A sum of Rs. 22,400 was payable to X on 01.08.1962 against a Life Insurance Policy. LIC paid Rs. 18,205 to X after deducting second loan but inadvertently did not deduct first loan of Rs. 14,474. This mistake was discovered on 20.05.1966, and suit filed on 08.07.1967. It is barred by time. LIC relies on Section 17. Decide whether suit is within time.
The suit is by the LIC to recover the Rs 14,474 which it paid to X by mistake. X's plea is that the suit is out of time. The issue is the application of section 17(1)(c) of the Limitation Act, 1963, which provides that where a suit or application is for relief from the consequences of a mistake, the period of limitation does not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the mistake or could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered it. Since the facts belong to the 1960s a purist would also ask which Act governed. The problem is plainly one for section 17 of the 1963 Act, and the discussion proceeds on that footing.
Start with the cause of action. The LIC paid more than it should have, and a suit to recover the excess is a suit for money paid by mistake. Money paid under a mistake has been treated as money received by the defendant for the plaintiff's use, to which Article 24 applies, and in any event the residuary article gives the same three years. The period would ordinarily run from the date of the payment, which was on or soon after 1 August 1962. Three years from that date ended in August 1965, and the suit filed on 8 July 1967 is therefore barred unless section 17 postpones the start.
Section 17 changes the starting point. If section 17(1)(c) applies, the period begins on the date the mistake was discovered or could with reasonable diligence have been discovered. The LIC says it discovered the omission on 20 May 1966. The day of discovery is excluded under section 12(1), so the three years run from 21 May 1966 to 20 May 1969, and a suit instituted on 8 July 1967, a little over thirteen months after discovery, is well within that period. The suit is therefore within time if the LIC has brought itself within section 17.
Whether it has depends on the one question the section leaves open, which is reasonable diligence. The section does not shelter a party who could have found the mistake sooner by taking ordinary care. The Supreme Court has said that diligence is relative to the circumstances, and that a plaintiff who is at fault for not exercising diligence when the circumstances demanded it cannot rely on the section (Saranpal Kaur Anand v Praduman Singh Chandhok, (2022) 8 SCC 401). If the defendant disputes the date of discovery, the plaintiff has to show that he could not have found the mistake earlier. The point cuts both ways here. On the one hand, the error was an inadvertent omission in the LIC's own records of a loan that the LIC itself had granted, and X will say that a corporation which keeps proper accounts and checks them before paying out should have noticed it at the time of payment. On the other hand, the section is intended for exactly the case of an inadvertent error, and a single clerical omission in the handling of one policy does not of itself show want of diligence. What matters is whether anything in the LIC's ordinary processes, such as an audit, a reconciliation or a later statement to X, would have shown the unpaid loan before May 1966, and the burden of showing that nothing would is on the LIC.
The decision, therefore, is as follows. The suit is within time on the stated facts, because it was filed within three years of the discovery of the mistake on 20 May 1966, provided that the LIC proves that the mistake was not discoverable earlier with reasonable diligence. If X shows that the LIC's own records disclosed the first loan at the time of payment, or at any earlier date that falls more than three years before 8 July 1967, then the period began then and the suit would be barred. On the facts given in the question, nothing points to earlier discovery, and the better view is that section 17 saves the suit.
A last point is that the section postpones the start of limitation and does not extend the period, so the LIC cannot add the interval after discovery to the original three years. It gets a new start of three years from discovery, which is more than enough here.
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