Admissibility of Admissions and FIR Confessions under BSA/IEA

Part I: Refusing to Sell Below Market Price — Admission in Favour of the Maker

The Question and Its Legal Home

A is charged with receiving stolen goods knowing them to be stolen. The critical element is not the act of receiving, but the accompanying knowledge. A now wishes to prove that he refused to sell the goods below their market price. The argument is obvious — a man who insisted on the full market value must have believed the goods were legitimate; a knowing receiver of stolen property, who fears exposure, would typically sell quickly and cheaply. The question is whether this evidence is admissible.

At first glance, the problem seems to run into a fundamental obstacle. The general rule, which flows from Section 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (corresponding to Section 19 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023), is that admissions — statements that suggest an inference as to a fact in issue — may be proved against the person who makes them, but cannot ordinarily be proved by or on behalf of the maker. The reason is self-evident: if a person could prove his own favourable statements, every accused would conveniently produce self-serving declarations at will.

The Saving Exception

However, Section 21 itself carves out an exception that is directly applicable here. Clause (3) of the proviso provides that an admission may be proved by or on behalf of the person making it, if it is relevant otherwise than as an admission. This is the crucial gateway. The question is no longer whether the statement is an admission, but whether it is otherwise relevant under some other provision of the Act.

The behaviour of refusing to sell below market value is not merely a statement of words — it is conduct that goes directly to the state of mind of A, and is therefore relevant under Section 14 of the IEA (Section 12 of the BSA), which makes facts showing a state of mind such as knowledge or good faith relevant when that state of mind is in issue. A's refusal to undersell speaks directly and specifically to the question of whether he knew the goods were stolen. It is not a general declaration of innocence; it is a particular piece of conduct connected intimately with the transaction in question, pointing to an innocent state of mind at the relevant moment.

This is precisely the situation contemplated by Illustration (d) to Section 21 of the IEA, which in terms provides: "A is accused of receiving stolen goods knowing them to be stolen. He offers to prove that he refused to sell them below their value. A may prove these statements, though they are admissions, because they are explanatory of conduct influenced by facts in issue." The BSA, 2023 retains the same illustration under Section 19. The conduct of refusing to sell below value is directly influenced by — and in turn illuminates — the question of whether A knew the goods were stolen at the time he received them.

The Governing Principle

The principle that emerges is one of functional relevance. The evidence is not admitted because A says "I am innocent" — that would be a bare self-serving statement. It is admitted because it constitutes actual conduct at the time of the transaction, bearing on a fact in issue, namely A's state of mind. A man who insists on full market value is displaying the consciousness of a legitimate owner, not the panic of a receiver of stolen property. Admissibility here flows from Section 14/12 BSA, and Section 21/19 BSA provides the exception that removes the general bar against a party proving his own admissions.

The evidence is, therefore, clearly admissible.

Part II: The Self-Lodged FIR as Evidence in a Murder Trial

The Unusual Scenario

Here, A kills his aunt and himself marches to the police station to lodge an FIR narrating the facts. He is subsequently prosecuted for murder on the basis of this FIR. No other evidence is given. At the trial, A does not plead guilty.

The legal landscape here is complex, because the document in question has a peculiar dual character. It is an FIR — an information given to the police about the commission of a cognizable offence. It is also a statement of the accused made to a police officer. And at the time of trial, it operates as an admission against its maker. Each of these angles creates a distinct legal difficulty.

The Bar of Section 25 IEA / Section 23 BSA

The first and most serious obstacle is Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act (corresponding to Section 23 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023), which provides, in unambiguous terms: "No confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence." This is an absolute bar with no exceptions. The rationale was stated with great frankness by the Allahabad High Court in Queen-Empress v. Babu Lal (ILR 1884 6 All 509) — the police had an unfortunate history of extorting confessions, and the legislature drew a bright line to protect the accused from the consequences of any statement made to police, however voluntarily made.

If A's FIR amounts to a confession — that is, a direct or implied acknowledgment of guilt — then Section 25/Section 23 BSA bars its use against him entirely. However, an important question arises: is every FIR lodged by an accused a "confession" within the meaning of Section 25?

A confession is a clear and unambiguous acknowledgment of guilt. If A in his FIR has admitted to killing his aunt, that is unquestionably a confessional statement to a police officer and falls squarely under the Section 25 bar.

The Trap of Relying on the FIR Alone

Even setting aside the Section 25 bar, consider the further difficulty under Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (now Section 180 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), which mandates that no statement recorded by a police officer during investigation shall be used for any purpose except to contradict the maker. An FIR, even if it does not amount to a confession, cannot be used as substantive evidence of the facts stated in it.

The prosecution's position is even more precarious because no other evidence was adduced. Even assuming for a moment that the FIR could be treated as an admission — a statement falling short of confession — rather than a confession, the general principle remains that admissions, even if admissible, are not conclusive proof of the facts admitted, as is expressly stated in Section 31 IEA (Section 25 BSA). They are only one piece of evidence, to be weighed with the rest.

The Result: A Cannot Be Convicted

A did not plead guilty at trial. The FIR, even if brought into evidence under some theory, amounts at best to an unretracted admission or a retracted confession. As the Supreme Court stated in Pyare Lal Bhargava v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1963 SC 1094), a retracted confession may form the legal basis of conviction if the court is satisfied it was voluntarily made and true — but this is a rule of prudence requiring corroboration, and no corroboration exists here.

The law is settled that an accused cannot be convicted on the basis of an FIR alone, with no other independent evidence. A's subsequent refusal to plead guilty is not treated as a confession; he is entitled to put the prosecution to proof of every element of the charge. Since no evidence was given apart from the FIR — which is both inadmissible as a police confession under Section 25 and cannot constitute sole proof in any event — the prosecution must fail.

The outcome is clear: A's prosecution based solely on the self-lodged FIR, without any other evidence, is legally insufficient to sustain a conviction.

Part III: X's Deathbed Confession to the Murder of B — Admissibility in A's Trial

The Core Difficulty

This is one of the most intellectually engaging problems in evidence law. X, on his deathbed, confesses that he murdered B. A is on trial for the death of B. The question is whether X's confession can be admitted as evidence in A's trial to exonerate A — or, more precisely, to show that someone else committed the very act for which A is being prosecuted.

The law of confessions under Sections 24–30 IEA (Sections 22–24 BSA) regulates confessions by an accused person in a criminal proceeding. X is not an accused. He is a dead man who made a statement implicating himself. A is the one on trial. The ordinary confession rules, which deal with voluntariness, police custody, and joint-trial effects, therefore do not directly apply to X's statement. The question must be approached through a different gateway entirely.

The Relevant Gateway: Section 32(3) IEA — Declaration Against Interest

Section 32(3) of the Indian Evidence Act (corresponding to Section 26, Clause (c) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023) provides that the statement of a person who is dead is a relevant fact when "the statement is against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the person making it, or when, if true, it would expose him or would have exposed him to a criminal prosecution." The principle behind this clause is that a person is not likely to make a statement against his own interest unless it is true. Self-interest induces caution; a statement that damages one's own position has an intrinsic ring of credibility.

X's deathbed confession that he murdered B is precisely the kind of statement contemplated by this clause. If true, it would expose X to a criminal prosecution for murder. The fact that X is already dying — and in the event, dead — does not affect the analysis of admissibility, though it goes to the weight the court might attach to such a statement. The statement was against X's own interest (exposing him to prosecution) at the time it was made, which is the test.

The commentary confirms this interpretation. It was held in Nga Po Yin v. King-Emperor (1906 UBR Evi 1904-06) that the confession of an accused person who is dead, implicating himself and an accomplice in a crime, is admissible under this clause and is not excluded by Illustration (b) to Section 30. The principle extends naturally to a case where a deceased person's confession exonerates another who is currently on trial.

The Limiting Principle

There is, however, a critical limitation. The commentary under Section 26(c) of the BSA/Section 32(3) IEA makes clear: "A statement made by a person against whom there is, already, in existence evidence which would lead to his prosecution and conviction, is inadmissible in evidence under this clause." In other words, the declaration must be made before criminal proceedings have commenced against the declarant — the clause cannot be used as a shield by someone who is already being investigated or prosecuted. X's statement, being a deathbed confession before any proceedings against him, satisfies this requirement.

Admissibility Confirmed, But Weight is a Separate Matter

To directly answer the question: Yes, X's deathbed confession that he murdered B is admissible evidence in A's trial. It is admissible as a statement of a deceased person against his own penal interest under Section 32(3) IEA / Section 26(c) BSA.

The court in A's trial will receive X's statement as a relevant fact. However — and this is of the utmost importance — its admissibility does not automatically mean it will be acted upon or that A must be acquitted on account of it alone. The weight to be given to such a statement is entirely for the court to determine. A dying man's confession, however sincere it might appear, cannot be cross-examined. Its reliability depends on the surrounding circumstances — whether X had any reason to make a false statement, whether the details are consistent with the other evidence in the case, and whether X was in a sound mental state when he made it. A court of conscience would weigh all of this carefully before allowing X's confession to override a prosecution built on other independent evidence. But if the prosecution's case against A is itself weak or inconclusive, X's confession may well tilt the scales in A's favour, or at least create a reasonable doubt that the law requires to be resolved in the accused's favour.