During the pendency of a suit for specific performance against A, A sells the disputed property to B. What is B's position?

The Sale Is Valid, But Subservient

The first and most important thing to understand about B's position is that the sale to B is not void. The doctrine of lis pendens does not strike down or annul the transfer. As the Supreme Court made clear in Thomson Press India Ltd v Nanak Builders and Investors Pvt Ltd (AIR 2013 SC 2389), the effect of section 52 is not to wipe out the transfer altogether but to subordinate it to the rights based on the decree in the suit. As between A and B, the sale is perfectly valid — B gets A's title, A gets the consideration. The deed is executed, registered, and operates between the parties to it. But that title comes with a condition the law attaches automatically — it will yield to whatever the court ultimately decides in the pending suit. B, in other words, steps into A's shoes and can have no better position than A occupied.

Good Faith Is Irrelevant to B

B may argue that he had no knowledge of the pending suit for specific performance, that he paid full market value, and that he is an honest purchaser. The law shuts this door completely. The doctrine of lis pendens, being a principle of public policy, makes the question of good faith entirely irrelevant. As the Supreme Court stated in Amit Kumar Shaw v Farida Khatoon (AIR 2005 SC 2209), a litigating party is exempted from taking notice of a title acquired during the pendency of litigation. In Govindapillai v Aiyyappan Krishnan (AIR 1957 Ker 10), the court laid down the foundational principle that the doctrine of lis pendens rests not upon notice — actual or constructive — but solely upon necessity. B simply cannot escape the operation of section 52 by pleading bona fide or ignorance. The protection of sections 41 and 51, which do turn on good faith, yield entirely to section 52. A purchaser during the pendency of a lis is not entitled to the protection of section 41.

B Is Bound by the Decree as If He Were a Party

Here lies the most consequential aspect of B's position. It is well settled that a transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree just as much as if he was a party to the suit. B has, in the words of the Allahabad High Court in Shyam Lal v Sohan Lal (AIR 1928 All 3), put himself in privity with the suit and must be treated not as a stranger to it but as a party, consequently bound by the decree in full. If the suit is decreed in favour of the plaintiff and the court directs A to execute a sale deed, B cannot obstruct the execution of that decree. In Sanjay Verma v Manik Roy (AIR 2007 SC 1332), the Supreme Court held that a lis pendens purchaser has no right to be impleaded as of right, and the doctrine does not prohibit the transfer — it only mandates that the transferee will be fully bound by the decree passed against his transferor. A purchaser pendente lite who causes obstruction in execution proceedings cannot require the court to decide his objection like a suit, nor can he question the legality or propriety of the decree.

B's Right to Be Impleaded

This brings up a practical question — can B at least seek to be made a party to the suit and participate in the proceedings? The law's answer is nuanced. B is not entitled to be impleaded as a matter of right. His application for impleadment may be refused, and he will still be bound by the decree. However, the court has a discretion to permit his impleadment under Order XXII, Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, and would ordinarily exercise it in B's favour if his interest in the subject matter is substantial and not merely peripheral — especially if there is a risk that A, having parted with the property, may not vigorously defend the suit and might even collude with the plaintiff against B's interests. As a full Bench of the Orissa High Court held in Jagannath Mahaprabhu v Pravat Chandra Chatterjee (AIR 1992 Ori 47), though there is no need for a transferee pendente lite to be impleaded, the court can exercise its discretion judicially and an alienee would ordinarily be joined as a party to enable him to protect his own interests. If B is impleaded, he is entitled to be heard on the merits and to take all defences which were available to A.

What If B Further Sells to C?

A natural follow-up question is whether B's position transmits to anyone who acquires from him. The answer is yes. The transferee from B — that is, a transferee of a transferee of the judgment-debtor — is equally bound by the ultimate decision in the suit under Order 21, Rules 98 and 102 of the Civil Procedure Code, read with section 52. The doctrine runs with the property until the litigation is finally resolved, not merely until the first pendente lite transfer.

The Practical Consequence for B

To sum up B's situation plainly: B holds the property under a title that could survive or perish depending entirely on the outcome of the suit for specific performance. If the plaintiff's suit fails, B retains the property unaffected. If the plaintiff succeeds and obtains a decree for specific performance, B must yield the property to the plaintiff, because B's title — though valid as between himself and A — is subservient to the court's decree. B's only real recourse, if he believes A colluded with the plaintiff or failed to properly defend the suit, is to establish that fact and seek appropriate relief. But he cannot, in any ordinary case, resist the decree by claiming independent rights as a purchaser for value without notice. A defendant cannot, by alienating the property during the pendency of litigation, deprive the successful plaintiff of the fruits of the case.