Examine the Constitutional validity of the law in the following case: A law granting to any building belonging to government sponsored Financing Board exemption from the operation of law relating to Rent Control.
The only provision that could be put forward against this law is Article 14, which guarantees equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws. A rent control law protects tenants of buildings against eviction and against excessive rent. A law exempting the buildings of a government sponsored Financing Board from it places those buildings in a separate class, so that their tenants lose a protection that other tenants enjoy. The question is whether that classification is reasonable.
The test is the one laid down in the decisions on classification. The classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those grouped together from others, and the differentia must have a rational relation to the object of the law (State of West Bengal v Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75). There is a presumption of constitutionality, and the person who challenges the law must show a clear violation, which here would mean that tenants of the Board's buildings are similarly situated to other tenants (R K Dalmia v Justice S R Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538).
Exactly this kind of exemption has been before the Supreme Court. In Baburao Shantaram v Bombay Housing Board (AIR 1954 SC 153) the Court held valid the exemption of the lands and buildings of government, of a local authority and of a government sponsored housing board from the Rent Control Act. Its reason was that such bodies have no profit motive and would not evict their tenants simply to raise rents as private landlords usually do, so their tenants are not similarly situated with the tenants of private persons. The difference in the character of the landlord has a rational connection with the object of rent control, which is to protect tenants from the exploitation of landlords seeking profit. Discrimination by the State in its own favour has also been upheld, since the State and a private person cannot be treated on an equal footing.
On this authority the law in question is valid, if the Financing Board is a public body of the same kind, sponsored by government and not run for private profit. The Court would ask the same question, whether the nature and purpose of the Board justify the different treatment.
Three qualifications should be added. First, the reasoning rests on the absence of a profit motive. If the Financing Board were a commercial body that charges rent for gain in the way a private landlord does, the justification would be much weaker, and a challenge based on equality would have a better chance. Secondly, even a valid exemption does not free the State and its instrumentalities from the Constitution. The Supreme Court has held that, having been exempted from rent control legislation by the legislature, the State and its instrumentalities cannot be tied to the same restrictions, but they must still be just, fair and reasonable in their dealings with tenants, and cannot indulge in rack renting or whimsical eviction. Their actions can be tested both under the rent legislation and under Article 14 (Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai, (2004) 3 SCC 214). Thirdly, an exemption is open to challenge if it lacks a rational basis or has outlived its reason. The Supreme Court struck down a provision of the Andhra Pradesh rent control law that exempted all buildings built after 26 August 1957, because it created a privileged class of landlords without a rational basis, though it accepted that exemption of new buildings for a limited time encourages building and is justified (Motor General Traders v State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1984 SC 121). It is also settled that an exemption that was valid when made may become discriminatory with time (Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1998 SC 602).
The conclusion is that the law is valid under Article 14 if the Board is a non-profit public body, as in Baburao Shantaram, and the exemption does not leave the Board's tenants without the protection of fair dealing, which the Constitution itself continues to require of the State.
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