A entered into agreement with B for purchase of immovable property on 20.12.64. Agreement was registered. It was agreed that sale deed was to be executed by B within 03 months of getting due permission for sale from other co-owners. A died in 1972, B died in 1965. In 1993, C (successor of A) wanted to sell property to D. E (successor of B) filed objections. C filed suit against E on 06.04.94 for specific performance. Decide the preliminary objection that suit is barred by limitation.
The preliminary objection should be rejected. The mere age of the agreement does not make the suit late, because the period of limitation for specific performance does not run from the date of the agreement. It runs from one of two points laid down in Article 54, and on the facts stated the point that applies is E's objection of 1993, from which the suit of 6 April 1994 is within three years.
Article 54 gives three years for a suit for specific performance of a contract, and it begins to run from "the date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused." The article thus has two limbs. The first applies when the contract fixes a date, and the second when it does not. In Ahmadsahab Abdul Mulla v Bibijan, (2009) 5 SCC 462 : AIR 2009 SC 2193, a Bench of three Judges held that the expression "date fixed for the performance" means a definite date fixed for doing the act, and that where no such date is fixed, time runs from the day on which the plaintiff has notice of the refusal, which has to be established on the materials placed before the court. The Court added that in either case the starting point is a definite point of time, and that the court should not look for an intention from other circumstances.
The agreement in question does not fix a date. It says that B is to execute the sale deed within three months of obtaining permission from the other co-owners, and nothing in the facts tells us when, or whether, that permission was to be obtained. The start of the three months depends on an event, and the event is uncertain, since the co-owners might give permission at any time or might never give it. A date which is made to turn on an uncertain event is not a date fixed for performance. The rule is that if the event on which performance depends is uncertain, the first limb of the article is not satisfied, and the later limb applies, so that time runs from the plaintiff's notice of refusal. The rule is illustrated by HM Krishna Reddy v HC Narayana Reddy, AIR 2001 Kant 442, where the agreement made performance depend on the lifting of a government ban on registration and the High Court held that the suit, filed within three years of the vendor's refusal, was in time. The case is a decision of a High Court and is of persuasive value elsewhere.
The question then is when C had notice of a refusal. The facts give us one such event, which is E's objection in 1993, when C proposed to sell the property to D. The objection is an assertion by the successor of the vendor that the property cannot be dealt with in the way the agreement contemplates, and it may fairly be read as a refusal to perform. The suit was filed on 6 April 1994, which is within a year of it, and so it falls well inside the three years allowed. The fact that A and B died in 1972 and 1965 does not alter the position, because the rights and liabilities under the contract pass to their successors, who sue and are sued in their place, and the death of a party does not start time. As the Supreme Court said in A. Valliammai v K.P. Murali, AIR 2023 SC 4375, a case about an agreement with no fixed date, time begins from the date on which the plaintiff had notice of the refusal, and the court has to find that date from the evidence. That case also shows the other side of the matter. If the plaintiff has received an earlier written refusal, the period counts from it, and an assignment of the plaintiff's rights does not renew it.
Two points follow which the objection does not raise but which C must be ready to meet. The first is that the notice of refusal must be shown to be real. If the evidence shows that E's predecessor or E refused to perform at some earlier time, for instance in the years after 1964, and that C or A knew of it, then time would have run from that date, and the suit would be late. A refusal may be gathered from the conduct of the parties as well as from words, but it has to be a conduct which makes clear to the plaintiff that the contract will not be carried out. Long silence does not itself amount to a refusal, although it is relevant to what follows. The second point is that limitation is only one hurdle. The agreement was a contingent one, and under section 32 of the Indian Contract Act a contract to do something if an uncertain event happens cannot be enforced until the event has happened. If the permission of the co-owners was never obtained, and was not waived by those entitled to it, C will have to explain how specific performance can be ordered. C must also show that A and his successors were ready and willing to perform throughout, as required by section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, and a delay of nearly thirty years will weigh heavily on that issue and on the court's discretion. Registration of the agreement in 1964 makes no difference to the period, since registration is a matter of proof of the document and does not extend the time for suing on it.
Thus the preliminary objection fails, because a suit that is within three years of the refusal pleaded cannot be dismissed as barred at the outset. This does not mean that C will win. The plaint must state when the refusal was made, and the objection of 1993 must be proved and not an earlier one. The other defences, including the want of permission and the want of readiness and willingness, remain open for decision at the trial.
Three short illustrations may help. In the first, a buyer agrees in 1980 to buy land when the Collector grants sanction. The seller writes in 1998 that he will not sell, and the buyer sues in 2000. The agreement fixed no date, and the suit is within three years of the refusal. In the second, an agreement of 1980 requires the sale to be completed within six months, and nothing is done. The date was fixed, so time ran from the end of the six months in 1980, and a suit in 1990 is barred. In the third, the same sanction agreement of 1980 is met by a written refusal in 1985, and the buyer sues in 1990. The suit is barred, since more than three years have passed from the refusal and the later passage of time cannot revive it.
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