Definition of Forgery (Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, Sections 335 & 336) and its Application to Scenario of Signing One's Own Name as Forgery

Forgery Under Sections 335 & 336 BNS, 2023

I. The Architecture of the Offence

Forgery, as an offence, is not defined in a single sweep. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 has crafted its definition across two inter-locking sections — one supplying the ingredient of a false document, and the other specifying the criminal intent that must accompany its making. Neither section is complete without the other. Together, Sections 335 and 336 BNS constitute the entire statutory definition of the offence. This two-section architecture corresponds exactly to the structure of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, where Sections 464 and 463 IPC respectively performed the same functions. Section 335 BNS corresponds to Section 464 IPC, and Section 336 BNS consolidates and replaces Sections 463, 465, 468 and 469 IPC. Significantly, there are no substantive changes in the verbatim of the provisions, and accordingly, the entire body of case law developed under the IPC provisions remains fully authoritative.

The Supreme Court confirmed the foundational logic of this architecture in Sushil Suri v CBI (2011) 5 SCC 708, where it held that two essential elements must coexist to constitute forgery — first, the making of a false document or part of it, and second, such making must be accompanied by one of the five intents specified in what is now Section 336(1) BNS. Both elements must be proved by the prosecution; the absence of either is fatal to the charge.

II. Section 335 BNS — Making a False Document: The Indispensable Foundation

Making a false document is the sine qua non — the absolutely indispensable foundation — of the offence of forgery. What it means to make a false document is defined in Section 335 BNS with precision and completeness. The section identifies three distinct modes by which a false document may be created.

The First Mode: False as to Maker or Authority

The first and most common mode is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently makes, signs, seals, executes, or transmits a document with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made by, or by the authority of, a person by whom or by whose authority he knows it was not made. The document must, in the words of the Calcutta High Court in J Ta Zwart v Indrani Mukherjee (1990) 1 Cal HN 62, tell a lie about itself — that is, it must misrepresent its own origin, identity, or authorship. A document that contains false statements of fact is not necessarily a false document; it is a false document only when it falsely attributes its own existence to a person who did not make or authorise it.

Under Section 464 IPC (= Section 335 BNS), a person makes a false document if he makes or signs a document intending it to be believed that it was made or signed by, or by the authority of, some person by whom he knows it was not so made or signed. To bring the offence within the four corners of this first mode, the false document must be created with a view to making it appear that it was made by some other person who, the accused knows, did not make it, as the Calcutta High Court held in AK Khoshla v TS Venkatesan (1992 CrLJ 1448 Cal).

Illustration (e) to Section 335 BNS gives a classic example under this first mode: A draws a bill of exchange on himself in the name of B without B's authority, intending to discount it as a genuine bill with a banker. A is guilty of forgery because, by drawing the bill, he has led the banker to suppose that he has the security of B, thereby deceiving the banker into discounting the bill.

The Second Mode: False as to Time — Antedating and Material Alteration

The second mode deals with dishonest or fraudulent alteration of a document in any material part without lawful authority, after it has been made or executed. The paradigmatic case under this mode is antedating — making a document appear to have been executed at a time earlier than it was actually made. The authorities consistently hold that antedating is not, by itself, forgery; it becomes forgery only when it could or does operate to the prejudice of some person.

The Supreme Court applied this principle in Shiv Bahadur Singh v State of VP (1954 CrLJ 910), where a government official antedated a lease deed — in lieu of a bribe of Rs 25,000 — to show that a resumption order had already been granted before the relevant authority intervened. The antedating was held to be forgery because it operated squarely to the prejudice of the persons whose interests the chronology of the documents was intended to defeat.

Illustration (d) to Explanation 1 of Section 335 BNS captures the legislative understanding: B, against whose estate an execution has been issued, executes a lease of the estate in collusion with Z, but dates it six months before the seizure, intending to defraud A and cause it to be believed that the lease was granted before the seizure. B, though he executes the lease in his own name, commits forgery by antedating it. This illustration also establishes the important principle that a person can commit forgery by signing his own name — a principle whose fuller dimensions are explored in Explanation 1.

The Third Mode: Document Obtained Through Deception or Incapacity

The third mode covers the exploitation of another person's mental incapacity or susceptibility to deception. Where a person dishonestly or fraudulently causes another to sign, execute, or alter a document, knowing that that person — by reason of unsoundness of mind, intoxication, or deception practised upon him — does not know the contents of the document or the nature of the alteration, the person who causes such execution is the maker of a false document. Illustration (i) to Section 335 BNS presents the paradigm case: Z dictates his will to A; A intentionally writes down a different legatee, and by representing to Z that he has prepared the will according to his instructions, induces Z to sign it. A has committed forgery. The deception that prevents Z from knowing the true contents of the document is the mischief targeted by this third mode.

The Supreme Court in Mir Nagvi Askari v CBI (AIR 2010 SC 528) confirmed that a person is said to make a false document only if he satisfies one of these three conditions — and that, in the absence of any of the three, no conviction for making a false document can be sustained.

III. The Three Explanations to Section 335 BNS

The legislature appended three Explanations to Section 335 BNS, each addressing a category of cases that might otherwise have generated uncertainty.

Explanation 1 resolves the apparent paradox of the accused who signs his own name. Explanation 2 addresses documents made in the names of fictitious or deceased persons. Explanation 3 defines affixing electronic signature by reference to the Information Technology Act, 2000, thereby bringing digital authentication within the scope of the provision.

IV. Section 336 BNS — Forgery: The Offence and Its Five Intents

Having established what a false document is, Section 336(1) BNS defines the offence of forgery thus:

"Whoever makes any false document or false electronic record or part of a document or electronic record, with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery."

The definition is characteristically wide. The Madras High Court in Daniel Hailey v State of Madras (AIR 1968 Mad 349) restated the requirements with admirable precision: the document or part of it must be false in fact; it must have been made dishonestly or fraudulently; and it must have been made with one of the intents specified in the section. These requirements are cumulative — all three must be satisfied.

The five specified intents are alternatives. Satisfaction of any one is sufficient. They may be briefly surveyed.

The first intent — to cause damage or injury to the public or to any person — is the widest in its social reach. Injury carries its Section 44 BNS meaning: any harm, however caused, to any person in body, mind, reputation or property. The gist of the offence, as the Nagpur High Court held in Kalyanmal (AIR 1937 Nag 45), is the intention to cause such damage — it is wholly immaterial whether damage is actually caused or not. The fabrication of an electoral roll to insert ineligible voters and exclude eligible ones — as in Nurahmad v Jogesh Chandra Sen (AIR 1934 Cal 838) — squarely attracted this head.

The second intent — to support any claim or title — operates even where the underlying claim is legally valid. As the Nagpur High Court confirmed in Krishnarao Raujirao v State of MP (AIR 1953 Nag 165), even if a man has a lawful title, he is guilty of forgery if he counterfeits documents to support it. The law insists that lawful claims must be supported by lawful means. The Allahabad High Court in Soshi Bhushan (1893 15 All 210) gave claim its widest interpretation — it is not limited to a claim to property, but extends to any claim to any status, custody, admission, employment, or position whatsoever.

The third intent — to cause any person to part with property — does not require that the property exist at the time the false document is made. A forged letter authorising delivery of a silver tea service when made is already forgery, as the Allahabad High Court established in Soshi Bhushan.

The fourth intent — to cause any person to enter into an express or implied contract — covers the use of false documents to induce another to enter any species of contract. Illustration (k) to Section 335 BNS provides the paradigm: A, without B's authority, signs a letter in B's name certifying A's character, intending thereby to obtain employment under Z. The contract of employment is the contract targeted by this intent, and the forgery is complete the moment the certificate is made.

The fifth intent — to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed — is the most encompassing. The Supreme Court in Vimla Dr v Delhi Administration (AIR 1963 SC 1572) held that defraud involves two elements — deceit, and either actual injury or possible injury to the person deceived, or benefit to the deceiver. In that case, Dr Vimla had signed insurance claim forms in the name of her minor daughter — in whose name the car was insured — when the car met with accidents. The Supreme Court acquitted her because neither had she obtained any advantage by signing in the daughter's name, nor had the insurance company suffered any loss. Both elements of fraud — deceit and injury or advantage — must coexist. The general principle that flows from Vimla is therefore: where there is deception but no injury to another and no advantage to the deceiver, the fifth intent is not satisfied.

Vimla was sharply distinguished in GS Bansal v Delhi Administration (AIR 1963 SC 1577), where an heir bypassed the legal procedure for encashing National Savings Certificates by forging his deceased father's signature. The Supreme Court convicted him — because, by avoiding the legal succession procedure, the accused had obtained a clear advantage (saving the expense and trouble of a succession certificate), and the postal authorities were deceived into parting with money through an unlawful device. Both elements of fraud were present, and the forgery was complete.

V. The Critical Principle: A Document Must Tell a Lie About Itself

Running through the entire law of forgery is the principle that a document is not false merely because it contains false statements. It is false only when it tells a lie about itself — when it misrepresents its own authorship, identity, date, or origin. A person who enters a false statement in a document that he executes in his own name and his own authority has not made a false document — he may be guilty of cheating or some other offence, but not of forgery. As the Supreme Court held in Mohd Ibrahim v State of Bihar (2009) 8 SCC 751, when a person executes a document purporting to convey property he does not own, he is not claiming to be someone else, nor claiming authority from someone else. The document does not tell a lie about its own maker, and no false document has been made.

VI. Application to Scenario — Signing One's Own Name as Forgery

The Apparent Paradox

The specific scenario — A signs his own name to a bill of exchange, intending that it may be believed that the bill was drawn by another person of the same name — triggers what many consider a paradox: how can a man commit forgery by writing his own genuine name? The instinctive reaction is that forgery requires signing another's name, assuming a stranger's identity, or impersonating someone entirely different. If A has simply written his own name, the signature appears genuine. No letter has been falsified. No stranger's name has been used. Where then is the forgery?

Explanation 1 to Section 335 BNS — The Legislature's Direct Answer

The legislature foresaw this very question and answered it with unambiguous clarity in Explanation 1 to Section 335 BNS (= Explanation 1 to Section 464 IPC):

"A man's signature of his own name may amount to forgery."

This is not a judicial inference or an interpretive stretch. It is a statutory declaration. The Explanation then supplies four sub-illustrations, the first of which is precisely the case before us:

Illustration (a): A signs his own name to a bill of exchange, intending that it may be believed that the bill was drawn by another person of the same name. A has committed forgery.

The answer to the question is therefore furnished by the statute itself, in terms, without ambiguity. A has committed forgery.

Why? The Governing Principle

The reason emerges from the foundational analysis of what a false document is. As established above, a document is false not when it contains false words, but when it tells a lie about its own identity. In A's case, the bill of exchange is not lying about the letters in the signature — the letters are genuinely A's own name. What the bill is lying about is whose legal and commercial identity stands behind the signature. A is signing the bill with the deliberate intent that the banker, holder, or commercial counterparty shall believe the bill was drawn by the other person of the same name — perhaps a person of established financial standing, proven commercial credit, or known business reliability. A is exploiting the coincidence of names as a mask for another person's identity. The instrument falsely represents that it emanates from the other person. It tells a lie about the identity of its maker. It is, therefore, a false document within the first mode of Section 335 BNS.

The authorities confirm this reasoning explicitly. The commentary on Explanation 1 states: there may be a sufficient falsity in a man merely signing his own name, if he does this in order that it may be mistaken for the signature of another person of the same name. The English case of Mead v Young (1790) 4 TR 28 — cited with authority in the Indian commentaries — settled the point: if a bill of exchange payable to A or order gets into the hands of another person of the same name as the payee, and that person, knowing that he was not the real person in whose favour it was drawn, endorses the bill, he is guilty of forgery. Similarly, in Francis (1811 Russ Ry 209), it was held that signing a bill in an assumed name is forgery, if the name was assumed to defraud the person to whom the bill is given, though such person would equally have taken the bill had the accused used his real name. The form of the deception is immaterial; what counts is the fraudulent intent and the false impression created.

The Essential Ingredients Satisfied

Applying the framework of Sections 335 and 336 BNS to A's scenario, every ingredient of forgery is present.

First, a false document has been made. A has signed the bill intending it to be mistaken for the bill of another person of the same name. The document tells a lie about the identity of its maker. It falls squarely within the first mode of Section 335 BNS, as illuminated by Explanation 1 and its Illustration (a).

Second, the making is dishonest and fraudulent. Section 24 BNS defines dishonestly as an intention to cause wrongful gain or wrongful loss. A intends to obtain, through the bill, the credit and financial standing of the other person — a wrongful gain to himself extracted from the commercial identity of someone who never consented to it. Section 25 BNS defines fraudulently as acting with intent to defraud. A intends to deceive the banker or holder of the bill into believing they are dealing with a person of established standing when they are in fact dealing with someone else entirely.

Third, the requisite intent under Section 336(1) BNS is present — most directly, the intent to commit fraud. A intends that the banker or holder shall act upon a false belief as to the drawer's identity, discount or honour the bill, and extend credit or money on the basis of that false belief. The two elements of defraud identified by the Supreme Court in Vimla Dr v Delhi Administration (AIR 1963 SC 1572) — deceit and injury or advantage — are both satisfied. The deceit is the false attribution of the bill to the other person's identity. The advantage is the unearned credit that A secures by presenting himself, through the vehicle of the shared name, as the other person.

The Three Cognate Illustrations

The three remaining sub-illustrations to Explanation 1 illuminate the same principle from different angles and confirm that it operates across a range of transactions.

Illustration (b) extends the analysis to acceptance rather than drawing: A writes the word "accepted" on a piece of paper and signs it with Z's name, so that B may afterwards write a bill of exchange on the paper as if it had been accepted by Z. A is guilty of forgery even before the bill is drawn. And if B, knowing the fact, draws the bill on the paper pursuant to A's intention, B is also guilty of forgery. This illustration establishes joint liability for a forgery executed in stages and confirms that the offence is committed at the moment of making the false document, regardless of whether it is subsequently used.

Illustration (c) is the most direct parallel to illustration (a): A picks up a bill of exchange payable to the order of a different person of the same name as A. A endorses the bill in his own name, intending to cause it to be believed that it was endorsed by the person to whose order it was payable. A has committed forgery. In illustration (a), the same name is used to falsely attribute the drawing of the bill; in illustration (c), it is used to falsely attribute the endorsement of the bill. The governing principle is identical in both cases — the coincidence of names is the instrument of impersonation.

Illustration (d) brings in antedating with a self-signature, confirming that a person commits forgery in his own name not only when misrepresenting the identity of the maker, but also when misrepresenting the time of execution.

The Contrast with the Vimla Scenario

It is instructive to place A's scenario against the facts in Vimla Dr v Delhi Administration (AIR 1963 SC 1572), because the contrast between the two cases sharpens the analysis. Dr Vimla signed insurance claim forms in the name of her minor daughter N, in whose name the car was insured. The Supreme Court acquitted her because the claims were genuine and true; neither had she obtained any advantage by signing as N, nor had the insurance company suffered any loss. There was deception in form — signing as N rather than as herself — but no fraud in substance, because no injury resulted and no advantage was secured.

In A's scenario, the position is diametrically opposite. A signs in his own name — but with the intent that his name shall be taken for the name of a different, creditworthy individual. The advantage A seeks is real and specific: the credit and financial standing of that other person. The banker or holder who advances money or discounts the bill on the strength of that person's name suffers actual or potential loss; A obtains an advantage to which he has no right. Both elements of fraud are present, and the forgery is complete.

VII. Punishment and Classification

Section 336 BNS provides a graduated punishment structure corresponding to the gravity of the specific intent with which the forgery is committed.

Under Section 336(2) BNS, the basic punishment for forgery is imprisonment of either description up to two years, or fine, or both. The offence is non-cognizable and bailable, triable by a Magistrate of the first class.

In A's scenario, however, the purpose of signing the bill is to negotiate it with a banker — which is itself the act of cheating the banker into extending credit or advancing money on a false belief as to the drawer's identity. This engages Section 336(3) BNS (= Section 468 IPC), which punishes forgery committed with the intent that the forged document shall be used for the purpose of cheating, with imprisonment up to seven years and fine. The offence under this sub-section is cognizable and non-bailable. As the authorities confirm, the accused need not have actually committed cheating — what matters is the intention that the forged bill shall be used for cheating, and that intention is self-evident on the face of A's transaction.