How is the disputed handwriting of a person proved? Examine admissibility of the evidence of a handwriting expert. Discuss the evidentiary value of opinion of a 'Handwriting Expert'. 'Handwriting of person can also be proved by a person who is qualified to express an opinion.' Comment briefly.

The proof of disputed handwriting is one of the most practically significant yet intellectually nuanced questions in the law of evidence. Courts routinely encounter this issue in criminal cases of forgery, cheque dishonour, and will disputes, and in civil suits concerning the execution of deeds and promissory notes. The law has fashioned not one but multiple modes of proof, each with its own conditions of admissibility and evidentiary weight. What follows is a comprehensive discussion of the entire subject, drawing on the statutory provisions of both the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA) and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), supported by leading case law.

The Preliminary Requirement: Proof of Signature and Handwriting

Before any document can be used as evidence, the law insists that it be genuine. Section 67 IEA (now Section 65 BSA) lays down the threshold requirement: if a document is alleged to be signed or to have been written wholly or in part by any person, the signature or handwriting of so much of the document as is alleged to be in that person's handwriting must be proved to be in his handwriting. The section does not prescribe any particular method — it simply declares that the obligation of proof exists. Mere production or filing of a document in court does not amount to its proof. As the Supreme Court held in Narbada Devi Gupta v Birendra Kumar Jaiswal (2003 8 SCC 745), marking a document as an exhibit by the court is not proof of its execution.

The Six Recognised Modes of Proof

The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — and the BSA following it — recognises six distinct ways by which the handwriting of a person can be proved. They are not mutually exclusive and may be used together or in the alternative.

By the Writer Himself

The simplest and most direct mode of proof is the evidence of the author of the document. If the person who wrote or signed the document is available and is examined as a witness, he may himself testify to his authorship. This amounts to a direct, firsthand admission of execution. Where A is the alleged writer and A admits in evidence or in pleadings that the handwriting is his, that ends the inquiry as regards him. As H. Venkatachala Iyengar v B.N. Thimmajamma (AIR 1959 SC 443) makes clear, under Section 67, for proving a document, the opinions of experts under Section 45 and of persons acquainted with handwriting under Section 47 become relevant.

By a Person Who Has Seen the Writer Write

A person who was present and personally witnessed the disputed document being written or signed can depose to that fact as a witness of direct perception. In Fakhruddin v State of MP (AIR 1967 SC 1326), the Supreme Court held that the evidence of a person who has seen the writer write constitutes direct evidence and no other additional evidence is ordinarily necessary.

By a Person Acquainted with the Handwriting: Section 47 IEA / Section 41 BSA

This is the provision that specifically deals with what may be called the opinion of a qualified ordinary witness — one who is not a handwriting expert in the technical sense but who, by reason of familiarity, is capable of identifying the handwriting. Section 47 IEA (corresponding to Section 41 BSA) provides: When the Court has to form an opinion as to the person by whom any document was written or signed, the opinion of any person acquainted with the handwriting of the person by whom it is supposed to be written or signed, that it was or was not written or signed by that person, is a relevant fact.

The Explanation to Section 47 defines what it means to be "acquainted" with another's handwriting. A person is acquainted if:

• He has seen that person write;

• He has received documents purporting to be written by that person in reply to his own communications;

• In the ordinary course of business, documents purporting to be written by that person have been habitually submitted to him.

The illustration to the section is vivid and instructive: B, a merchant in Calcutta (now Bengaluru under the BSA illustration), has corresponded with A, a merchant in London (now Itanagar under the BSA). B's clerk C has routinely examined and filed that correspondence. D, B's broker, has habitually received A's letters for advice. The opinions of B, C, and D — none of whom has ever seen A write — are nonetheless relevant as to whether the letter in question is in A's handwriting. The section, therefore, makes familarity of any kind — whether by correspondence, business routine, or personal observation — a sufficient basis for the expression of opinion.

The word "habitually" in the Explanation does not mean the frequency of occasions but the invariability of the practice. In Emperor v Ponde No. 2 (1925, 27 Bom LR 1031), a record-keeper whose official duty was to file papers sent to him was held to be competent to testify about the handwriting of the person whose papers he had filed, even if the number of documents was not numerically large.

The wife of a person has been recognised as a person acquainted with her husband's handwriting. In Shankeappa v Sushilabai (AIR 1984 Kant 112), a letter written by a husband to another woman was tested by reference to his wife's opinion — and the Karnataka High Court held her to be a person "acquainted" within the meaning of the section. Similarly, a person who has custody of family records and has thereby become familiar with the handwriting of deceased members may express an opinion.

The Comment: "Handwriting Can Also Be Proved By a Person Qualified to Express an Opinion"

This proposition lies at the very heart of Section 47. The contrast with Section 45 is instructive and revealing. Under Section 45, an expert gives an opinion based on a scientific comparison of documents — he brings specialised training, instruments, and technical criteria to bear upon the inquiry. Under Section 47, the witness is not an expert at all. He does not compare scientifically. He gives his opinion based on familiarity — an intimate and consistent acquaintance with the writing style, letter formations, and idiosyncrasies of the person in question.

As was observed by the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v Chotta Lal Patni (AIR 1967 SC 778), where the complainant-employer had seen his accused employee write and sign on numerous occasions over the years, the employer was fully competent to express his opinion that the handwriting on the disputed cheques was that of the accused. The court held that this constituted direct evidence and the employer was clearly "acquainted" with the handwriting. This is precisely what Section 47 contemplates — a qualified non-expert who gives his honest opinion grounded in personal experience.

The expression "qualified to express an opinion" in the comment does not refer to technical qualification but experiential qualification — the person must have a sufficient nexus with the writer's handwriting to make his identification reliable. The court must satisfy itself by whatever means are available that the opinion is such that it may be acted upon. In the words of Fakhruddin v State of MP (AIR 1967 SC 1326), the court must be satisfied that the witness's opinion may be acted upon.

By Expert Evidence in Comparing Handwriting: Section 45 IEA / Section 39 BSA

Where a person is specially skilled in the science of handwriting identification, his opinion under Section 45 IEA (now Section 39 BSA) constitutes expert opinion evidence. Unlike Section 47, where the opinion rests on familiarity, the handwriting expert's opinion rests on scientific comparison — an analysis of pen pressure, slant, letter formations, spacing, connecting strokes, terminals, and countless other microscopic characteristics that distinguish one person's writing from another's.

The Illustration (c) to Section 45 is precise: The question is whether a certain document was written by A. Another document is produced which is proved or admitted to have been written by A. The opinions of experts on the question whether the two documents were written by the same person or by different persons are relevant. The expert must personally compare the disputed writing with an admitted specimen — he cannot merely theorise.

Admissibility of the Expert's Evidence

For handwriting expert evidence to be admissible, the following conditions must be satisfied:

First, the expert must be shown to be peritus — skilled in the science of handwriting identification. Academic qualifications, though desirable, are not the exclusive measure. The value of handwriting expertise lies in the soundness of the reasoning and the reliability of the methods used. As was observed, "identification of handwriting being not a developed science... there is no formal qualification to be possessed," and direct or circumstantial evidence lending support to the expert opinion will strengthen it.

Second, the opinion must be given orally, in court, by the expert in person. A mere report or certificate by an expert, without his being examined as a witness, is not admissible as evidence. In Bapurao v State of Maharashtra (2003 Cr LJ 2181, Bom), the Bombay High Court held that where the handwriting expert was not examined as a witness, no evidentiary value could be attached to his report. The expert report is not evidence in itself — it is the expert's oral testimony in the witness box, backed by his report and reasoning, that constitutes evidence.

Third, the specimen or admitted writings with which the disputed writing is compared must themselves be proved to be genuine — either by admission or by other sufficient evidence. A comparison made against an unproved specimen is unreliable.

Evidentiary Value of Handwriting Expert Evidence

The handwriting expert occupies a uniquely difficult position in Indian jurisprudence. Courts have consistently recognised the utility of such evidence but have been equally consistent in refusing to treat it as conclusive. Several guiding principles have emerged from decades of case law.

Corroboration is ordinarily necessary. The Supreme Court stated unequivocally in Murari Lal v State of MP (AIR 1980 SC 531) that before acting on handwriting expert evidence, it is usual to see if it is corroborated by other clear direct or circumstantial evidence. The sole evidence of a handwriting expert is not normally sufficient for recording a definite finding about disputed writing. Handwriting evidence is corroborative rather than conclusive.

The court is not bound by the expert's opinion. As was stated in S Gopal Reddy v State of AP (AIR 1996 SC 2184), the expert's evidence is weak and not safe to rely upon without corroboration. The court does not surrender its judgment to the expert — it weighs the opinion alongside all other evidence and forms its own conclusion. The Calcutta High Court's observation remains foundational: "the duty of an expert is to depose and not to decide."

The credibility of the expert matters critically. In Alamgir v State NCT Delhi (AIR 2003 SC 282), the dead body of a woman was found in a locked guest house room where she had stayed with her husband. Two slips of paper recovered from the room were opined by a handwriting expert to be in the accused husband's handwriting. The Supreme Court held that the expert's opinion could be relied upon when supported by other items of evidence and could serve as corroborating circumstantial evidence. The chain of circumstances was complete.

Where the expert has given no reasons, his opinion is unsafe. In Mahmood v State of UP (AIR 1976 SC 69), the Supreme Court held it not safe to rely upon a fingerprint expert's opinion where he had given no reasons in support of it and had not been shown to possess adequate skill and knowledge. The same principle applies to handwriting experts — reasoning is the soul of expert testimony.

A handwriting expert who has not practised for years may be rejected. In Lakshmi Chand v Ishroo Devi (AIR 1977 SC 1694), the Supreme Court upheld the rejection of a handwriting expert's opinion where he had not been in practice since 1950 and had expressed opinions beyond his natural field.

By Court's Own Comparison: Section 73 IEA / Section 72 BSA

Section 73 IEA (now Section 72 BSA) empowers the court to independently compare the disputed signature, writing, or seal with any signature, writing or seal admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the Court to have been written by that person. Further, the court may direct any person present in court to write any words or figures in order to enable the court to compare them with the words or figures alleged to have been written by him.

This provision recognises the court as itself a potential arbiter of handwriting, but the judicial consensus strongly cautions against its liberal exercise. In State Delhi Administration v Pali Ram (AIR 1979 SC 14), the Supreme Court described Section 73 as creating a mode of proof by comparison — but insisted that where handwriting is the sheet anchor of the prosecution's case, the judge must hesitate to base his finding solely on his own comparison. As Murari Lal v State of MP (AIR 1980 SC 531) declared with characteristic force, "if it is hazardous to do so, as sometimes said, we are afraid it is one of the hazards to which judge and litigant must expose themselves whenever it becomes necessary."

In Thiruvengada Pillai v Navaneethammal (2008, 5 SCJ 18), the Supreme Court observed that comparison by the court without the assistance of any expert is always "hazardous and risky." While the court cannot be forbidden from doing so where necessary, it must give reasons that specifically refer to the characteristics of the handwriting it relies upon — a bare finding is not enough.

Importantly, the second paragraph of Section 73, which empowers the court to direct a person present in court to write, applies only during trial proceedings and not during investigation. In State of UP v Ram Babu Misra (AIR 1980 SC 791), the Supreme Court held clearly that the direction under Section 73 is to enable the court to compare — not the investigating agency.

Section 47A IEA / Section 41(2) BSA: Electronic Signature

Section 47A IEA (now Section 41(2) BSA) extends the framework to digital and electronic signatures. When the court has to form an opinion as to the electronic signature of any person, the opinion of the Certifying Authority which has issued the Electronic Signature Certificate is a relevant fact. This is a specialised application of the expert opinion principle — the Certifying Authority, by virtue of its statutory role and technical expertise, is accorded the status of an expert. Proof of an electronic signature, unless it is a secure signature, must be positively established, as Section 66 BSA (Section 67A IEA) makes clear — a court cannot take an electronic signature at face value.

The BSA's Position: A Summary

The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, has substantially carried forward the framework of the IEA on this subject. The six modes of proof of handwriting find their place in a coherent structure:

A Practical Illustration

Consider a case where A, the accused, is charged with forging a will in his favour. The propounder of the will relies on the following:

1. A's employer, who has received A's letters over five years, gives evidence that the signature on the will is A's — this is Section 47/Section 41 BSA evidence.

2. A handwriting expert from the Central Forensic Science Laboratory appears, comparing the will's signature with admitted specimens of A's writing on a previous registered document, and opines that both are by the same hand — this is Section 45/Section 39 BSA evidence.

3. The court itself compares the disputed will signature with the admitted writing on the vakalatnama — this is Section 73/Section 72 BSA.

The court gives the expert's opinion the greatest weight since it is corroborated by the employer's testimony based on familiarity, and both findings are consistent with the court's own cautious comparison. The defence produces another expert with a contrary opinion. Following Murari Lal, the court examines the quality of reasoning behind each expert's opinion, evaluates whether it is corroborated by any other evidence, and arrives at its independent conclusion. Neither expert's opinion binds the court — the court weighs, evaluates, and decides.

The conclusion that emerges from a survey of both statute and case law is that proof of disputed handwriting is a multi-layered inquiry requiring the court to weigh different modes of evidence with care and circumspection. Expert opinion is a valuable but not conclusive aid. The opinion of a person acquainted with handwriting under Section 47/Section 41 BSA occupies its own valuable space — it is not expert evidence, but it is none the worse for that. It is the direct testimony of a person whose personal familiarity with the writer's hand gives him a qualified basis for an opinion that the law regards as relevant. And when all other modes fail, the court must itself take up the difficult task of comparison — always with caution, always with reasons, and always remembering that its finding must be supported not by instinct but by a careful reference to the identifying characteristics of the writing in question.