A and his sons B and C were Mitakshara coparceners. C separated, then A dies leaving widow W and daughter D. Claims analysis.

Setting the Stage: The Coparcenary and Its Disruption

To begin with, A, B, and C form a Mitakshara coparcenary, each holding an undivided one-third interest in the joint family property. The coparcenary, as the Supreme Court described it in State Bank of India v. Ghamandi Ram (AIR 1969 SC 1330), is a quasi-corporate body in which no member can predicate a definite, fixed share until partition is sought.

Then C separates. The moment C demands partition and receives his share, a severance of status occurs between C and the rest of the family. C takes his one-third share as his separate property and walks out of the coparcenary. What remains is a reduced coparcenary between A and B, each now holding an equal undivided one-half share in the residual joint family property. C is, from this moment, a separated coparcener — a stranger, in the coparcenary sense, to the remaining family. The daughter D, by virtue of the Hindu Succession Amendment Act, 2005, is a coparcener by birth, and her position must be factored in throughout.

A Dies: Opening of the Question

When A dies, the law that springs into operation is Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, as amended in 2005. Under the amended provision, the doctrine of survivorship stands abolished for all male coparceners dying after 9th September 2005. The amended section mandates that when a Hindu dies having an undivided interest in Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest shall devolve not by survivorship, but by testamentary or intestate succession, after effecting a notional partition immediately before the moment of death.

The first task, therefore, is to ascertain what A's share would have been had a partition taken place just before his death.

The Notional Partition: Computing A's Share

At the time of A's death, the coparcenary in existence consists of A, B, and D — D having become a coparcener by virtue of Section 6(1) of the amended Act, which confers upon the daughter of a coparcener the same birth right in coparcenary property as a son. C has already separated and holds no interest in this coparcenary.

A critical rule of Explanation II to the old Section 6 — which continues to hold relevance — provides that "nothing in the proviso shall be construed as enabling a person who has separated himself from the coparcenary before the death of the deceased, or any of his heirs, to claim on intestacy a share in the interest referred to therein." C, being a separated coparcener, is completely excluded from the notional partition. Neither C nor any of his heirs can lay any claim to A's undivided interest.

The notional partition is therefore effected among A, B, and D. Under the wider approach affirmed by the Supreme Court in Gurupad v. Hirabai (AIR 1978 SC 1239), the widow W is also entitled to be allotted a share equal to that of a son at the time of the notional partition, since she would have received such a share had a real partition taken place. The coparcenary thus notionally divides among A, B, D, and W — four shares. A's share comes to one-fourth (1/4) of the total remaining joint family property.

This one-fourth share, once demarcated through the fiction of notional partition, becomes A's separate property available for succession under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Distribution of A's Share Among His Heirs

A has died intestate. His heirs are W (widow) and D (daughter), both of whom figure in Class I of the Schedule to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. B, the surviving son and coparcener, also figures in Class I. The rule under Section 8 is that Class I heirs inherit simultaneously, and under Section 10, they take per capita — that is, in equal shares.

A is thus survived by three Class I heirs: W, B, and D. His one-fourth share divides equally among them:

• W (widow) takes 1/3 of 1/4 = 1/12 of the total property

• B (son) takes 1/3 of 1/4 = 1/12 of the total property

• D (daughter) takes 1/3 of 1/4 = 1/12 of the total property

B, of course, already holds his own undivided one-half interest in the joint family property as the surviving coparcener. After A's death, B's total interest in the property becomes his pre-existing half share plus the one-twelfth he inherits from A — giving him, effectively, a 7/12 interest. W and D each hold a 1/12 interest as tenants-in-common with B and with each other. It bears emphasis here that the shares inherited by W, B, and D from A's estate are held by them as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants — they do not revive into any fresh coparcenary among themselves. As the Supreme Court made plain in Uttam v. Saubhag Singh (AIR 2016 SC 1751), once the coparcenary interest devolves by succession under Section 8, the property ceases to be joint family property in the hands of the heirs, and they hold it as tenants-in-common.

The Position of C: Excluded on All Fronts

It deserves special emphasis that C's claim, whether as a surviving coparcener or as an heir to A's estate, is entirely without foundation. As a coparcener, he separated before A's death. As an intestate heir, he belongs to Class II of the Schedule (as a brother of A), and Class II heirs are totally excluded by the presence of Class I heirs. The combined operation of Explanation II to the old Section 6 and the scheme of Class I priority under the Hindu Succession Act shuts C out completely from any share in A's estate.

The Claims of W and D: Their Absolute Ownership

Both W and D hold their respective 1/12 shares as absolute owners. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, has abolished the concept of a woman's limited estate. Any property that vests in a female Hindu, whether by succession or partition, is held by her as a full owner with untrammelled powers of disposal. W's 1/12 share and D's 1/12 share are therefore not qualified or limited interests — they belong to them absolutely, to sell, gift, bequeath, or otherwise deal with as they see fit.

W also retains the right to enforce her share. As the Supreme Court recognised in Gurupad v. Hirabai, a widow who inherits under the proviso to Section 6 is entitled not only to her share in the estate of the deceased coparcener but also, if she chooses to seek partition of the remaining joint property, to assert both her inherited interest and her share as she would have received in a real partition — the two sources of entitlement being cumulative, not alternative.

Summary of Final Shares

Note on D: Since D is herself a coparcener at the time of the notional partition, she receives a share equal to that of B in the notional division (i.e., 1/4 of remaining property is notionally allotted to her), and then separately takes 1/12 of A's share by intestate succession. Her combined entitlement, where she seeks to enforce it, would therefore be stronger than that of W.

The problem thus presents a finely layered analysis: severance by C, the mechanics of notional partition excluding the separated coparcener, the application of the wider approach from Gurupad v. Hirabai to include the widow's share, and the absolute ownership of the female heirs under Section 14 — all operating together to produce a result that is at once logically coherent and remedially just.