Discuss the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act regarding the acquisition of ownership by possession.
The Limitation Act, 1963 is ordinarily a statute about remedies. Its general rule is that when the time for suing has run out, the court will refuse relief, but the right itself survives, so that a creditor whose debt is time-barred may still, for example, retain a security he already holds. Acquisition of ownership by possession is the principal exception to that rule, and it is created by section 27. The section reads: "At the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished." Everything else in the law of adverse possession is an application of this one sentence read together with the articles that fix the period.
The working of the section can be seen by following what happens to an owner who is dispossessed. For a suit by such an owner, Article 65 allows twelve years from the time the defendant's possession becomes adverse to the plaintiff. Article 64 gives the same twelve years to a person who sues on the strength of earlier possession alone and was dispossessed while in possession; there the period runs from the date of dispossession. When the period under the relevant article expires, section 27 does two things at once. It shuts the owner's door to the court, and it also extinguishes his title. Because a title cannot remain vacant, the person who has been in adverse possession is left as the holder of a good title. The Act nowhere says in so many words that the possessor becomes owner; that result follows from extinguishment of the former owner's right. The point of difference with a time-barred debt is therefore that here the right and not merely the remedy perishes. Section 27 is also confined to suits for possession of property that can be recovered in specie, so it has no application to a bare claim for declaration, or to specific performance of a contract.
The Explanation to Article 65 deals with three cases in which the defendant's possession is not treated as adverse at the usual moment. Where the plaintiff is a remainderman, a reversioner other than a landlord, or a devisee, the defendant's possession is deemed adverse only when the estate falls into possession. Where the plaintiff is a Hindu or Muslim who becomes entitled on the death of a Hindu or Muslim female, time begins only on her death. And where a purchaser at an execution sale buys when the judgment-debtor was out of possession, he is treated as the judgment-debtor's representative, and the period therefore runs from the time the judgment-debtor himself ceased to be in possession. The second of these provisions is of limited reach today, because since the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 a Hindu widow's limited estate in property she possessed has generally matured into full ownership under its section 14, and so the reversioner's expectancy of which the Explanation speaks arises mainly in older or exceptional cases.
Government is given longer protection by Article 112. A suit by or on behalf of the Central or a State Government, other than one in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, may be brought within thirty years, counted from the time at which the period would begin to run against a similar suit by a private person. It is Article 112, and not Article 65, that is the source of the thirty years commonly mentioned against the State, and a person who claims to have prescribed against public land must therefore make good thirty years of adverse possession and not twelve.
The Act also contains a second route to a right in land, which is prescription of easements. Section 25 provides that a right of way, a watercourse, the use of water, or any other easement, whether positive or negative, which has been peaceably and openly enjoyed by a person claiming title to it as an easement and as of right, without interruption, for twenty years, becomes "absolute and indefeasible." Light and air to a building are covered in terms. The twenty years must be a period ending within two years before the institution of the suit in which the claim is contested, and where the servient property belongs to the Government the period becomes thirty years. The Explanation says that nothing is an interruption unless there has been an actual discontinuance of possession or enjoyment by reason of an obstruction by someone other than the claimant, and the obstruction has been submitted to or acquiesced in for one year after the claimant has notice of it and of the person responsible. It should be added that Orissa repealed section 25 with effect from 31 August 1967, so the section does not apply in that State.
The change brought by the 1963 Act in the burden of proof is worth mentioning because it affects how these cases are fought. Under Articles 142 and 144 of the 1908 Act a plaintiff-owner had to prove that he had been in possession within twelve years before suit. Under Article 65 the plaintiff proves his title, and it is the defendant who pleads and proves that he has held adversely for the full period. That shift follows the recommendation of the Law Commission and puts the burden on the person who is asking the law to take away another man's property.
Finally, it has been settled by a three-judge decision of the Supreme Court in Ravinder Kaur Grewal v Manjit Kaur, (2019) 8 SCC 729, that a person who has completed the period and so perfected his title can use it not only as a defence but also as the foundation of a suit, for declaration or for recovery if he is dispossessed. The older view that adverse possession is only a shield was overruled. The section therefore works in both directions, but the person who invokes it still carries the whole burden of proving the facts that Q40 describes.
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