Constitutional LawRight to Life and Personal Liberty 29 July 2026· 10 min read

    Critically evaluate the scope of the expression 'Personal Liberty' in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Do you think that the expression 'procedure established by law' in Article 21 introduces India, the American 'due process clause' on the subject? Discuss.

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    The question has two parts. The first asks how wide "personal liberty" is. The second asks whether "procedure established by law" brings the American due process clause into Indian law. The history of Article 21 shows that the answers have changed over time, and that the second answer is still not entirely settled.

    The scope of "personal liberty"

    The Constitution does not define the expression. In the first decade after the Constitution came into force, the Supreme Court looked at it in A K Gopalan v State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27, a preventive detention case. Although the majority approach to Article 21 was narrow, several of the judges said things which proved to be important later. Kania CJ held that personal liberty in Article 21 was independent of the freedoms in Article 19, and observed that if Article 19 were the only Article safeguarding personal liberty, rights such as eating, drinking, working, playing and swimming, and even the right to life, would have no protection. Das J said that the Constitution did not try to list all the personal rights but used the compendious expression "personal liberty" in Article 21, and so protected the bundle of rights which, together with the rights mentioned in Article 19, make up personal liberty. These observations were the root of the later broad reading.

    In Kharak Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 1295, the majority held that night-time domiciliary visits by the police infringed personal liberty, but held that secret picketing of the house and shadowing of movements did not fall under Article 21. Subba Rao J, in the minority, proposed a wider concept: personal liberty means freedom from restrictions or encroachments on the person, whether imposed directly or brought about indirectly by calculated measures, and Articles 19 and 21 overlap and are not mutually exclusive.

    The decisive step was Maneka Gandhi v Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597, a seven-judge decision. The Court held that Articles 14, 19 and 21 are not mutually exclusive but interlinked, and that "personal liberty" has the "widest amplitude", covering many rights of which some have been given separate protection in Article 19. Bhagwati J placed the right to go abroad within Article 21 on the strength of Satwant Singh, which had held that the right to travel is part of personal liberty. Since then the Court has recognised many aspects. Reproductive choice, dignity, and bodily integrity were accepted in Suchita Srivastava v Chandigarh Administration, (2009) 9 SCC 1 : AIR 2010 SC 235. Self-determination of gender was held to be part of personal autonomy in National Legal Services Authority v Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438. A detenu's right to meet family and friends was upheld in Francis Coralie, and a detenu's right to write and send a book was upheld in State of Maharashtra v Prabhakar Pandurang Sanzgiri, AIR 1966 SC 424. The Court has read a long list of further rights into Article 21, among them speedy and fair trial, legal aid, privacy, the right against handcuffing and custodial violence, the right to decent environment, health, and reputation.

    A critical assessment

    The expansion has been criticised as well as praised. There are three points of criticism.

    First, the Court has not offered a clear test for deciding which interests are part of personal liberty. In Maneka Gandhi Bhagwati J suggested that a right is protected within a named fundamental right if it is an integral part of the named right, or partakes of its basic nature. He used that test to hold that the right to go abroad is not part of the freedom of speech in Article 19(1)(a), and then placed it in Article 21 by relying on a precedent. Critics point out that this offers no real principle for when a particular interest deserves to be raised to the level of a fundamental right. Chandrachud J followed the narrower reasoning of Ayyangar J in an earlier case, and held the right to go abroad and the freedom of speech to be made up of basically different constituents.

    Second, there has been inconsistency in what is included. Before Maneka Gandhi the Court, in Re Sant Ram, AIR 1960 SC 932, said that the right to livelihood does not fall within "life" in Article 21. After Maneka Gandhi, in Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180 : (1985) 3 SCC 545, it held that the right to livelihood is part of the right to life, because a person cannot live without the means of living. But the Court has also held that Article 21 does not extend to the freedom of trade or commerce (Sodhan Singh). Some rights are therefore in and others are out, and the line between them is not always obvious.

    Third, personal liberty has to be balanced against the duties and obligations a person owes to others. The Supreme Court observed in M C Mehta v Union of India, (2003) 5 SCC 376 : AIR 2003 SC 3469, that individual liberty has to be balanced with duties towards fellow citizens. And in Suchita Srivastava the Court made the point that the strict boundaries of personal liberty cannot be marked, but that liberty must also accommodate the public interest.

    Does "procedure established by law" introduce American due process?

    Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the American Constitution, no person may be deprived of life, liberty or property "without due process of law", and the American courts have used that clause to test not only the procedure but also the content of the laws. The Indian provision uses different words. The question is whether the result is the same.

    At the start the Supreme Court said no. In Gopalan the petitioner argued that "procedure established by law" brings in procedural due process, which would allow the courts to see whether the law gives a fair hearing. The majority rejected the argument for four reasons. First, the word "due" is absent from Article 21, and it is on that word that the whole idea of due process depends. Second, the draft Constitution had contained the words "due process of law", but they were dropped and the present words were adopted, which was strong evidence that the Constituent Assembly did not wish to adopt the American concept. Third, in America the idea of due process had produced the doctrine of police power, and if one was imported, the other might have to be, which would complicate matters. Fourth, "due" has a variable content and what is just varies from situation to situation. Fazl Ali J, dissenting, held that "procedure established by law" implied procedural due process, in particular that no one should be condemned unheard. The effect of the majority view was that a law only had to exist, lay down a procedure, and be followed by the executive. The courts could not ask whether the procedure was fair. This has been described as the high-water mark of legal positivism.

    The historical account is also contested. It has long been assumed that the Constitutional Adviser, B N Rau, after meeting Justice Frankfurter in the United States, who warned him against due process, caused the words to be changed. A more recent historical study casts doubt on that account. According to that study, the Drafting Committee had kept "due process of law" till January 1948, and the words were replaced with "procedure established by law" on 21 February 1948, with the explanation that the latter was more specific, as it was in the Japanese Constitution. When the matter came before the Constituent Assembly, an amendment to restore due process was moved and was defeated. Dr Ambedkar, in the debate on 13 December 1948, said that there were dangers on both sides: a legislature packed by party men might make laws violating fundamental principles of life and liberty, but he did not see how five or six judges could be trusted to decide, by their own conscience, bias or prejudice, which law was good and which was bad. The amendment was put to the vote and negatived.

    The position changed with Maneka Gandhi. The Court held that the procedure must be right, just and fair, not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. It held that "law" in Article 21 does not mean any enacted law but a law that is reasonable. It read Article 14 into the procedure and linked the three Articles together. After that decision, Article 21 has come to be described as the Indian version of the American concept of procedural due process. A law that gives no fair hearing, or which allows the passport to be impounded without an opportunity of being heard, fails the test, even though it is a valid enactment.

    Whether the Court can also test the substance of a law is more doubtful. In A K Roy v Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 271, Chandrachud CJ drew a distinction. The power to judge the fairness of the procedure laid down by a law can be found in the language of Article 21. But the power to decide on the justness of the law itself comes from a due process provision such as the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the American Constitution. He rejected the latter. Later decisions seem to go further. Kartar Singh held that a law can be void for vagueness, and Selvi v State of Karnataka, (2010) 7 SCC 263, spoke of "substantive due process" as the threshold for examining governmental action that affects personal liberty. In Mohd Arif v Supreme Court of India, (2014) 9 SCC 737, Nariman J said that "the wheel has turned full circle" and that substantive due process is now part of Article 21. He repeated that view in his opinion in Puttaswamy. Chandrachud J, in the same case, was more careful. He observed that, having regard to the constitutional history surrounding the deletion of the phrase, it would be inappropriate to equate the jurisdiction of an Indian court to entertain a substantive challenge to a law with the exercise of substantive due process under the American Constitution. References to substantive due process in some judgments, he said, are really references to a substantive challenge to a law on the ground that its content, as distinct from its procedure, violates the Constitution.

    Conclusion

    The expression "procedure established by law" does not, by its words, introduce the American due process clause, and the framers' decision to leave out those words was deliberate. But the effect of Maneka Gandhi is that Article 21, read with Articles 14 and 19, requires the procedure to be fair, just and reasonable, which in substance is what procedural due process requires. As to substantive due process, the position is that Indian courts can strike down a law as unreasonable or arbitrary under Articles 14, 19 and 21 without borrowing the American doctrine in all its details. The more careful view, that of Chandrachud J, is that this should be treated as a substantive challenge to the validity of a law in the Indian constitutional text and not as an import from the United States. So the answer is that Article 21 has come close to the American position in practice, though through the Indian route of reading the Articles together, and the exact extent of the courts' power over the content of laws is still being worked out.

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