At the trial of A for the murder of her husband B by administering arsenic to him, evidence is offered to show that: (a) A is in habit of poisoning people. (b) A had in similar circumstances administered arsenic to two of her children. (c) B had shortly before his death stated that he had been poisoned by his wife, but had not complained about it. (d) A and B used to have frequent quarrels. (e) B had, three days before his death, written a letter to a friend complaining of his failing health. Discuss fully whether the evidence offered is admissible in any of these cases?
A is charged with the murder of her husband B by giving him arsenic. Five pieces of evidence are offered. Each has to be tested against the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA) and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA). The first is not admissible. The other four are admissible.
(a) A Is in the Habit of Poisoning People
This evidence is not admissible. Explanation 1 to Section 14 IEA (Section 12 BSA) says that a fact showing a relevant state of mind must show that the state of mind exists in reference to the particular matter in question, and not in a general way. A general habit of poisoning people is just the kind of evidence this rule keeps out.
Illustration (o) to Section 14 makes the point. A is tried for the murder of B by intentionally shooting him dead. The fact that A on other occasions shot at B is relevant to show his intention to shoot B. The fact that A was in the habit of shooting at people with intent to murder them is irrelevant. The same applies to a general habit of poisoning. The law asks what the accused did on this occasion, not what sort of person she is.
Section 54 IEA (Section 49 BSA) supports this. In a criminal case the accused's previous bad character is not relevant, unless she has first led evidence of her good character. Until then, evidence of a general tendency to commit crime is kept out because the risk of unfair prejudice is greater than its value.
(b) A Had in Similar Circumstances Given Arsenic to Two of Her Children
This evidence is admissible. Section 15 IEA (Section 13 BSA) deals with the question whether an act was accidental or intentional. When there is such a question, the fact that the act formed part of a series of similar occurrences, in each of which the person doing the act was concerned, is relevant.
The facts fit the section. There are similar occurrences, which are the giving of arsenic to two children in similar circumstances, and A was concerned in each. The purpose is not to show that A is a cruel person. The purpose is narrower. It is to answer any claim that B's poisoning was an accident or a mistake, and to show that it was part of a plan.
The English case Makin v. Attorney General for New South Wales ((1894) AC 57) is the classic example. The Privy Council admitted evidence that the bodies of other babies had been found buried in the gardens of houses where the accused couple had lived. This was admitted because it bore on whether the deaths were natural or part of a design.
This evidence may be used only to rebut accident or to show design. The judge must not use it to conclude that A is simply the kind of person who commits murder.
(c) B Had Stated Before His Death That His Wife Had Poisoned Him, but Had Not Complained
This statement is admissible as a dying declaration under Section 32(1) IEA (Section 26(a) BSA). That section makes relevant a statement by a person who is dead, made as to the cause of his death or as to the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, where the cause of his death comes into question.
The section applies whether or not the person who made the statement was under expectation of death at the time. This makes Indian law more liberal than the English common law, which needs the declarant to have given up hope of living. B's statement that his wife poisoned him relates to the cause of his death, and the cause of his death is the very question in the case.
In Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay (AIR 1958 SC 22) the Supreme Court held that a dying declaration is admissible even if the maker did not know he was about to die. It also held that a dying declaration that is found to be true and voluntary can by itself be the basis of a conviction. The fact that B "had not complained" does not affect whether the statement can be admitted. It may affect the weight the court gives the statement, but that is a separate question.
(d) A and B Used to Have Frequent Quarrels
This evidence is admissible. Section 8 IEA (Section 6 BSA) makes relevant any fact that shows or forms a motive or preparation for a fact in issue. Frequent quarrels between wife and husband show ill-will and resentment. From them the court may infer why A might have given poison to B.
Section 14 IEA (Section 12 BSA) also applies. Illustration (k) says that when the question is whether A has been guilty of cruelty towards B, his wife, expressions of their feeling towards each other shortly before or after the alleged cruelty are relevant. By the same reasoning, evidence of frequent quarrels, showing hostility on A's part, is relevant to whether she gave the poison on purpose.
Motive is not a part of the offence, but it is always relevant in proving the prosecution case. A history of strife between husband and wife is useful circumstantial evidence of motive. The quarrels may also be relevant under Section 7 IEA (Section 5 BSA) as part of the state of things in which the poisoning took place.
(e) B Had, Three Days Before His Death, Written to a Friend Complaining of Failing Health
This evidence is admissible. Illustration (l) to Section 14 IEA (Section 12 BSA) covers it. When the question is whether A's death was caused by poison, statements made by A during his illness about his symptoms are relevant. A complaint of failing health is a statement about the state of the body and bodily feeling. In a case of suspected arsenic poisoning it may describe weakness or stomach illness that fits the poisoning.
The letter may also be relevant under Section 32(1) IEA (Section 26(a) BSA) if it is a statement about the circumstances that led to B's death, and under Section 7 IEA (Section 5 BSA) as part of the state of things in which the poisoning occurred. Whichever section is used, the writing must be proved to be B's.
The letter has limits. It shows that B's health was failing. It does not by itself show that A caused it. Its value is that it supports the medical evidence of gradual poisoning. The court must read it together with the medical and other evidence.
Summary
| Evidence | Admissible? | Provision | Purpose |
| (a) A's general habit of poisoning people | No | S.14 Explanation 1 IEA / S.12 BSA | A general disposition is kept out; the state of mind must relate to this case |
| (b) Arsenic given to two children | Yes | S.15 IEA / S.13 BSA | Series of similar occurrences; answers a plea of accident |
| (c) B's statement that his wife poisoned him | Yes | S.32(1) IEA / S.26(a) BSA | Dying declaration; cause of death is in question |
| (d) Frequent quarrels between A and B | Yes | S.8 and S.14 IEA / S.6 and S.12 BSA | Motive and ill-will |
| (e) B's letter about his failing health | Yes | S.14 IEA / S.12 BSA | State of his body; circumstances of his death |
The problem teaches one lesson. The law distrusts evidence of a general bad character or disposition, and keeps it out. It accepts specific facts that bear directly on motive, intention or a series of similar occurrences, because their value is greater than the risk of prejudice. The contrast between (a) and (b) shows this clearly.
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