Critically examine the provisions of Article 356 of the Constitution. Would you subscribe to the view that the power to impose President's rule in a State is the most misused provision of the Constitution? Give examples in support of your answer.

The Constitutional Text: Article 356

Article 356(1) provides that if the President, on receipt of a report from the Governor of a State or otherwise, is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, the President may by Proclamation assume to himself all or any of the functions of the Government of the State and all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by the Governor or any body or authority in the State other than the Legislature of the State, declare that the powers of the Legislature of the State shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament, and make such incidental and consequential provisions as appear to the President necessary or desirable for giving effect to the objects of the Proclamation, including provisions suspending, in whole or in part, the operation of any constitutional provision relating to any body or authority in the State, though the President cannot assume the powers of any High Court.

Article 356(3) requires that every such Proclamation be laid before each House of Parliament and cease to operate at the expiration of two months unless approved by resolutions of both Houses before that period expires. Article 356(4) provides that a Proclamation so approved shall, unless revoked, cease to operate on the expiration of six months from the date of issue, and Article 356(5), inserted through subsequent amendment, restricts continuation of the Proclamation beyond one year unless a National Emergency is in operation or the Election Commission certifies that holding elections to the Legislative Assembly of the State concerned is not feasible, and even then continuation cannot ordinarily exceed three years in total. Article 357(1) empowers Parliament to confer upon the President the power of the State Legislature to make laws, or to authorise the President to delegate this power to any other authority, and to authorise expenditure from the State's Consolidated Fund pending Parliamentary sanction.

The Rationale Underlying Article 356

Article 356 is based on Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and was included in the Constitution to address the possibility of a genuine breakdown of constitutional government within a State, whether through political paralysis, large-scale internal disturbance rendering ordinary governance impossible, or persistent, deliberate defiance of constitutional obligations by a State Government. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, while defending the inclusion of this provision in the Constituent Assembly, expressed the hope that it would remain a dead letter, to be invoked only in the rarest and most extreme circumstances, since its underlying premise was to safeguard the Constitution itself, not to serve as an instrument of ordinary political contest between the Union and the States.

Historical Pattern of Misuse

The historical record substantially bears out the criticism that Article 356 became one of the most frequently and improperly invoked provisions of the Constitution. The Sarkaria Commission, examining seventy-five instances of the Proclamation's use between 1951 and 1987, concluded that in fifty-two of these instances, the power ought not to have been invoked at all, reflecting a pattern in which the provision was used not to address genuine constitutional breakdown but to serve partisan political objectives. Commonly identified categories of misuse include the dismissal of a Ministry that continued to command a majority in the Legislative Assembly, without first testing that majority through a floor vote; the denial of an opportunity to a rival political formation to attempt government formation before imposing President's Rule; the wholesale, large-scale dissolution of several State Assemblies simultaneously following a change of government at the Centre, often justified on the flimsy ground that the new ruling party at the Centre required electoral consistency with State governments; and the failure to issue any prior warning to an allegedly errant State Government before recommending its dismissal, denying that Government any opportunity to correct the situation. Successive Union Governments across different political parties resorted to this pattern with striking frequency, particularly through the 1970s and 1980s, when Article 356 was invoked dozens of times, disproportionately against State Governments controlled by parties opposed to the party in power at the Centre.

The Corrective Intervention: S.R. Bommai v. Union of India

The judicial response that fundamentally reshaped the practical operation of Article 356 came from a nine-judge Bench of the Supreme Court in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, arising from a batch of cases challenging the dismissal of several State Governments. The Court held that the President's satisfaction under Article 356(1) is not immune from judicial review, rejecting the earlier assumption that this satisfaction was purely subjective and beyond the reach of courts, and held that while courts cannot examine the correctness or adequacy of the material before the President, they can examine whether such material existed at all, whether it was relevant to the formation of that satisfaction, and whether the Proclamation was issued mala fide or for reasons wholly extraneous to the object of Article 356. The Court further held that a Proclamation could be struck down where the power was exercised for a purpose entirely unrelated to a genuine breakdown of constitutional machinery, such as dismissing a Government purely for political convenience.

Bommai laid down several important operational safeguards that have transformed the practical exercise of this power. The Court held that the existence or otherwise of majority support in the Legislative Assembly is a matter that should ordinarily be tested on the floor of the House, and not through the subjective assessment of the Governor, meaning a State Government cannot be dismissed on the ground of loss of majority without first affording it the opportunity to prove that majority in the Assembly itself. The Court also held that the power under Article 356 is a conditional power, exercisable only when a situation has genuinely arisen in which the government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with constitutional provisions, and not merely because the Union Government finds the policies of a State Government disagreeable or because of a change in ruling party at the Centre. Crucially, the Court held that if a Proclamation is subsequently found by the Court to be unconstitutional, the status quo ante can be restored, meaning the dismissed Legislative Assembly and Council of Ministers can be revived, thereby providing a genuine and effective remedy against future improper invocations, rather than a merely declaratory finding of illegality after the fact.

Illustrative Instances Underscoring the Misuse

Several specific historical episodes illustrate the pattern the Sarkaria Commission and subsequent commentators have identified. Following the 1977 Lok Sabha elections, in which the Congress party lost power at the Centre, the newly formed Janata Government at the Union level dismissed nine State Governments then controlled by the Congress party, dissolving their Legislative Assemblies en masse on the stated ground that these Governments no longer enjoyed popular support following the general election results, even though these State Assemblies had been separately and validly elected and had not themselves faced any comparable loss of confidence. In a reciprocal pattern, when the Congress party returned to power at the Centre in 1980, it similarly dismissed several State Governments controlled by opposition parties, dissolving their Assemblies on largely similar reasoning. The dismissal of the Government in Karnataka in 1989, and similarly in several other States during this period, without any genuine attempt to verify majority support through a floor test, formed part of the very batch of cases that eventually reached the Supreme Court in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, providing direct judicial confirmation that such dismissals, based on the Union Government's unilateral political assessment rather than any tested loss of legislative confidence, could not be sustained. More recent invocations in various States have generally been far more circumspect, reflecting the deterrent and corrective effect Bommai has had, though occasional controversies over the timing or necessity of particular Proclamations continue to surface, indicating that the potential for contested use of this power has been substantially reduced but not entirely eliminated.

Illustration

Suppose, following a State election, no single party secures a clear majority, and the Governor, rather than inviting the largest party or pre-poll alliance to form a government and demonstrate its majority on the floor of the Assembly, immediately recommends President's Rule on the ground that no stable government can be formed. Applying the principles in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, such a recommendation, made without first affording any political formation the opportunity to prove majority support through a floor test, would be constitutionally suspect, and the resulting Proclamation would be vulnerable to challenge, potentially resulting in the restoration of the Assembly and an opportunity for government formation to be properly tested. Contrast this with a situation where a State genuinely descends into widespread breakdown of law and order, with the State's administrative machinery entirely paralysed and unable to function due to extensive civil unrest, a circumstance approaching the kind of genuine constitutional breakdown Article 356 was originally intended to address, in which invocation of the provision would likely withstand scrutiny even under the stricter standard laid down in Bommai.

The view that Article 356 has been the most misused provision of the Constitution finds substantial historical support in the sheer frequency and often transparently partisan character of its invocation across successive decades, as documented by the Sarkaria Commission and illustrated by episodes such as the mass dismissals of 1977 and 1980, but the transformative intervention of the Supreme Court in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, requiring judicially reviewable satisfaction, mandating floor tests, and permitting restoration of unlawfully dismissed Governments, has fundamentally altered the calculus facing any Union Government contemplating recourse to this provision, ensuring that while Article 356 retains the same broad textual power it always possessed, its exercise today operates under a degree of constitutional discipline conspicuously absent for much of independent India's early constitutional history.