Explain divorce by mutual consent under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act.
Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 was inserted by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976. It allows divorce by consent: where both spouses have concluded that the marriage is over, they need not allege a matrimonial offence. It departs from the fault theory, but it is not an easy exit, and the section carries procedural safeguards.
The Foundation: What Section 13-B Says
The provision operates in two stages. The first stage is the joint presentation of the petition. Both parties to the marriage, not one, not a representative, but both, must together present a petition to the district court. That petition must aver three things: first, that they have been living separately for a period of one year or more; second, that they have not been able to live together; and third, that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved. Once the petition is presented, the parties must then wait. They cannot move the court for the final decree earlier than six months after the presentation of the petition, and they must do so not later than eighteen months from that date. If no motion is made within this outer limit, the petition stands dismissed. On the second motion, the court satisfies itself that the marriage was solemnised, that the averments in the petition are true, and that the consent of neither party was obtained by force, fraud or undue influence, and thereupon passes a decree of divorce.
The Three Conditions for the Petition
The three averments are substantive and not formalities.
Living separately does not necessarily mean living in different houses or different cities. The law looks at substance. Parties who are living under the same roof may still be said to be living separately if they are not living with each other as husband and wife, that is, if the matrimonial relationship in its practical sense has ceased. The provision recognises the fact of separation and does not require different addresses.
Not being able to live together means something more than a temporary disagreement or a passing estrangement. It must be established to the satisfaction of the court that the marriage has broken down irretrievably, that the parties have genuinely arrived at the position where resumption of matrimonial life is not a real possibility. A mere whim is not enough; the facts must show a genuine failure of the marriage.
Mutual agreement is the cornerstone of the entire provision. Both parties must genuinely and freely agree to the dissolution. The court is required under Section 23(1)(bb) of the Act to satisfy itself that consent has not been obtained by force, fraud or undue influence. The inquiry is a real one, and it matters most where one party may be under social or family pressure.
The Cooling-Off Period and the Second Motion
The six months between the first and second motion is a cooling-off period. The parties may reflect, seek reconciliation, and withdraw their consent if they have second thoughts. The aim is to check hasty decisions.
Whether the six-month period is mandatory or directory was disputed among the High Courts. In Manish Goel v. Rohini Goel (AIR 2010 SC 1099) the Supreme Court held that the period could be waived only by the Supreme Court under Article 142, and not by the lower courts. That position has since been changed. In Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur ((2017) 8 SCC 746) the Supreme Court held the period to be directory, so that a family court may waive it where the statutory conditions are met, the parties have been separated well beyond the period, efforts at reconciliation have failed, and waiting would only prolong their suffering. In Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan (2023 SCC OnLine SC 544) a Constitution Bench held that the Supreme Court may itself dissolve a marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown under Article 142, and may waive the period.
The Vexed Question of Withdrawal of Consent
No aspect of Section 13-B has generated more judicial controversy than the question of whether one of the parties may unilaterally withdraw consent after the joint petition has been filed but before the final decree is passed.
Some High Courts took the view that consent, once given, is irrevocable. The Bombay High Court took this view in Jayashree v. Ramesh (AIR 1984 Bom 302), as did the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Harcharan Kaur v. Nanchhatdar Singh (AIR 1988 P&H 27).
The Supreme Court settled the question in Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash (AIR 1992 SC 1904), and Hitesh Bhatnagar v. Deepa Bhatnagar (AIR 2011 SC 1637) later followed it. The court held that mutual consent must subsist not only at the time of the initial petition but continuously until the court passes the final decree. If either party withdraws consent before the decree is passed, there can be no decree under Section 13-B. The reason is that the section requires a joint motion for the second stage, and the cooling-off period presupposes that the parties may reconsider.
The Supreme Court later reinforced this in Smruti Pahariya v. Sanjay Pahariya (AIR 2009 SC 2840), reiterating that continuing consent is a sine qua non of a decree under Section 13-B. If the court receives no joint motion, or if one party explicitly withdraws, the petition must stand dismissed.
There is one exception. In Anil Kumar Jain v. Maya Jain (AIR 2010 SC 229) the Supreme Court held that even where one party has withdrawn consent, it may itself dissolve the marriage under Article 142 of the Constitution in exceptional circumstances, but the district courts and High Courts cannot do so.
Silence, Inaction, and Non-Appearance
A related but distinct question is whether a party's silence or non-appearance after the initial petition amounts to withdrawal of consent. Silence by itself is not withdrawal. A party who gives consent at the time of filing and then remains absent on subsequent dates does not, by that absence alone, signal that the consent has been withdrawn. However, the court cannot proceed on a presumption of continuing consent in the absence of both parties, the second motion must be made jointly, and the court must record its satisfaction at that stage. As the Supreme Court observed in Smruti Pahariya, the primary basis of marriage is consent of the parties, and the revocation of the relationship itself must be consensual.
Conversion of Other Petitions
Courts have, in appropriate circumstances, allowed the conversion of a petition filed under Section 13 on a fault ground into a petition for mutual consent under Section 13-B. Where parties who began as adversaries reach an understanding, the court need not insist on completing the contested proceeding. The requirements of Section 13-B, however, must still be independently satisfied; the court cannot treat concessions made by one party in cross-examination as amounting to the three ingredients of mutual consent under Section 13-B.
The Duty of the Court
Before passing any decree, even in a consent petition, the court's duty under Section 23 of the Act is not suspended. The court must be satisfied that consent was freely given, that there was no force, fraud, collusion or undue influence, and that the averments in the petition are true. The court must also make an endeavour at reconciliation, as required by Section 23(2). A consent decree is a judicial act that follows a real inquiry.
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