A goes to Germany on study leave. Wife B maintains herself, sometimes takes goods on credit (rice, sarees, gold necklace). Of which goods is A bound to pay?

Wife's Implied Authority and the Doctrine of Necessaries

When A leaves for Germany on study leave, he does not sever his legal obligation to maintain his wife B. The law recognises that a husband who leaves his wife without adequate maintenance, or who is simply absent without making sufficient provision, clothes her with an implied authority to pledge his credit for necessaries. This operates on a well-established intersection of two doctrines under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 — the implied agency of a wife under the law of agency, and the quasi-contractual liability for necessaries under Section 68.

The Foundation: Agency of the Wife

The law has long settled that a wife living with her husband, or left by him without adequate provision, has an implied authority to bind him for necessaries suited to their station in life. The leading principle, confirmed in Debenham v Mellon (1880 AC 24), is that the wife's authority arises from the domestic relationship and extends to articles reasonably required for the household in a manner consistent with the style of living the husband has chosen to maintain. As the courts have put it, a husband who conducts himself as a man of means naturally expects his wife to conduct herself accordingly.

However, the husband's liability is not absolute. He can rebut it by proving: (1) that he expressly warned the tradesman not to supply goods on credit; (2) that the wife was already sufficiently supplied with the articles in question; or (3) that he had furnished her with sufficient funds to purchase the articles without pledging his credit. The Allahabad High Court in Girdhari Lal v Crawford (1885 9 All 147) added that even if the fact of a money allowance was not known to the seller, it still negates the husband's liability — the communication is to the world through the wife's possession of means, not necessarily to each tradesman individually.

Analysing the Three Goods

Now the central question: of the goods taken on credit — rice, sarees, and a gold necklace — which ones bind A?

Rice is an easy case. Food is the paradigmatic necessary. Whether the family is wealthy or modest, food — and rice in particular — is indispensable to sustain life. It falls squarely within the meaning of necessaries under Section 68, which, as the courts have clarified, covers "everything necessary to maintain the person in the state, station, or degree of life in which he is." A is bound to reimburse the supplier of rice without doubt.

Sarees require a closer inquiry into the condition of life and station of the parties. Clothing is unquestionably a necessary — no one disputes that garments essential to daily life must be paid for. The decisive factor is whether the sarees were suited to B's condition in life, and whether she was already sufficiently supplied. The English case of Nash v Inman (1908 2 KB 1) — universally applied in Indian courts — settled the twin-test firmly: the goods must be of a kind suitable to the person's condition, and the person must not already have a sufficient supply of them. The supplier bears the burden of proving both. If the sarees were ordinary items of clothing suited to B's domestic station, A would be liable. If they were of an extravagant number or quality far beyond B's usual standard of living, the court might reduce or deny liability.

The gold necklace stands on very different ground. Jewellery, particularly gold ornaments, has been treated by courts as an article of luxury rather than a necessary. The classical statement from Peters v Fleming (1840 6 M&W 42) is instructive: "All such articles as are purely ornamental are to be rejected, as they cannot be required for anyone." A gold necklace, while treasured in Indian households, is not indispensable to sustaining life or maintaining one's basic station. It belongs to the category of comfort and ornament rather than necessity. A is, therefore, not bound to pay for the gold necklace.

Section 68 and the Quasi-Contractual Foundation

It is worth noting that the liability here does not arise from any real contract between A and the tradesman. A never entered any agreement with them. The obligation is quasi-contractual — imposed by law under Section 68 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which provides that where necessaries suited to the condition of a person legally bound to be supported are supplied by a third party, the supplier is entitled to reimbursement. The liability is not to pay the agreed price but only to reimburse a reasonable amount, and importantly, it is a liability of A's property, not a personal contractual debt in the traditional sense.

The Condition of Sufficient Provision

One caveat cuts across all three goods: if A had left B with a sufficient allowance of money, the entire basis of implied authority collapses. In Mulla's treatment of the Indian Contract Act, it is explicitly recognised that if a husband has made reasonable provision for his wife — either by money or otherwise — the wife's implied authority to pledge his credit is negatived. The shopkeepers who deal with B, after she has been supplied with adequate means, do so at their own risk.

Summary of A's Liability

The law draws this line not arbitrarily, but on the sound principle that a husband who has entrusted his wife to maintain the household in his absence must bear the cost of what the household genuinely needs — not the indulgences that go beyond it.