A, B and C are joint family members. A and B borrow money from P for joint family. Can decree be executed against C's share?
The Governing Principle
The foundation of this rule lies in the concept of managerial authority within a Hindu joint family. The Karta — or any member acting as manager — has an implied authority to contract debts and pledge the credit and property of the family for the ordinary purposes of the family business or for legal necessity. Such debts, incurred in the ordinary course of the family's affairs, are binding on the entire joint family, including the interest of every coparcener, whether or not that coparcener was a party to the transaction. The other coparceners are only liable, however, to the extent of their interest in the joint family property — their personal or separate property is not at risk.
The governing principle was authoritatively stated by the Privy Council and is now settled as a rule of Mitakshara law: a decree passed against the manager of a joint family as representing the family, for a debt contracted by him for family necessities or for the family business, operates as res judicata under Explanation VI of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure and is binding upon all members of the family — including minors — even if those members were not parties to the suit. The decree may accordingly be executed against the whole coparcenary property.
The Illustration from Mulla
The precise factual situation in this problem — A and B as managing members, P as creditor, and C as the non-party coparcener — is in fact addressed directly through a well-known illustration drawn from settled Privy Council authority: where A and B are the managing members of a joint family and they borrow from P for the necessities of the family, and P sues A and B as managers and obtains a decree against them as such, the decree may be executed against the whole coparcenary property including C's interest therein, even though C was not a party to the suit and even if C was a minor. Importantly, P is also entitled to a personal decree against A and B, since they were parties to the contract — which means P can additionally proceed against the separate properties of A and B. However, P is not entitled to a personal decree against C, because C was not a party to the contract. C's liability is limited strictly to his interest in the joint family property; his personal or separate estate is untouchable.
The Critical Condition: Family Purpose
The entire liability of C hinges on one indispensable requirement — the debt must have been incurred for a purpose that is binding on the joint family. If A and B borrowed the money for a joint family necessity, the benefit of the estate, or for the performance of an indispensable duty, the family property is fully liable. If, however, the debt was contracted by A and B for a purely personal purpose — unrelated to family affairs — it would bind only their own undivided interests in the joint family property, and P could not execute the decree against C's share. The distinction is between a debt incurred by A and B as managers acting for and on behalf of the joint family, and a debt incurred by them as individuals for personal ends.
It is equally important to note that A and B must have been sued and the decree obtained against them as managers — not merely in their personal capacities. A decree, even for a family debt, passed against the manager personally (as opposed to in his representative capacity), cannot be executed against the whole coparcenary property. It can be executed only against his own interest in the property. The test is not merely the label used in the pleadings, but whether, in substance, A and B were acting and being sued as representing the whole family.
The Position of C
C, who is an adult coparcener, is bound by the decree even without having been a party to the suit. The law recognises that it would be impossible in practice to require the creditor to sue every single member of a joint family and obtain separate decrees against each of them. The joint family is treated as a represented unit through its manager or managers, and all members — whether adult, minor, or even subsequently born within the limits of the coparcenary — are bound by transactions lawfully entered into on behalf of the family. C's remedy, if he believes that the debt was not incurred for a family purpose, is to resist execution by proving that A and B had no authority to bind the family for that particular purpose. The burden of establishing that would rest on C.
In sum, the decree obtained by P against A and B as managers of the joint family can be validly executed against C's share in the coparcenary property, provided the borrowing was for a purpose binding on the joint family. P cannot, however, obtain a personal decree against C or proceed against C's separate properties, since C was not personally a party to the contract.
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