Limitation ActCondonation of Delay 22 June 2026· 7 min read

    Can the court extend period of limitation for filing suit if sufficient causes are shown? What are the limitations on powers of condonation of delay by courts?

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    The court's power is not enlarged by consent. Section 3(1) says that every suit instituted after the prescribed period "shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence", subject to sections 4 to 24. The word is "shall", the direction is addressed to the court, and the court must apply it on its own motion if the defendant says nothing. Section 5 allows a court to admit an appeal or application out of time on sufficient cause, but it does not mention suits, and a court cannot supply the omission by treating a sufficient cause for a suit as if it were a sufficient cause for an appeal. The position is supported by Rikhab Dass v Chandro (AIR 1971 All 234), Baishnab Charan Ray v Debraj Sahoo (AIR 2004 Ori 3), and the Supreme Court's statement in Ramlal, Motilal and Chotelal v Rewa Coalfields Ltd (AIR 1962 SC 361) that the discretion to admit after the period is limited to appeals and applications. A Karnataka decision, D. Mahadevaiah v SC (Harijan) Housing Building Co-operative Society Ltd (1995 AIHC 5986 at 5988), states the same limit. The duty to dismiss a suit that is barred on its face, even at the appellate stage and though the plea was never raised, was stated in Craft Centre v Koncherry Coir Factories (AIR 1991 Ker 83).

    Nor can the court reach the same result by another door. The inherent power under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not include a power to condone delay in a case that section 5 does not reach, since that would nullify the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court in P.K. Ramachandran v State of Kerala ((1997) 7 SCC 556 : AIR 1998 SC 2276) said that courts have no power to extend limitation on equitable grounds, and the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Dev Bala Sehgal v Devinder Pal Singh ((2001) 1 Punj LR 775) held that a court cannot extend time on the principle of interests of justice, or bypass the mandatory provisions of the Act. The Act has to be applied as it is written. Hardship is a reason for the legislature to extend a period and not for a court to do so.

    An illustration: A lent B money on 1 July 2022, so that under Article 19 the suit had to be filed by 1 July 2025. A has no money to engage an advocate and files on 5 July 2026, a year late. He applies for the delay to be condoned on the basis of his poverty. The application must be refused and the suit dismissed. Poverty is not a ground provided by sections 4 to 24, and section 5 does not apply to the suit. It would make no difference if A said that B had given repeated oral assurances that he would pay; an oral assurance is not an acknowledgment, because section 18 requires an acknowledgment in writing signed by the party against whom the right is claimed, made before the period expires.

    A qualification is needed on the point of jurisdiction. A court with territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction does not lose that jurisdiction because a suit is out of time. What section 3 does is to impose a duty to dismiss. A decree passed in breach of that duty is therefore irregular and liable to be set aside in appeal or revision, and the Supreme Court in Union of India v Punjab Singh (AIR 2003 SC 3321 : (2003) 10 SCC 36) held that such a decree cannot be sustained when limitation has been specifically objected to. The Kerala High Court in Kurian E. Kalathil v Kerala State Electricity Board (AIR 2014 Ker 35) put the same thing by saying that the court should not dispose of a time-barred suit on the merits, and that if it does, the judgment must be set aside. This is different from saying that the decree is a nullity, which would permit it to be attacked at any time and in any proceeding. The sounder view is that it is an erroneous decree that has to be corrected through the ordinary remedies.

    It is sometimes said that even the Supreme Court, in its extraordinary jurisdiction, cannot extend limitation for a suit, and that needs qualifying. In the ordinary exercise of its jurisdiction, no court can condone delay in filing a suit. But during the COVID-19 pandemic the Supreme Court, acting in its own suo motu proceedings (In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No 3 of 2020), excluded the period from 15 March 2020 to 28 February 2022 from limitation for all proceedings, suits included. That was an exercise of the Court's special powers in a general emergency, and not a case of a court accepting a plaintiff's reasons for his own delay.

    The limits on the court's power of condonation generally follow from what has been said. The first limit is the text of section 5, which restricts the power to appeals and applications and excludes applications under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure. Execution is governed by a period of twelve years under Article 136, and the judgment-debtor's freedom from execution after that period is protected from the court's discretion.

    The second limit comes from section 29(2). Where a special or local law prescribes its own period, sections 4 to 24 apply only to the extent they are not expressly excluded, and the courts have found exclusion by the scheme of the law as well. In Hukumdev Narain Yadav v Lalit Narain Mishra ((1974) 2 SCC 133 : AIR 1974 SC 480) it was held that sections 4 and 5 do not apply to election petitions under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. In Union of India v Popular Construction Co ((2001) 8 SCC 470 : AIR 2001 SC 4010) and again in Simplex Infrastructure Ltd v Union of India (AIR 2019 SC 505) the Court held that section 5 cannot be used to extend the period of thirty days permitted by section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

    The third limit is that condonation is a discretion and never a right. Sufficient cause is a condition for the exercise of the power, not a command to exercise it, and the court weighs the accrued right of the opposite party. A fourth limit is procedural. The court cannot admit a late appeal without deciding the condonation question, and in civil appeals it must give notice to the respondent under Order XLI Rule 3A(2). A fifth limit is that the cause must be shown by evidence, and a sixth is the rule in Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v State of Gujarat (AIR 1981 SC 733) that the cause must be traceable to the period itself.

    Sections 4 to 24 are not themselves instances of condonation. They do not give the court a general power to excuse delay. They adjust the way the period is computed: section 4 where the court is closed on the last day, section 12 for the day of the decree and the time taken to obtain a copy, section 14 for time spent in a wrong court in good faith, and sections 17 and 18 for fraud and acknowledgment. A suit that is within time on that computation is not a case of condonation at all. The difference matters because these provisions apply on defined facts and the court has no discretion to extend them to facts that are not within their words.

    The principle behind all of this is the one expressed in the maxims interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt. A suit starts a claim, and the defendant is entitled to repose when the period lapses. The Act gives the court discretion to relieve a party who is already before it, and not to give a new claim a second life.

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