Distinguish between the following: (i) Fact in issue and relevant fact. (ii) Disproved and not proved. (iii) Proved and not proved.

There are few distinctions in the law of evidence that are as foundational — and as frequently confused — as the three pairs presented in this question. Each pair operates at the threshold of the evidentiary process: they determine what the court is being asked to decide, how it processes what is placed before it, and the legal consequence of the evidence it receives. To treat these distinctions loosely is to misunderstand the entire structure of the law of evidence. Let us examine each in turn, with the care the subject demands.

I. Fact in Issue vs. Relevant Fact

The distinction between a fact in issue and a relevant fact is the cornerstone upon which the entire architecture of Chapter II of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA) rests. Under Section 3 of the IEA (corresponding to Section 2(l) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 — BSA), a "fact in issue" means and includes "any fact from which, either by itself or in connection with other facts, the existence, non-existence, nature or extent of any right, liability, or disability, asserted or denied in any suit or proceeding, necessarily follows." A relevant fact, on the other hand, is not directly in contention — it is a fact which, under one or more of the provisions of Chapter II of the IEA (Sections 6 to 55), is connected with a fact in issue in such a manner as to render that fact in issue more or less probable. Section 2(k) of the BSA defines a relevant fact as one connected with another fact "in any of the ways referred to in the provisions of this Adhiniyam relating to the relevancy of facts."

The relationship between the two is best understood through the Latin terminology borrowed from the classical law of evidence: the factum probandum (the fact to be proved) is the fact in issue, while the factum probans (the evidentiary fact that proves) is the relevant fact. The fact in issue is the destination; the relevant fact is the road that leads to it.

Section 5 of the IEA (now Section 3 of the BSA) gives the governing rule: "Evidence may be given in any suit or proceeding of the existence or non-existence of every fact in issue and of such other facts as are hereinafter declared to be relevant, and of no others." The words "and of no others" impose a strict duty on the court to exclude anything outside the scope of facts in issue and declared-relevant facts.

Consider the classic illustration given in the IEA itself: A is accused of the murder of B. The following are facts in issue — (a) that A caused B's death; (b) that A intended to cause B's death; and (c) whether A was of unsound mind at the time. Now, suppose the prosecution wishes to prove that A was seen purchasing a weapon of the kind used for the killing, shortly before the murder. That fact of purchase is not a fact in issue — nobody has specifically alleged it — but it is a relevant fact because it is the preparation for the act, falling under Section 8 of the IEA (now Section 6 of the BSA) relating to motive and preparation.

Phipson's celebrated formulation puts it plainly: a fact in issue is one "directly in contention between the parties" — one which the plaintiff or prosecutor must establish to win, or which the defendant must establish to succeed in a defence. The relevant fact, by contrast, serves as circumstantial evidence — it tends to prove or disprove the fact in issue, but is not itself the proposition whose existence is disputed. In Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal (AIR 2009 SC 1103), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the object of framing issues in a civil proceeding is precisely to identify the facts in issue — the questions or points that require judicial decision — so that parties know what they must prove at trial.

The distinction also has an important consequence for the burden of proof. The party asserting a right must prove the facts in issue that constitute the legal basis of that right. Relevant facts, however, are adduced in evidence in order to prove those facts in issue — they are the evidentiary building blocks. A relevant fact need not be directly pleaded in the same way a fact in issue must be, but it must fall within one of the categories of relevance declared by the statute. The court has no power to receive evidence of a fact — however logical its connection might seem — unless that fact qualifies as relevant under one of the specific sections of the Act.

II. Disproved vs. Not Proved

The second distinction is one of the most practically significant yet conceptually nuanced in the law of evidence. The definitions appear in Section 3 of the IEA (now Section 2(b) and 2(h) of the BSA) and occupy barely a few lines of text, but the difference between the two conditions has profound consequences for the outcome of litigation.

A fact is said to be "disproved" "when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes that it does not exist, or considers its non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does not exist."

A fact is said to be "not proved" "when it is neither proved nor disproved."

The difference, expressed simply, is this: disproved is an affirmative judicial conclusion that a fact does not exist. Not proved is a state of epistemic suspension — the court has neither accepted nor rejected the fact; it remains in a zone of uncertainty. As one commentator aptly observed, "not proved" indicates a state of mind between the two definite states of proved and disproved, where the court is unable to say precisely how the matter stands.

In practical terms, "not proved" means the party who bore the burden of proving a fact has failed to discharge that burden — but that failure does not translate into a positive finding that the fact does not exist. "Disproved" goes further: it is a positive finding of non-existence. The distinction becomes critical in criminal proceedings. When the prosecution fails to prove an element of the offence, that element is not proved — the accused is acquitted not because innocence is established, but because guilt is not proved. This is the core of the presumption of innocence and the standard beyond reasonable doubt. Acquittal does not equal a finding of innocence; it is a finding that guilt was not proved to the required standard.

The converse is also significant. When an accused pleads a defence — say, the right of private defence or insanity — and the court finds that defence to be not merely unproved but positively contradicted by the evidence, the defence is disproved. This has a stronger bearing on the court's assessment of the accused's version.

The Allahabad High Court in Emperor v. Shafi Ahmed (AIR 1925 PC 305) noted that "not proved" is simply a state of uncertainty, while "disproved" requires a positive belief in non-existence or at least a conclusion that non-existence is so probable that a prudent man would act upon that supposition. The standard in both definitions — the prudent man test — is the same standard that governs the definition of "proved", which ensures consistency across all three states.

III. Proved vs. Not Proved

The third distinction completes the triangle. A fact is said to be "proved" under Section 3 of the IEA (now Section 2(h) read with Section 2(b) of the BSA) "when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists."

The contrast with "not proved" is this: proved requires the court to cross a threshold — a belief in existence, or at minimum, a probability of existence strong enough that a reasonable, prudent person would act upon it in the affairs of ordinary life. Not proved is the condition where that threshold has not been crossed, but neither has the court arrived at the converse conclusion. It is an intermediate state — a non-finding. The Act applies the same standard of proof — the prudent man test — across both civil and criminal cases, though the degree of probability required will vary: beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases and preponderance of probability in civil cases. The prudent man, in a criminal case, is a man who will not act unless he is convinced to the point where no reasonable doubt lingers; in a civil case, he is satisfied when one side's account is more probable than the other's.

In Gulabchand v. Kudilal (AIR 1966 SC 1734), the Supreme Court confirmed that the definitions of proved, disproved, and not proved in Section 3 together describe what degree of certainty the court must reach before recording a finding, and that the standard is uniform in all civil cases, varying only in quantum when it comes to criminal proceedings. The Bombay High Court in Emperor v. Shafi Ahmed (1925 31 Bom LR 515) remarked that the definition of "disproved" is merely the converse of "proved" — the same mental process, but directed toward non-existence rather than existence.

A Comparative Overview

The interplay between these three concepts governs every judicial proceeding from its first moment to its last. The judge who begins by identifying facts in issue, then admits only those relevant facts that the law permits, and finally applies the proved/not proved/disproved test to each piece of evidence — that judge is applying the Indian law of evidence in its full rigour and sophistication.