A suit is filed where neither plaintiff nor defendant resides, but the cause of action arose there. Is the suit maintainable?

Section 20 and Its Three Limbs

Section 20 governs territorial jurisdiction in personal actions — suits that do not relate to immovable property. The section, after the words "subject to the limitations aforesaid," provides that every suit shall be instituted in a court within whose jurisdiction —

• (a) the defendant actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or

• (b) any of several defendants so resides or works, with leave of the court or acquiescence of other defendants; or

• (c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.

These three limbs are disjunctive — joined by the word "or." The plaintiff is not required to satisfy all three. Satisfying any one of them is sufficient to clothe the court with territorial jurisdiction. This is the most important structural feature of Section 20, and it answers the question in a single sentence: since clause (c) independently confers jurisdiction on the court where the cause of action arises, the residence of neither party is a relevant consideration when the cause of action test is invoked.

The Object Behind Clause (c)

The underlying philosophy of Section 20 is to bring justice as near as possible to every man's hearthstone, and to ensure that the defendant is not put to the trouble and expense of travelling long distances merely to defend himself. But the legislature was equally conscious that the cause of action — the bundle of facts which gives rise to the plaintiff's right to sue — has an organic connection to a particular place, and that place is a natural and rational forum for the litigation.

It would be perverse to hold that a court loses jurisdiction merely because neither party happens to reside within its territorial limits, when the entire transaction forming the basis of the dispute took place before that very court. The witnesses are there, the evidence is there, and the facts can most conveniently be examined there. Clause (c) recognises this reality and converts it into a jurisdictional anchor.

"Wholly or in Part" — The Breadth of Clause (c)

The legislature has used the phrase "wholly or in part" with deliberate generosity. A cause of action is not a single event — it is, as the courts have consistently described it, a bundle of facts which are necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to succeed in his suit. Each constituent fact of that bundle which must be proved is, in itself, capable of grounding jurisdiction under clause (c).

In a suit for breach of contract, for instance, the cause of action consists of the making of the contract, the terms agreed upon, the obligation to perform, the act of breach, and the refusal to remedy. If even one of these facts arose within the territorial limits of a particular court, clause (c) is satisfied and that court has jurisdiction — regardless of where the parties reside. The second illustration appended to Section 20 makes this pellucidly clear: A resides at Simla, B at Calcutta and C at Delhi — yet they execute a promissory note at Benaras. A may sue B and C at Benaras where the cause of action arose. Neither A, nor B, nor C resides at Benaras. The suit is entirely maintainable there.

The Plaintiff Cannot Sue Where He Resides Alone

The corollary of this analysis is equally important and frequently misunderstood. While the defendant's residence under clause (a) is a recognised ground for jurisdiction, the plaintiff's own residence is never, by itself, a ground for jurisdiction under Section 20. The section is not designed around the convenience of the person who chooses to sue. A cannot drag a defendant to A's home court merely because A lives there. If the cause of action arose elsewhere and the defendant resides elsewhere, the plaintiff must go to one of those forums — not insist on his own place of residence.

This principle was illustrated in the context of service law: where an employee was residing at one place but was employed at another, it was held that the suit could not be instituted at the place of his residence merely because he happened to live there, since no part of the cause of action arose there.

Cause of Action as the Connecting Thread

The courts have recognised that the expression "cause of action" in clause (c) must be interpreted purposively and not pedantically. In Sonic Surgical v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. (2010) 1 SCC 135, the Supreme Court reiterated that it should be a court's endeavour to locate the place where the cause of action has substantially arisen, rather than allowing plaintiffs to found jurisdiction on remote or tangential connections to a particular territory. A mere pretextual or artificial connection — such as a letter written incidentally from a place — will not constitute the "cause of action" arising there.

At the same time, the court must not be overly restrictive. Even a partial cause of action is sufficient. The Supreme Court in World Tanker Carrier Corporation v. SNP Shipping Services Pvt. Ltd. (AIR 1998 SC 2330) and other decisions has confirmed that wherever any integral fact forming part of the cause of action occurred, that court acquires jurisdiction — and this is so even though neither party has any residential or business connection with that place.

Conclusion

The suit is therefore fully maintainable. The residence of the parties is relevant only when the plaintiff chooses to invoke clauses (a) or (b) of Section 20. When clause (c) is the foundation — and the cause of action arose at the place of filing — neither the plaintiff's nor the defendant's residence anywhere else can deprive the court of its jurisdiction. Indeed, one may go further and say that the court where the cause of action arose is, in most cases, the most appropriate forum — for it is there that the evidence lies, the witnesses reside, and the facts can be most effectively examined. The Code of Civil Procedure recognises this, and Section 20(c) translates it into a clear, workable rule.