Limitation ActLegal Disability 06 July 2026· 4 min read

    Cause of action accrued to plaintiff's father in 1917 when he was a minor. The plaintiff was not even born at that time. After the death of plaintiff's father, the plaintiff got the right to sue, but he was then a minor for several years. The plaintiff filed suit on attaining majority. Would the suit be maintainable?

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    The facts put two different disabilities side by side. One belongs to the father, who was a minor when the cause of action arose in 1917. The other belongs to the son, who was a minor when the father died. The first is an initial disability and the second is a disability that arose later, and the result depends on which of them the plaintiff can claim under. Since the cause of action arose in 1917, the Limitation Act, 1908 would have governed the starting of time; the 1963 Act re-enacts the disability provisions in substance, and the analysis below is stated in terms of the 1963 Act, on the footing that the rules are the same in the respects that matter here.

    Begin with the plaintiff's own position. Section 6(1) helps a person who is a minor "at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned". The son was not in existence on that date, not even in the womb, so he was not a minor within the meaning of the section and the Explanation. The Patna High Court so held on this very pattern of facts in Sk Md Zafr v Sk Amiruddin (AIR 1963 Pat 108), where the father had been a minor in 1917; a plaintiff cannot claim the benefit of the section if limitation had begun before his birth. Lalchand Dhanalal v Dharamchand (AIR 1965 MP 102) and Ranodip Singh v Parmeshwar Pershad (AIR 1925 PC 33) are cited for the same rule. The contrast is with the child who was in the womb on the date in question, who has the protection of the Explanation, as in Aswini Kumar Pan v Parimal Debi (AIR 1964 Cal 354). The son's later minority at the time of his father's death is a subsequent disability, and section 9 provides that it cannot stop time which has already started. So, if the son sues in his own right, he has no case on limitation.

    The son's position is different if he sues as a person claiming through his father, and it is here that the sub-sections of section 6 matter. The father, a minor in 1917, was himself within section 6(1), and so he had the usual period after attaining majority, which section 8 limited to three years from the cessation of his minority. The son can use that extended period only through section 6(3) to (5), and only to the extent that it was still open when the father died. If the father died while still a minor, so that the disability continued up to his death, section 6(3) allows his legal representative to sue within the same period after the death, again subject to the three-year cap in section 8 running from the death. If the legal representative was himself a minor at that date, as the son was, section 6(4) applies sub-sections (1) and (2) to him, so that he may sue within the same period after his own disability ceases, subject to the cap of three years from that cessation. If the father died after attaining majority but within his three years, section 6(5) gives the legal representative the same period after the death as the father would have had.

    On the facts as stated, the father lived long enough to have a son, and the son's right to sue came to him after the father's death. The realistic reading is that the father reached majority, did not sue in the three years that section 6 and section 8 allowed him, and died long afterwards. If so, the right to sue had expired before the father's death, there was no extended period left for the son to take under section 6(3) to (5), and the son's suit is barred. Nothing about the son's later minority revives it, for section 9 forbids that, and the son's own birth after the cause of action cannot give him a fresh period.

    The conclusion is therefore in two parts. On the facts stated, and on the decided cases, the suit is not maintainable, because the plaintiff cannot rely on his own minority and the extended period available through his father had run out before he came to sue. The result would differ only if the father had died while his own disability continued, or within the three years after it ceased, and the son sued within the period allowed by section 6(3) to (5), with the cap in section 8. The point of the problem is to separate the plaintiff's own disability, which gives him nothing, from the representative's right under the sub-sections, which depends on the date of the father's death.

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