Limitation ActComputation of Period of Limitation 29 June 2026· 6 min read

    Discuss the law relating to the computation of the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application and exclusion of time bona fidely spent in pursuing proceedings in a Court having no jurisdiction.

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    Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 protects a litigant who has gone to a court that turns out to be the wrong one. Without it, the time spent before that court would count against him, and he could find his claim barred when he reached the proper forum. The section gives him an exclusion in computing limitation for the fresh proceeding. Two ideas run through the cases: the section is there to protect a man who has honestly tried to get his case heard on the merits, and it must not be turned into a way to cover negligence.

    The text of section 14(1) is that in computing the period of limitation for any suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. Sub-section (2) gives the same exclusion to an applicant, for an application, where the earlier proceeding was against the same party for the same relief. Sub-section (3) applies sub-section (1) to a fresh suit filed with permission under Order XXIII Rule 1 where the first suit must fail by reason of a defect of jurisdiction or a cause of a like nature. The Explanation has three clauses: both the day of institution of the former proceeding and the day it ended are counted in the excluded period; a plaintiff or applicant resisting an appeal is deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding; and misjoinder of parties or of causes of action is a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction.

    The courts have reduced the section to a list of conditions. Both proceedings must be civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party. The earlier one must have been prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith. It must have failed because of a defect of jurisdiction or a cause of a like nature. The two proceedings must relate to the same matter in issue. And both must be in a court (Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department, (2008) 7 SCC 169). The requirement of a court has a real consequence: the section has been held not to apply to proceedings before a quasi-judicial tribunal (Kalpraj Dharamshi v Kotak Investment Advisors Ltd, (2021) 10 SCC 401). It does, however, apply to proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 that are brought before a court, because that Act does not exclude it and section 43 applies the Limitation Act to arbitrations (State of Goa v Western Builders, (2006) 6 SCC 239 : AIR 2006 SC 2525). Time spent on an application to set aside an award in a court that could not entertain it can therefore be excluded.

    Good faith is the condition that causes most dispute. The Supreme Court has said that in this section it means the exercise of due care and attention (Deena v Bharat Singh, (2002) 6 SCC 336 : AIR 2002 SC 2768), and that it is a question of fact. An honest mistake of law on a doubtful point of jurisdiction or procedure qualifies as readily as a mistake of fact. In Rabindra Nath Samuel Dawson v Sivakami (AIR 1972 SC 730) the Court held that an error in valuing the suit, or a deficiency in court fee, does not show want of good faith; the plaintiffs there presented the plaints in the proper court on the day they were returned. On the other hand, the benefit is refused where the earlier remedy was not pursued in good faith (Wamanrao Keshavrao Deshmukh v Dinkarrao Bhausaheb Deshmukh, AIR 1999 SC 322). Courts have refused it to a plaintiff who pursued a remedy that the law plainly forbade, and to one who, despite the defendant's objection from the start, did not cure a defect he could easily have cured. The advice of counsel is relevant, but the conduct of the lawyer is examined: if his view was unreasonable or palpably negligent, the party bears the consequence, and if his view, though wrong, was a reasonable one to take, the party is entitled to the benefit.

    The phrase "other cause of a like nature" has been read liberally. The defect need not be one of jurisdiction in the strict sense; any circumstance that prevents the court from entertaining the dispute on the merits can qualify, provided it is akin to a want of jurisdiction (Roshanlal Kuthalia v RB Mohan Singh Oberoi, (1975) 4 SCC 628; Union of India v West Coast Paper Mills Ltd, (2004) 3 SCC 458). The Explanation settles that misjoinder is such a cause. But the benefit is not given where the earlier proceeding failed on its merits, or where the court did have jurisdiction and the cause of action was different.

    On computation, section 14 excludes time and does not restart it. The days excluded are added to the end of the prescribed period (Kali Prasad Mahton v Santlal Mahton, AIR 1957 Pat 442), and the fresh suit is tested as if it were a new suit in which the excluded period is left out. The excluded period runs from the day the earlier proceeding was instituted to the day it ended, both days counted. The gap between the return of the plaint and its presentation in the proper court is not excluded except for the reasonable time needed to go to that court. Termination of the earlier proceeding is not necessary for claiming the exclusion in an appropriate case, but the exclusion stops at the date the proceeding ended. No separate application is needed to claim it; the plaint should plead the facts.

    A short illustration shows the working. A has a claim to which a three-year article applies, with the period beginning on 11 January 2016 and ending on 10 January 2019. On 10 January 2018 A sues in a civil court, which holds on 10 July 2018 that it lacks pecuniary jurisdiction and returns the plaint. A presents it in the proper court on 20 February 2019, after the original last day. The excluded period runs from 10 January 2018 to 10 July 2018, counting both days, which is 182 days. The last day moves from 10 January 2019 to 11 July 2019, and the suit presented on 20 February 2019 is within time. The months between the return of the plaint and its presentation are not excluded, but they are not needed, because only 955 days in all are counted against A.

    The essential point is that section 14 is a rule of computation. It does not condone delay, and it has nothing to do with the discretion of a court to admit an application under section 5.

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