A suit is filed claiming ownership of property. During the suit, the defendant transfers the property to a bona fide purchaser. Discuss the purchaser's rights.

The scenario of a defendant selling the disputed property during a pending ownership suit is one of the most instructive settings in which the doctrine of lis pendens, embodied in section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, reveals its full character. The purchaser acquires title, yet that title is burdened — permanently and irrevocably — by the outcome of the litigation he never attended.

The Governing Principle

Section 52 rests on the Latin maxim ut lite pendente nihil innovetur — nothing new shall be introduced into a pending litigation. The principle was articulated with great clarity in the celebrated English case of Bellamy v Sabine, where Turner LJ observed that it would plainly be impossible for any suit to be brought to a successful termination if alienations pendente lite were permitted to prevail — the plaintiff would be liable in every case to be defeated by the defendant's alienation and would be driven to commence his proceedings afresh, only to be defeated again by the same stratagem. Lord Cranworth in the same case added a thought that carries special importance for the question at hand: the doctrine does not affect a purchaser because it amounts to notice of the suit, but because the law does not allow litigants to give to others, during the pendency of litigation, rights in the property in dispute so as to prejudice the opposite party.

Bona Fides Are Completely Irrelevant

This is perhaps the most striking and decisive consequence for the purchaser in the given problem. He may have paid full market value. He may have acted with complete honesty. He may have conducted all the due diligence that a reasonable buyer would undertake. None of this assists him. The principle of lis pendens under section 52 is a principle of public policy, and the question of good faith or bona fide is therefore totally irrelevant to its application. It was firmly settled by the Kerala High Court in Govindapillai v Aiyyappan Krishnan (AIR 1957 Ker 10) that the foundation of the doctrine does not vest upon notice, actual or constructive, but rests solely upon necessity — the necessity that neither party to a litigation should alienate the property in dispute so as to affect his opponent.

This irrelevance of bona fides is what distinguishes section 52 from most other protective doctrines in property law. Under sections 41 and 51, a bona fide purchaser for value without notice receives the law's protection. But the Supreme Court settled in Amit Kumar Shaw v Farida Khatoon (AIR 2005 SC 2209) that in the case of a transfer hit by lis pendens, those protections yield entirely — a purchaser during litigation cannot seek shelter under section 41 and cannot be considered a bona fide transferee without notice.

The Transfer Is Valid but Subservient

It is equally important to understand what section 52 does not do. It does not strike down or annul the transfer. The sale deed executed in favour of the purchaser is perfectly valid between the seller and himself. As the Supreme Court put it in A. Nawab John v V.N. Subramaniyam (2012 7 SCC 738), such a transfer is not void, but it remains subject to the decision of the court — the purchaser would be entitled to enjoy or suffer the same legal rights and obligations of his transferor as may eventually be determined. The transfer, in other words, is conditional on the outcome of the suit: if the plaintiff's claim to ownership fails, the purchaser retains the property unaffected; if the plaintiff succeeds and obtains a decree declaring ownership, the purchaser must yield.

Bound by the Decree as Though He Were a Party

The most consequential legal position of the purchaser is that he is bound by the decree passed in the suit just as much as if he had been a party to it. He puts himself in privity with the suit and must be treated not as a stranger to the litigation but as a party — consequently bound by the terms of any decree in full. This means the purchaser cannot, when the successful plaintiff seeks to execute the decree and take possession, obstruct the execution proceedings. Courts have made it clear that a lis pendens purchaser who causes obstruction in execution cannot require the court to decide his objection like a separate suit, and he has no right to question the legality or propriety of the decree passed against his seller.

Whether the Purchaser Can Be Made a Party

A natural question arises: can the purchaser at least participate in the suit and defend his interest? The law's answer is carefully calibrated. The purchaser is not entitled as of right to be made a party to the pending suit. The court, however, has a discretion under Order XXII, Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code to permit his impleadment, and would ordinarily exercise that discretion in his favour if his interest in the subject matter is substantial and not peripheral. A Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Chappidi Subbareddy v Chappidi Narapureddy (AIR 2006 AP 662) laid down a detailed framework: the purchaser may seek leave to come on record; if he does not do so, it is at his own peril; and if he remains unrepresented, he is still bound by the judgment as though he were present.

There is one important safety valve. Where the seller-defendant, having parted with the property and having no real interest left to protect, does not defend the suit properly and even colludes with the plaintiff, the purchaser may be permitted to join the suit so as to put forward a genuine defence of his own interests. The Orissa High Court in Shantilata Masanta v Rajanimani Nayak (AIR 2007 Ori 69) held precisely this — that where the transferor-defendant colludes with the plaintiff after alienating the property, the lis pendens purchaser may be allowed to come on record and he would be entitled to be heard on the merits.

When the Suit Is for Ownership

In an ownership suit, the right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question — which is precisely the requirement section 52 contemplates. The purchaser of such property during the pendency of the suit therefore squarely falls within the doctrine. If the plaintiff establishes ownership and gets a decree for declaration of title and possession, the purchaser is bound by that decree. He has no independent title that can prevail against the plaintiff's judicially declared right. A defendant, in the emphatic words of the courts, cannot by alienating the property during the pendency of litigation deprive the successful plaintiff of the fruits of his case.

The Only Real Safety

The purchaser's only real security lies outside the courtroom — in getting a proper indemnity from his seller at the time of purchase for the risk he is knowingly or unknowingly assuming, and in pursuing the seller for the consideration paid if the decree goes against him. The law of property does not protect him from the litigation; it protects only the parties to that litigation. The bona fide purchaser, in this domain, simply holds title under a cloud that only the court's final word can lift or confirm.