A commits an offence of publishing defamatory matter against B and is tried under section 501 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. B dies during the trial and wants to compound the offence. Advise.

The Offence: Section 501 IPC and Section 356(3) BNS

Section 501 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 punishes whoever prints or engraves any matter, knowing or having good reason to believe that such matter is defamatory of any person. The punishment is simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or fine, or both. This offence essentially targets the printer or engraver who, with knowledge of the defamatory character of the matter, lends their craft to its dissemination. In the present case, A falls squarely within this provision by publishing defamatory matter against B.

Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, defamation in all its forms — including making, publishing, printing, and selling defamatory matter — is consolidated into a single comprehensive provision, Section 356. What was Section 501 IPC corresponds to Section 356(3) BNS, which punishes the printing or engraving of matter known to be defamatory with simple imprisonment up to two years, fine, or both. The BNS has made a significant structural improvement by integrating Sections 499 to 502 IPC into this single provision, thereby simplifying the framework without diluting the substance.

Compoundability of the Offence: The General Rule

The first question one must answer is whether the offence under Section 501 IPC / Section 356(3) BNS is compoundable at all. The answer is yes — but with an important qualification that depends on the forum before which the case is tried.

Under the classification schedule of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the offence under Section 356(3) BNS is classified as follows:

• Where tried before a Court of Session (for instance, when the defamation concerns the President, Vice-President, or a Governor in the discharge of public functions): Compoundable with the permission of the court, by the person defamed.

• Where tried before a Magistrate of the First Class (for ordinary defamation against an individual): Compoundable by the person defamed, without requiring the court's permission.

So the critical rule emerges: in all cases of defamation, whether under IPC or BNS, the right to compound the offence vests exclusively in the person defamed — that is, the individual whose reputation was attacked. No one else holds this right as a matter of course. The law entrusts this power to the aggrieved person alone, recognising that criminal defamation is an offence that strikes at the honour of a specific individual.

The Central Problem: B Dies During Trial

Now comes the heart of the problem. B — the person defamed, who alone possesses the right to compound the offence — dies during the pendency of the trial. The question is: can anyone else exercise this right? Can B's legal heirs or representatives step in and compound the offence?

Here the law draws a firm and somewhat uncomfortable line. The right to compound a compoundable offence is a personal right vested in the person aggrieved. It does not automatically devolve upon the legal heirs or representatives of the deceased complainant merely by reason of inheritance or succession. As the Bombay High Court observed in a case dealing with compoundable matrimonial offences, the right to compound is not a property right that passes to legal heirs — it is a personal right tied to the living person who suffered the wrong.

Section 320(1) CrPC (Section 359 BNSS) provides that the offence may be compounded by the "person mentioned in the third column of the table" — which in defamation cases is specifically "the person defamed." The law does not contemplate a substitute. Once B is dead, B can no longer compound. The legal heirs can neither claim that right on their own behalf nor exercise it as representatives of B.

What Happens to the Trial After B's Death?

The death of the complainant during trial raises a further procedural question. A criminal trial, once set in motion, is the State's prosecution — particularly when a charge-sheet has been filed or a court has taken cognizance. The death of the complainant does not by itself cause the prosecution to abate. However, in cases of defamation, it is important to recall that the complaint itself was filed under Section 199 CrPC (Section 224 BNSS) which requires a complaint by the aggrieved person. The private complainant's death therefore removes the very foundation upon which the cognizance was taken.

Courts have grappled with this position. Where the complainant in a private complaint case dies during trial, the question arises whether someone can be substituted to carry forward the prosecution. Section 302 CrPC (Section 362 BNSS) permits any person to conduct the prosecution in a summons case if the Magistrate so permits. The legal heirs of B may therefore approach the court seeking permission to continue the prosecution — they can conduct it, but they cannot compound it.

This distinction is crucial: conducting a prosecution and compounding it are entirely different rights. The legal heirs, if permitted under Section 302 CrPC, may carry the prosecution to its conclusion. But they cannot place themselves in the shoes of the deceased defamed person and compound the offence under Section 320 CrPC, because that personal right died with B.

What Advice Should Be Given?

Given this legal framework, the advice to B's representatives or to A's counsel would be as follows:

First, the offence under Section 501 IPC / Section 356(3) BNS can ordinarily be compounded. However, that right vested exclusively in B as the person defamed. Since B has died during the trial, the right to compound has lapsed. No legal heir, family member, or representative can validly compound the offence in B's place.

Second, if A wishes to put an end to the criminal proceedings, the appropriate remedy is not compounding but rather an application for quashing the criminal proceedings under Section 482 CrPC (Section 528 BNSS) before the High Court, relying on the inherent jurisdiction of the court to secure the ends of justice. The Supreme Court in B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana (AIR 2003 SC 1386) firmly recognised that even where an offence is non-compoundable or where the right to compound no longer subsists, the High Court may exercise its inherent power to quash proceedings if continuing them would serve no useful purpose. In a defamation case where the very person who suffered the reputational harm is no longer alive, there is a compelling argument that continuing the prosecution would be a hollow exercise divorced from any genuine victim interest.

Third, if B's legal heirs wish to continue the prosecution to vindicate B's honour posthumously, they may apply to the court under Section 302 CrPC for permission to conduct the prosecution as a private party. Since Explanation 1 to Section 499 IPC (and correspondingly Section 356(1) BNS) specifically recognises that it may amount to defamation to impute anything to a deceased person if the imputation would harm the reputation of that person if living and is intended to be hurtful to the feelings of his family or other near relatives, the family of B has a recognised interest in the vindication of B's reputation even after death.

An Illustrative Parallel

The position can be understood through a clear illustration. Suppose A prints and circulates pamphlets falsely and maliciously accusing B, a respected teacher, of financial fraud. B files a complaint under Section 501 IPC. During the trial, B passes away. A's counsel approaches the court with a letter from B's son, stating that the family is willing to settle and compound the case. The court cannot permit this. The son may apply to conduct the prosecution, but he cannot, as the "person defamed," stand in B's place and exercise B's personal right to compound. A's only remaining avenue, if he seeks to end the proceedings, is a petition before the High Court under Section 482 CrPC for quashing on the ground that the continuation of proceedings would be a futile exercise, the victim having passed away.

Summary of Legal Position

The death of B mid-trial creates a procedural lacuna that the law has not entirely sealed. The right to compound dies with the victim; the prosecution, however, does not die with the complainant. This is the delicate balance that must be understood and advised upon in practice.