A intends to murder B, his enemy. He buys a knife for that purpose. A is arrested. Is he guilty of preparation to commit murder?

The Act — And Why It Does Not Constitute an Offence

A buys a knife with the intention of murdering B. He is arrested before he does anything further. The short and direct answer is: A has committed no punishable offence. The act of purchasing a knife, even with the clearest murderous intention in his heart, remains at the stage of preparation — and preparation to commit murder is not punishable under either the Indian Penal Code, 1860 or the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

This is not because the law is indifferent to dangerous intentions. It is because criminal law, built as it is on the twin pillars of mens rea and actus reus, insists that a culpable state of mind must be accompanied by a sufficiently proximate and unequivocal external act before the law can intervene. Buying a knife is an act that thousands of people perform every day for entirely innocent purposes — cooking, farming, craftsmanship. The act is, in itself, equivocal. It does not speak for itself as pointing only and exclusively towards murder.

The Four Stages of Crime

Before arriving at any conclusion about A's liability, it is necessary to recall the architecture that the law imposes on the journey towards a completed crime. Criminal law universally recognises four successive stages: first, the formation of intention to commit the offence; second, preparation — devising and arranging the means necessary for the commission of the contemplated crime; third, attempt — the direct movement towards commission after preparations are complete; and fourth, if the attempt succeeds, the commission of the offence.

The IPC and the BNS leave the first two stages, as a general rule, outside the reach of punishment. Mere intention, however blameworthy, cannot be punished because the law cannot peer into the human mind. And mere preparation — even purposeful preparation — ordinarily escapes punishment because the act is still too remote from the completed crime, still capable of innocent explanation, and still capable of being abandoned. As the Supreme Court stated with authoritative finality in Koppula Venkat Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 2004 SC 1874): "Preparation consists in devising or arranging the means or measures necessary for the commission of an offence. It differs widely from attempt which is the direct movement towards the commission after preparations are made."

The law is clear: preparation to commit murder is not punishable under the IPC or the BNS, unless the preparation specifically falls within one of the very limited exceptions where preparation is itself criminalised — such as preparation to wage war against the Government (Section 122 IPC / Section 147 BNS) or preparation to commit dacoity (Section 399 IPC / Section 310 BNS). Murder is not among those exceptions. No provision of the IPC or the BNS criminalises preparation to commit murder.

Section 307 IPC and Section 109 BNS — Attempt to Murder

Section 307 of the IPC provides: "Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years..."

The corresponding provision under the BNS is Section 109, which is substantially identical in its language and scope.

The crucial phrase in Section 307 — and it bears close reading — is "does any act." The section does not punish intention. It does not punish preparation. It punishes an act done towards the commission of murder. When A merely buys a knife, he has not yet done any act with "such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder." The buying of the knife, taken by itself, cannot cause death. It is too remote from the completed offence of murder. It is a step that precedes attempt — it is preparation.

The statute itself — with rare clarity — addresses this precise situation through an illustration to Section 307 IPC. The illustration reads:

"A, intending to murder B, buys a knife. A has not yet committed the offence defined in this section."

No provision of law could speak more plainly. The legislature, in its wisdom, chose to make this very example part of the statutory text, anticipating exactly the situation before us. A buys a knife to murder B — and commits no offence under Section 307. The illustration is a legislative declaration, not merely a judicial opinion, and it binds the courts.

Section 511 IPC and Section 62 BNS — The General Provision on Attempts

Section 511 of the IPC (mirrored as Section 62 of the BNS) is the general provision that punishes attempts to commit offences for which no specific penal provision already exists in the Code. Section 511 provides punishment for whoever "attempts to commit an offence punishable by this Code with imprisonment for life or imprisonment, and in such attempt does any act towards the commission of the offence."

The operative requirement — "does any act towards the commission of the offence" — must be read as requiring an act that is more than merely preparatory. The Supreme Court in Abhayanand Mishra v. State of Bihar (AIR 1961 SC 1698) explained this requirement with enduring clarity: a person commits an attempt when, having made preparations and with the intention to commit the offence, he "does an act towards its commission." But that act must be a step during the course of committing the offence — not simply a step that might someday lead to it.

Buying a knife, at its highest, is a step taken before the journey towards commission even begins. It equips the offender for the journey but does not start it. Section 511 / Section 62 BNS, therefore, offer A no liability either. Since attempt to commit murder is expressly provided for in Section 307, Section 511 would in any case be inapplicable — but even the principles embedded in Section 511 lead to the same conclusion.

Why Preparation Is Not Punished — The Rationale

The reason the law declines to punish preparation, expressed with rare candour by the authors of the IPC themselves, is threefold. First, it is genuinely difficult to establish beyond reasonable doubt that a preparation was motivated by a specific criminal intention — the person who buys arsenic may intend to kill pests, not people. Second, preparation, being remote from the ultimate crime, does not yet disturb the peace of the community or threaten the specific victim in any immediate or direct sense. Third — and perhaps most importantly — the law values what the Latin doctrine calls locus paenitentiae: the opportunity for repentance. As long as a person remains in the stage of preparation, there is every possibility that he will think better of his design, experience remorse, or simply never proceed further. The law, in its humanity, refuses to slam the door of mercy on a person who has not yet passed the point of no return.

The Supreme Court gave this principle eloquent expression in State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Yakub (AIR 1980 SC 1111): the test for determining whether an act amounts to preparation or attempt is "whether the overt acts already done are such that if the offender changes his mind and does not proceed further in its progress, the acts already done would be completely harmless." If A, having bought the knife, simply puts it in a drawer and never confronts B, no harm has been done to anyone. The knife remains an instrument innocent in itself. This is the hallmark of preparation — its inherent harmlessness if the criminal design is abandoned.

Where the Line Would Have Been Crossed

It is worth pausing to consider at what point A would cross the line into punishable territory, because the illustration to Section 307 itself tells us. The statutory illustration continues:

"A meets B and, armed with the knife, wounds B. A is guilty of attempt to murder."

The critical difference is the act directed at the victim — the knife being raised or thrust at B. At that moment, A's act is no longer equivocal. It speaks for itself. It is proximately and unequivocally aimed at causing B's death. The act — wounding B — is done "under such circumstances that if death ensued, A would be guilty of murder." That is the moment Section 307 IPC / Section 109 BNS is attracted.

Similarly, even pursuing B with the drawn knife, in the view of most commentators, would cross the line — because at that point A has done a direct act towards B's murder, and the criminal design has broken free of A's own control. The proximity, both physical and intentional, to the completed offence is sufficient to constitute attempt. As the Madras High Court observed in T. Munirathnam (AIR 1955 AP 118), when an old man with the intention to shoot the deceased raised his gun, he had commenced his attempt — the external act of raising the weapon at the victim marked the beginning of attempt, regardless of whether the shot was ultimately fired by him or another.

Conclusion on A's Liability

A, having merely purchased a knife with the intention of murdering B, has committed no punishable offence under either the IPC or the BNS. The act stands firmly within the stage of preparation. The statutory illustration to Section 307 IPC itself so declares. No provision of the IPC or the BNS makes preparation to commit murder a crime. A retains his locus paenitentiae — he has not yet taken any act towards B, and the acts done, if he were to change his mind, would be completely harmless. The law does not punish him — not because it approves of his intention, but because it wisely refuses to convict a person on the basis of intention alone, unaccompanied by a proximate, unequivocal, and dangerous act directed at the victim.