Explain what is meant by the expression "failure of constitutional machinery in a state under Article 356 of the Constitution of India." Which situation will fall and which will not fall within this expression? Explain.
The Constitutional Text: Articles 356 and 365
Article 356(1) provides that if the President, on receipt of a report from the Governor of a State or otherwise, is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, the President may issue a Proclamation assuming to himself the functions of the State Government and the powers of the Governor, declaring that the powers of the State Legislature shall be exercisable by Parliament, and making such incidental provisions as necessary to give effect to the Proclamation's objects. The phrase "cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution" is the operative constitutional standard, and it is deliberately broad and undefined in the text itself, leaving the precise content of "failure of constitutional machinery" to be filled in through practice, executive judgment, and, since 1994, judicial scrutiny.
Article 365 provides a specific and additional ground linked to this same expression, stating that where any State has failed to comply with, or to give effect to, any directions given by the Union in exercise of its executive power under any provision of the Constitution, it shall be lawful for the President to hold that a situation has arisen in which the government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. This provision creates a deemed failure of constitutional machinery specifically arising from a State's non-compliance with binding Union directions, such as those issued under Articles 256 and 257 concerning the exercise of executive power by the States in a manner not impeding the exercise of the executive power of the Union.
The Sarkaria Commission's Fourfold Classification
The Sarkaria Commission on Centre-State Relations, examining decades of practice under Article 356, classified the circumstances constituting failure of constitutional machinery into four broad categories, a classification that has become the standard analytical framework for understanding this expression.
Political crisis, arising where, following a general election, no party or coalition can command a majority to form a government, or where an existing Ministry resigns or is defeated on the floor of the House and no alternative government commanding majority support can be formed.
Internal subversion, arising where a State Government deliberately acts in a manner subverting the Constitution, such as engaging in flagrant, sustained, and deliberate violation of constitutional provisions, or where a Ministry, though holding a nominal legislative majority, has lost all moral authority through actions destructive of constitutional governance itself.
Physical breakdown, arising where a State's administrative machinery is unable to function due to large-scale internal disturbance, insurgency, natural calamity, or comparable circumstances that paralyse the government's capacity to govern and endanger the security of the State.
Non-compliance with constitutional directions of the Union Executive, arising specifically under Article 365, where a State persistently and deliberately refuses to give effect to binding directions lawfully issued by the Union.
The Governing Case Law: S.R. Bommai v. Union of India
The definitive judicial elaboration of what does and does not constitute a genuine failure of constitutional machinery came from the nine-judge Bench in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India. The Court held that the satisfaction of the President under Article 356(1) is not a matter of unfettered subjective discretion but is a conditional power, exercisable only where objective material genuinely discloses a situation in which the government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with constitutional provisions, and this satisfaction is subject to judicial review on grounds of mala fides, irrelevance of material, or complete absence of any material supporting the conclusion. The Court held that loss of majority support in the Legislative Assembly, being the most common trigger for invoking this power, must ordinarily be tested and established on the floor of the House itself, through a vote of confidence, rather than being assessed through the subjective, unilateral opinion of the Governor, since the Assembly, not the Governor's private assessment, is the constitutionally appropriate forum for determining whether a Ministry retains legislative confidence.
Situations That Fall Within the Expression
Drawing on Bommai and the Sarkaria classification, several categories of situations have been recognised as genuinely constituting failure of constitutional machinery.
A hung Assembly following a general election, where no party or pre-poll or post-poll alliance can muster a working majority even after a genuine attempt at government formation has failed, represents a legitimate ground, since the ordinary mechanism of representative government has, on the facts, failed to produce a functioning government at all. A confirmed loss of majority, established through an actual vote on the floor of the Assembly, such as defeat on a confidence motion or a budget, followed by the inability of any alternative combination to form a government, similarly qualifies, since this reflects an objectively verified breakdown rather than a mere assessment or apprehension. Widespread, prolonged internal disturbance, insurgency, or armed rebellion that genuinely paralyses the State's administrative and law-and-order machinery to the point where governance in accordance with constitutional norms becomes impossible, as might occur during severe ethnic violence overwhelming the State's police and civil administration, would also constitute a valid ground, falling within the physical breakdown category. Deliberate, sustained defiance by a State of binding constitutional directions lawfully issued by the Union under Articles 256, 257, or similar provisions, invoking the deemed failure recognised in Article 365, likewise qualifies, provided the non-compliance is genuine and not itself the product of an unreasonable or unlawful Union directive.
Situations That Do Not Fall Within the Expression
Bommai and subsequent constitutional practice equally clarify what does not amount to a genuine failure of constitutional machinery, and invocation of Article 356 on any of these grounds would render the Proclamation vulnerable to being struck down.
Mere maladministration, corruption allegations, or governance failures falling short of a complete breakdown do not by themselves constitute failure of constitutional machinery, since Article 356 is not a mechanism for the Union to correct policy or administrative shortcomings of a democratically elected State Government, a distinction the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised in cautioning against the conflation of poor governance with constitutional breakdown. A Governor's subjective, unverified opinion that a Ministry has lost majority support, without any actual floor test having been attempted, does not satisfy the Bommai standard, since the Court held that such loss of confidence must be objectively demonstrated on the floor of the House rather than assumed on the Governor's private assessment. A mere change of the ruling party at the Centre, without any independent finding that governance in a particular State has genuinely become impossible, cannot justify invoking Article 356 against State Governments of a different political persuasion, a pattern the Bommai Bench specifically condemned when examining the historical dismissals of 1977 and 1980. Similarly, disagreement between the Union and a State over policy matters, or ordinary political friction between different ruling parties at the Centre and in a State, does not amount to failure of constitutional machinery, since the Constitution's federal design expressly contemplates and tolerates political diversity between the Union and the States as a normal feature of democratic governance, not a symptom of constitutional breakdown.
Illustration Distinguishing the Two Categories
Suppose, following a State election, three parties each secure roughly equal seats, and despite genuine and sustained efforts by the Governor to explore possible coalition arrangements over a reasonable period, no combination can produce a working majority, and the situation persists to the point where no government can be sworn in at all. This would properly fall within the expression "failure of constitutional machinery," constituting a genuine political crisis as recognised by the Sarkaria Commission and consistent with the Bommai framework, since the ordinary democratic process has, in fact, failed to yield a functioning government. Contrast this with a situation where a State Government, having a clear working majority never seriously challenged on the floor of the Assembly, faces significant public criticism over alleged corruption, administrative inefficiency, or failure to control a localised law-and-order problem confined to certain districts, none of which has paralysed the overall functioning of the State administration. Invoking Article 356 in this second scenario would not satisfy the Bommai standard, since maladministration and public criticism, however serious, do not equate to the government being unable to be "carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution," and any Governor's report recommending dismissal on such grounds, without a genuine and demonstrated inability to govern constitutionally, would be liable to be struck down as an improper invocation of the power.
The expression "failure of constitutional machinery," therefore, denotes a genuine, objectively verifiable inability of a State Government to function in accordance with the Constitution, whether through political deadlock, deliberate subversion, physical paralysis of administration, or persistent non-compliance with Union directions under Article 365, and the Supreme Court's decision in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India stands as the decisive authority ensuring that this expression is never stretched to cover mere administrative shortcomings, unverified assessments of lost legislative confidence, or ordinary political disagreement between different levels of government, all of which the Constitution's federal and democratic design is intended to tolerate and resolve through ordinary constitutional and electoral processes rather than through the extraordinary intervention Article 356 contemplates.
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