penal law. Here, the signing of the FIR is a statutory duty explicitly cast by Section 154 Cr.P.C. / Section 173 BNSS upon the informant. B, by going to the Police Station Officer and giving oral information about a murder, has brought himself within the scope of this provision. He cannot now selectively avail of the machinery of the law — setting it in motion by giving information — and then refuse to perform the very act the law requires of him as the informant.

The Four Ingredients of Section 215 BNS / Section 180 IPC

For an offence under this section to be made out, the following four ingredients must be established:

• First, the accused must have made a statement before the public servant.

• Second, the public servant must have required the accused to sign that statement.

• Third, the public servant must have been legally competent to require the signature — that is, there must exist a statutory provision empowering him to demand the signature.

• Fourth, the accused must have refused to sign the statement.

In the present problem, all four conditions are satisfied. B gave an oral statement to the Police Station Officer; the statement was recorded; the officer asked B to sign it; B refused. The officer's competence to require the signature flows directly from Section 154(1) Cr.P.C. / Section 173(1) BNSS, which mandates the informant's signature on the FIR. There is therefore a clear legal obligation on B, and his refusal is a violation of that obligation.

The Important Caveat: The Context Matters

The sources are emphatic that this section is not a general provision punishing all refusals to sign. The law has drawn clear distinctions. A witness is not legally bound to sign his deposition in a revenue inquiry, nor is he bound to sign or affix his thumb mark to his deposition in a civil case. In such cases, the refusal does not constitute an offence under this section. Similarly, an accused person who refuses to sign a statement made at his trial in answer to questions put by the court commits no offence under this section, in the absence of any statutory obligation to sign.

The ratio that emerges from these authorities is consistent: the obligation to sign must arise from a specific statutory provision. Where no such provision exists, a person's refusal is not criminally punishable. The distinction may be illustrated compactly:

The Punishment and Nature of the Offence

Under Section 215 BNS, the offence of refusing to sign a statement is punishable with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to three thousand rupees, or both. The offence is non-cognizable, bailable, and triable by the Court in which the offence is committed, or by any Magistrate. The relatively mild punishment reflects the legislature's view that this is essentially a contempt of the lawful authority of public servants — significant enough to merit criminal sanction, but not of the gravity that would warrant severe punishment.

Constitutional Dimension: The Right Against Self-Incrimination

There is a dimension of this problem that a careful student must not overlook. Article 20(3) of the Constitution guarantees that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. This constitutional protection, as the Supreme Court clarified in Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani (AIR 1978 SC 1025), applies only to a person who is accused — that is, one who has been formally arraigned or against whom a formal accusation has been made. B, at the stage of giving the FIR, is the informant — not the accused. He is the person reporting a murder, not one who is suspected of having committed it. The protection of Article 20(3) is therefore not available to him. He cannot invoke the right against self-incrimination to justify his refusal to sign the FIR.

However, the position would be entirely different if B were himself under suspicion or investigation in connection with the very murder he was reporting. In that situation, compelling B to sign would amount to compelling him to authenticate a statement that could incriminate him, and the constitutional protection would come to his aid. The courts have been sensitive to this nuance. The Rajasthan High Court in Pal Singh, Santa Singh v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1955 Raj 18) held that an accused cannot be forced to surrender the very privilege for which he is fighting.

Conclusion

B has committed an offence under Section 180 IPC (corresponding to Section 215 BNS) by refusing to sign the FIR recorded by the Police Station Officer. The Police Station Officer had the statutory authority under Section 154 Cr.P.C. / Section 173 BNSS to require B's signature, and that requirement carries with it a corresponding legal obligation on B to comply. Since the four ingredients of Section 215 BNS are all satisfied, B's refusal is punishable with simple imprisonment up to three months, or fine up to three thousand rupees, or both. The offence is, however, non-cognizable and bailable, and the constitutional protection against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) does not avail B since he appears as an informant and not as an accused.