A victim of rape while coming back to village was weeping and abusing the accused. State what part of fact is relevant and in what form. Also: In a charge of murder of 'K' where the prosecution case is that on the day of incident the accused uttered a threat that he would finish off 'K' and then after also kill himself. Is the evidence admissible to show that the accused tried to kill 'K'?

Problem I: The Rape Victim Returning — Weeping and Abusing the Accused

The Facts and the Question

A victim of rape is on her way back to the village after the outrage. She is weeping and abusing the accused. The question is: what part of these facts is relevant, under which provision, and in what form?

This problem requires the student to look carefully at three distinct legal categories: (i) the conduct of the victim — her weeping, her demeanour, her physical state; (ii) the complaint she makes — the words of abuse directed at the accused; and (iii) the evidential form in which all this is admissible.

The Conduct: Section 8 IEA / Section 6 BSA

The first point to appreciate is that the victim's weeping and her disturbed physical and emotional condition while returning from the scene of the rape is her conduct, directly influenced by the fact in issue — namely, the commission of rape upon her. Section 8 of the IEA (Section 6 of the BSA) makes relevant the conduct of any person "an offence against whom is the subject of any proceeding," where such conduct is influenced by a fact in issue or relevant fact.

A person who has just been subjected to rape does not walk home cheerfully. Her weeping, her dishevelled appearance, her distressed demeanour — all of this is the natural and direct aftermath of the outrage inflicted upon her. This conduct is influenced by the very fact that is in issue — that she was ravished. Illustration (j) to Section 8 of the IEA (and its equivalent in Section 6 of the BSA) specifically addresses this situation, stating: "The question is, whether A was ravished. The facts that, shortly after the alleged rape, she made a complaint relating to the crime, the circumstances under which, and the terms in which, the complaint was made, are relevant."

The conduct here — weeping, visible distress, the manner in which she returned — is relevant as conduct of the victim influenced by the fact in issue under Section 8 IEA / Section 6 BSA. It is admissible to show that her behaviour was consistent with her account of being raped.

The Words — A "Complaint" or a Mere Statement?

The abusive words directed at the accused constitute a more interesting evidential question. Here, a crucial distinction must be drawn between a complaint and a mere statement. Section 8 of the IEA / Section 6 BSA renders a complaint relevant as a form of conduct, because a complaint evidences the feelings of the victim and her natural response to the outrage — it is not just words, it is an act reflecting her state of mind. Illustration (j) draws this distinction explicitly: "The fact that, without making a complaint, she said that she had been ravished is not relevant as conduct under this section."

A complaint, in this context, is understood as a natural, spontaneous expression of the agony and indignation of the victim — a "pouring forth of her grief," as the courts have said. When the victim, on her way back to the village, weeps and abuses the accused, those words — particularly if directed towards others within hearing, expressing that she was wronged — carry the character of a complaint. The circumstances in which the complaint was made and the terms in which it was made are both relevant. The law does not require the complaint to be in any formal or precise language. An expression of anguish, grief, and accusation while still under the stress of the assault would satisfy the requirement.

The Spontaneous Cries as Res Gestae: Section 6 IEA / Section 4 BSA

There is a further dimension. If the victim's weeping and the words she utters while returning — abusing the accused — are substantially contemporaneous with the transaction of rape and are spontaneous, they may qualify as part of the same transaction under Section 6 IEA / Section 4 BSA. The test is the one laid down in Ratten v. R (1971) 3 All ER 801 by Lord Wilberforce — was the statement made in such circumstances of spontaneity and involvement in the event that the possibility of concoction can be disregarded?

The Supreme Court applied this principle in Rameshwar, Son of Kalyan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1952 SC 54), holding that where an eight-year-old rape victim, immediately after regaining consciousness, told her mother about the rape, her conduct was natural and spontaneous and formed part of res gestae under Section 6. The Court articulated that the test of "naturalness" is a component of the test of spontaneity. A woman who has just been raped weeping and abusing her attacker on her way home — while still under the overwhelming and immediate pressure of the assault — satisfies both the tests of spontaneity and contemporaneity. Her distressed state carries what Lord Wilberforce called "its own stamp of spontaneity."

In Subrati v. State of UP (Allahabad, 2016), the Court held that the statement of the mother of a rape victim immediately after the incident was relevant under Section 6. The conduct of the victim herself, making utterances in her distressed state, would a fortiori be relevant on the same ground.

The Form of Admissibility

The victim's weeping and abusive words, being relevant under Section 6 IEA (as spontaneous and contemporaneous), are substantive evidence — they stand on their own as proof of the relevant facts, not merely as corroboration. The conduct relevant under Section 8 IEA is also substantive evidence of her state and her natural reaction to the outrage. If the victim herself is available to testify, her conduct and complaint will corroborate her testimony. If she is not available but witnesses who observed her state on the way back are called, they can depose to what they saw and heard — her weeping, her words — and this evidence is admissible under Section 6 as part of the transaction, and under Section 8 as her conduct influenced by the fact in issue.

What is not admissible under Section 8 as conduct is a mere statement made without complaint — a bare assertion to a friend, without the spontaneous and emotional character of a genuine complaint. The distinction, as the illustration makes clear, is between words that carry the character of conduct (a complaint born of anguish and emotion) and words that are simply narration.

Problem II: The Threat to Kill 'K' — Is Evidence of the Prior Threat Admissible?

The Facts and the Question

On the day of an incident in which K is murdered, the accused uttered a threat that he would "finish off K" and then kill himself. The question is whether this evidence — the prior threat — is admissible to show that the accused tried to kill K.

The answer is an unambiguous yes. This evidence is admissible, and admissible under not one but multiple provisions of the IEA / BSA.

Section 8 IEA / Section 6 BSA: Motive and Previous Conduct

Section 8 of the IEA (Section 6 of the BSA) declares that any fact is relevant which shows or constitutes a motive or preparation for any fact in issue or relevant fact. It further provides that the previous or subsequent conduct of any party, if it influences or is influenced by a fact in issue, is relevant.

A threat uttered on the very day of the incident — stating "I will finish off K" — is unmistakably the expression of a settled and present intention to kill. It is motive in the most direct sense. Motive, as the law defines it, is "that which moves a man to do a particular act." The emotion of murderous rage or vendetta, expressed in explicit verbal terms on the day of the killing, provides the psychological engine that explains why K was attacked. The courts have consistently held that previous threats, previous altercations, and previous declarations of hostile intent are admissible to show motive. As the court observed in the context of section 8, the prior words of the accused indicating the purpose and the target make the commission of the offence highly probable.

The additional statement — that after killing K, the accused would kill himself — is a remarkable circumstance. Such a statement shows not merely hostility but finality — the state of mind of a person who has resolved upon an act of irreversible violence. Far from being irrelevant, it dramatically reinforces the inference that the threat was made with genuine intent, not in passing anger. This is conduct and expression revealing a state of mind directly relevant to the fact in issue.

Section 14 IEA / Section 12 BSA: State of Mind

Section 14 of the IEA (Section 12 of the BSA) makes relevant facts showing the existence of any state of mind, such as intention, knowledge, good faith, negligence, rashness, ill-will, or good-will towards any particular person — when the existence of such state of mind is in issue or relevant. The illustrations to this section contemplate precisely the kind of evidence under consideration. When a person states that he will "finish off" a named individual on the very day that individual is murdered, the statement directly reveals the accused's state of mind — his intention and ill-will towards K. This evidence is squarely admissible under Section 14 IEA / Section 12 BSA to establish the accused's murderous intent as part of the prosecution's case on mens rea.

Section 6 IEA / Section 4 BSA: Part of the Same Transaction

There is a compelling additional ground. The threat was uttered "on the day of the incident." If it was uttered shortly before the attack on K — as the facts suggest — the threat and the murder are so closely connected in time, place, and purpose as to form part of the same transaction. The threat is not a distant, unconnected utterance — it is the verbal declaration that immediately precedes the physical act of violence. It constitutes part of what the courts have described as the psychological or mental dimension of the transaction. Under Section 6 IEA / Section 4 BSA, this statement is part of the res gestae of the murder — it is, in effect, the declared intention that inaugurates the transaction of killing.

Section 6 provides that facts forming part of the same transaction are relevant "whether they occurred at the same time and place or at different times and places." The threat on the morning of the murder and the assault on K that afternoon may be different in time, but they are joined by unity of purpose and design — the single thread of the accused's expressed resolve to kill K. This is precisely the situation the section contemplates.

The Weight and Significance of the Evidence

The courts have always held that previous threats go a long way in establishing that the subsequent violence was not accidental, impulsive, or unintended. They directly rebut any defence of sudden provocation or accident. The threat to kill K followed by a threat to kill himself shows a cold, settled determination — not a moment of passion. Judicial decisions across the country have admitted and relied upon prior threats as evidence of motive and intention in murder trials.

The admissibility of this evidence can be mapped across the relevant provisions as follows:

The Underlying Unity

What connects these two problems is a deeper principle of the law of evidence: the law does not allow a court to see only the central act while remaining blind to the surrounding circumstances that give it its full meaning. A rape is not just a physical act — the victim's weeping, her conduct on the way home, her spontaneous accusation, are all parts of the same human reality the court must understand. Equally, a murder is not just the moment of violence — the expressed intention that preceded it, the threat uttered in anger on that very day, is as much a part of the story as the blow itself. The Evidence Act, in its wisdom, brings all of this within the court's view.