'A' is accused of the murder of 'B'. 'A' wrote a letter addressed to his friend 'C' stating that he had committed that crime. The letter fell into the hands of a police officer. Are the contents of this letter relevant as evidence against 'A'? Also: A warden of a prison promised to post a letter given to him by a prisoner which contained confession signed by the prisoner. Instead of posting, the warden sent the letter to the Public Prosecutor. Is it admissible as a confession?

The Letter that Fell Into Police Hands, and the Warden's Betrayal: The Law on Confessional Letters

Understanding the Two Problems

Both situations placed before us involve written confessions — one a letter addressed to a friend that was intercepted by the police, and the other a signed confessional letter handed by a prisoner to his warden with the understanding it would be posted but which was instead forwarded to the Public Prosecutor. Though both involve paper and ink, the underlying legal questions are different, and the law governing them invokes distinct provisions. The first turns on the meaning of the phrase "made to a police officer" in Section 25 of the IEA (= Section 23(1) of the BSA, 2023). The second turns on the operation of Section 29 of the IEA (= Second Proviso to Section 22 of the BSA, 2023), which deals with confessions obtained under a promise of secrecy or through deception.

Part I: The Letter Addressed to Friend C — Is It a Confession to a Police Officer?

A writes a letter to his friend C admitting that he committed the murder of B. The letter never reaches C. It falls into the hands of a police officer. The first and most important question is: does this letter amount to a confession made to a police officer within the absolute prohibition of Section 25 of the IEA?

Section 25 says "No confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence." The phrase "made to" is the critical expression. It connotes communication — a deliberate act of addressing a statement to a particular person. A letter written and addressed to a friend C is, by its very nature, intended for C. It is not addressed to the police officer. The fact that it accidentally or incidentally fell into the hands of a police officer does not transform it into a confession made to that police officer.

The Supreme Court settled this question in the leading case of Sita Ram v. State of U.P. (AIR 1966 SC 1906). The Court held that "a confession contained in a letter written and signed by the accused and addressed to a police officer was held to be admissible as the letter was not written in the presence of the police officer." More directly relevant to our facts, the Gujarat High Court in Himmat Singh v. State of Gujarat (AIR 1965 Guj. 802) examined the precise question of what the words "made to" mean in Section 25 and held: "The significant words to be noticed are 'made' and 'to' and these should be given due weight. These words also definitely imply that there should be some direct or indirect nexus or connection between the person making the statement and the police officer." In Himmat Singh, a confessional letter found in the pocket of the accused who was in an unconscious state was held to be admissible because the letter was not made to the police officer — there was no communicative nexus between the accused and the police officer at the time of making the confession.

Applying this to A's letter addressed to friend C: A wrote the letter to C, not to any police officer. The letter was intended for C. It merely fell into the hands of a police officer. There is no direct or indirect communicative nexus between A and the police officer at the time the letter was written. The bar of Section 25 does not apply. The confession is admissible in evidence.

The Letter as an Extra-Judicial Confession

Since the letter falls outside Section 25 (and outside Section 26, as A was not in police custody when he wrote it), it is treated as an extra-judicial confession — a confession made otherwise than before a Magistrate or in court. An extra-judicial confession in a letter addressed to a friend is a perfectly well-recognised category of admissible evidence. As the Supreme Court held in Kishore Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh (AIR 1990 SC 2140): "An unambiguous extra-judicial confession possesses high probative value as it emanates from the person who committed the crime and is admissible in evidence provided it is free from suspicion and suggestion of any falsity."

The authenticity of the letter, the fact that it was signed by A, the circumstance that it was addressed to an intimate friend to whom A might naturally communicate such a matter — all these go to the reliability and weight of the confession. The letter is relevant under Section 21 of the IEA (= Section 19 of the BSA, 2023) as an admission made by the accused against his own interest. It is also receivable as a piece of evidence tending to prove the guilt of the accused, and the court may, in conjunction with other independent evidence, convict A on the basis of it. However, courts always approach extra-judicial confessions with caution. As reiterated in Narayan Singh v. State of M.P. (AIR 1985 SC 1678): "It is not open to the court trying the criminal case to start with a presumption that extra-judicial confession is always a weak type of evidence. It would depend on the nature of the circumstances, the time when the confession is made and the credibility of the witnesses who speak for such a confession."

The Crucial Caution: The Sitaram Distinction

There is one nuance that must be honestly addressed. The courts have also observed — in the passage from Sita Ram — that while a letter addressed to a police officer may be admissible because it was not made in the presence of the officer, a court must be alert to the possibility of the police manufacturing or procuring such letters. The commentators have rightly pointed out that "the very purpose of section 25 can be easily defeated by the police getting confessions addressed to a police officer sent by post." This warning applies equally in reverse — the police should not be getting confessions addressed to third parties to escape section 25 on technical grounds. However, on the facts before us, A addressed the letter genuinely to his friend C, and its interception by the police was apparently fortuitous. There is nothing to suggest manipulation. The confession is therefore admissible and is entitled to the weight that a voluntary, written, and signed extra-judicial confession deserves.

Part II: The Warden's Betrayal — The Prison Letter to the Public Prosecutor

This second problem is a classic examination of Section 29 of the IEA (= Second Proviso to Section 22 of the BSA, 2023). The prisoner, while in judicial custody, gives the warden a signed confessional letter with the express understanding that the warden will post it. Instead, the warden sends it to the Public Prosecutor. The prisoner clearly relied on a promise — either express or implied — that the letter would be communicated privately and not to the prosecution.

Section 29 of the IEA (= Second Proviso, Section 22 of the BSA, 2023) provides explicitly: "If such a confession is otherwise relevant, it does not become irrelevant merely because it was made under a promise of secrecy, or in consequence of a deception practised on the accused person, or when he was drunk, or because it was made in answer to questions which he need not have answered, whatever may have been the form of those questions, or because he was not warned that he was not bound to make such confession, and that evidence of it might be given against him."

The provision is stark and deliberately so: a confession is not rendered inadmissible merely because it was made under a promise of secrecy or in consequence of deception practised on the accused. The warden promised to post the letter. That promise of secrecy — that the letter would go only to C and not to the prosecution — was clearly broken. The accused was deceived into handing over the letter. Section 29 directly addresses this situation and declares that such deception does not render the confession inadmissible.

Why Section 29 Operates as It Does — The Rationale

Section 29 operates on a distinct philosophical premise from Sections 24, 25, and 26. Those sections exclude confessions because of the risk of involuntariness arising from inducement, threat, promise, or police coercion. The assumption is that such external pressures may have produced a false confession. Section 29, by contrast, addresses a situation where the confession was made voluntarily — the accused chose to write the letter and reveal his guilt — but the mode of transmission involved deception or a broken promise of secrecy. The law takes the view that the voluntariness of the confession is not affected by the deception. The accused made the confession freely; the deception went only to the manner in which it came to light. As the Supreme Court quoted with approval in numerous decisions, the rationale is that "an admission made to a stranger, under whatever terms as to secrecy, is not protected by law from disclosure."

The Distinction from Section 24

The critical distinction must be drawn between this situation and one governed by Section 24. Under Section 24, if the promise held out was one of advantage in the proceedings — such as "confess and I will ensure you get a lighter sentence" or "write this letter and I will arrange for you to be freed" — the confession would be inadmissible because the promise was of a temporal and procedural nature. The promise made by the warden in our problem was not of that character. He merely promised to post the letter — a promise of communication, not of criminal advantage. The broken promise affects the conduct of the warden, not the voluntariness of the prisoner's confession. The prisoner confessed because he wished to communicate with someone, not because he was induced by the promise to confess.

The Application and Conclusion

The prisoner's signed confession — forwarded by the warden to the Public Prosecutor — is admissible in evidence under Section 29 of the IEA (Second Proviso, Section 22 of the BSA, 2023). The deception practised by the warden does not render it inadmissible. Since the prisoner was in judicial custody — and not in police custody — the bar of Section 26 does not apply (the bar under Section 26 attaches to confessions made while in the custody of a police officer). Since the confession was not made to the warden in his capacity as any person in authority over the criminal proceedings, Section 24 also does not bite. The confession stands as a voluntary extra-judicial confession in writing, signed by the prisoner, and is receivable in evidence.

A jailor and, by analogy, a prison warden, has been held to be not a police officer, and a confession made to him may be given in evidence. As the authority in Queen-Empress v. Bhima (1892 17 Bom 485) established, and as consistently followed thereafter, a jailor is categorically not a police officer for the purposes of either Section 25 or Section 26.

The Comparative Position in a Single View

Both confessions, therefore, are admissible. In the first case, the letter is a voluntary extra-judicial confession not hit by Section 25 because it was never addressed to a police officer. In the second, the signed prison letter is admissible under Section 29, which expressly preserves the admissibility of confessions obtained through broken promises of secrecy or deception. The moral conduct of the intermediaries — whether a police officer who intercepted a letter or a warden who betrayed a prisoner's trust — is irrelevant to the legal question of the confession's admissibility. The law looks at whether the confession itself was voluntary, and in both these cases, the accused made his confession freely, from his own mind, without any pressure of the kind that the exclusionary provisions were designed to protect against.