Cause of action accrued to plaintiff's father in 1917 when he was a minor. The plaintiff was not even born at that time. After the death of plaintiff's father, the plaintiff got the right to sue, but he was then a minor for several years. The plaintiff filed suit on attaining majority. Would the suit be maintainable?

Governing principle

Section 6 helps only a person who is himself under legal disability at the time from which limitation is to be reckoned. The section does not create a fresh cause of action for a person who was not born when the cause of action first arose. Section 9 reinforces the same rule: once time begins to run, it does not stop because of any subsequent disability.

The commentary states this expressly in the form of a decided principle: where the cause of action accrued to the plaintiff’s father during his minority, and the plaintiff was not born at that time, the plaintiff cannot, on attaining majority, claim the benefit of Section 6. The reason is simple: the plaintiff was not the person entitled to sue when limitation first began.

Why the suit fails

The plaintiff’s father had the cause of action in 1917, but he was under disability. That disability could have protected the father, or in some situations the father’s heirs if the statutory conditions were satisfied, but it cannot be transferred automatically to a child who was not yet born. The later birth of the plaintiff does not stop the running of limitation, nor does the plaintiff get a new, independent starting point merely because he later became major.

The commentary is clear that Section 6 applies only where the person entitled to sue is under disability at the relevant starting point. It also says that if limitation had already begun before the plaintiff’s birth, the plaintiff cannot claim the benefit of Section 6 or Section 8.

Relevant provisions

Section 6 gives protection to minors, persons of unsound mind, and idiots when they are themselves the persons entitled to sue or apply at the commencement of limitation. Section 8 caps that benefit by saying the extended period cannot exceed three years from the cessation of disability. Section 9 then states that once limitation starts, it keeps running and is not interrupted by later disability.

This means the plaintiff must satisfy two things: first, that he was the person entitled to sue when limitation began; and second, that he was under disability at that time. If either condition fails, Section 6 cannot be used.

Illustrations

1. A father’s right to sue arises in 1917 while he is a minor. His son is born later. The son cannot say that limitation started against him only when he became major; the law treats the cause of action as having already arisen earlier.

2. If a child is already in existence, though in the womb, when the cause of action arises, the law may protect him as a minor under Sections 6 and 8.

3. If a person becomes minor after limitation has already started, that later disability does not stop time.

Case law

In Md. Zafir v. Amiruddin, the Patna High Court held that where the cause of action had already arisen before the plaintiff’s birth, the plaintiff could not take advantage of Section 6 on attaining majority. The court reasoned that Section 6 is meant for an existing person under disability, not for a person who comes into existence after limitation has already commenced.

In Lalchand Dhanalal v. Dharamchand and Ranodip Singh v. Parmeshwar Pershad, the courts similarly held that a person cannot claim the benefit of Section 6 if limitation had already begun before his birth. The Supreme Court in Nathu Ram v. Manphool recognised that the protection of disability provisions depends on the plaintiff’s existence and disability at the material point of time.

Conclusion

The suit would not be maintainable if it is filed on the theory that the plaintiff got a fresh right merely because he later attained majority. Since the cause of action accrued to the father before the plaintiff was born, limitation had already started running, and Sections 6, 8, and 9 do not allow that running time to be arrested or restarted for a later-born heir. The suit is therefore barred by limitation.