Limitation ActMortgage and Property Rights 06 July 2026· 7 min read

    In 1893, oral mortgage of land was executed for Rs. 53/-. On 11.01.1960, mortgagees sold their mortgage rights to A vide registered sale deed. In 1968, B filed suit for possession by way of redemption against A, who raised preliminary objection that suit was time-barred as period of limitation of redemption started from 1893 and period of 60 years is to be counted from 1893. Discuss merits of respective contentions.

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    A's objection is right on the ordinary view of the law and is the one that should be accepted, but it rests on an assumption about the nature of the mortgage which the facts do not settle, and the conclusion has to be stated with that qualification. If the mortgage was one in which the mortgagor kept possession, the suit is barred, because the right to redeem accrued in 1893 and was extinguished with the end of sixty years in 1953. If the mortgage was one in which possession was handed to the mortgagee, a decision of the Supreme Court of 2014 makes A's contention unsafe, and B's suit may be in time.

    The first question is which law applies to the suit. The suit was filed in 1968, after the Limitation Act, 1963 came into force on 1 January 1964. Under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Article 148 allowed sixty years to redeem or to recover possession of mortgaged property, from the time when the right to redeem or to recover possession accrued. Article 61(a) of the present Act gives thirty years, again from the accrual of the right to redeem. Article 61(b) gives twelve years to a mortgagor to recover possession of mortgaged property which the mortgagee has afterwards transferred for valuable consideration, from the time when the transfer becomes known to the plaintiff. The transitional provisions decide how the old and new periods are to be fitted together. Section 30 deals with a period shortened by the new Act and lets a suit be brought within seven years of the commencement or within the old period, whichever expires earlier, but section 31 provides that nothing in the Act enables a suit to be brought for which the period under the 1908 Act had expired before the Act commenced. These are the provisions which a court looks at when the right to sue came into being under the old law and the question is about its end. A right that was already barred under the old Act on 1 January 1964 is not revived by anything in the 1963 Act.

    The second question is when the right to redeem accrued. The rule that applies where the mortgage fixes no date for repayment is that the right to redeem accrues at once, on the execution of the mortgage. This rule under Article 61 is stated in Sampuran Singh v Niranjan Kaur, AIR 1999 SC 1047 : (1999) 2 SCC 679, and where the deed makes the right to redeem depend on a condition, time runs from the expiry of the condition. An oral mortgage of 1893 for Rs 53 would have been valid under section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which allows a mortgage of a principal sum of less than one hundred rupees to be made by delivery of the property, without a registered instrument. We are told of no date for repayment, so on the ordinary rule the right to redeem accrued in 1893. Sixty years from 1893 ended in 1953, which was more than ten years before the 1963 Act came into force, and the suit of 1968 was filed fifteen years after that. If the ordinary rule applies, B's suit is barred, and section 31 prevents the thirty years of Article 61(a) from reviving it.

    The facts of the problem are a version of the facts in Sampuran Singh v Niranjan Kaur, which was decided by the Supreme Court on 23 February 1999 by A.P. Misra and N. Santosh Hegde JJ. That case involved an oral mortgage of 1893 for Rs 53 and a transfer of the mortgagees' rights in 1960, and the redemption suit was filed in 1980. The Court held that the transfer of 1960 did not amount to an acknowledgment of the mortgagor's right and gave no fresh start, and that the suit was barred. In the present question the year of the suit has been changed to 1968, and the argument is the same. It is easy to see why a transfer by the mortgagees cannot help B. An acknowledgment under section 18 has to be made in writing by the party against whom the right is claimed, and made before the end of the period of limitation. A sale of the mortgagees' rights in 1960 was made seven years after the period had expired in 1953, and it is not an acknowledgment of the mortgagor's right at all. It is a dealing by the mortgagees with their own interest. Nor does it start a fresh period of limitation against the purchaser, since the mortgagor's right is the same right whoever holds the mortgagee's interest, and section 18 cannot revive a right that was already barred when the acknowledgment was made. Article 61(b), which allows twelve years from knowledge of a transfer of the mortgaged property by the mortgagee for value, is an argument that B might raise, because the suit of 1968 was within twelve years of the sale of 1960. It does not help him. The article applies only where the transferee takes an absolute title, and not where he takes no more than the qualified interest which the mortgagee could transfer. A bought the mortgage rights, which means only the mortgagee's interest, so the article is not attracted.

    The qualification arises from Singh Ram v Sheo Ram, (2014) 9 SCC 185, a decision of a Bench of three Judges of the Supreme Court given on 21 August 2014, after the traditional line of authority had developed. The Court held there that in a usufructuary mortgage, in which the mortgagee holds possession and takes the produce in place of interest and where no date for redemption is fixed, the thirty years in Article 61(a) do not run from the date of the mortgage. In such a mortgage the right to redeem becomes available when the mortgagor pays or tenders or deposits the mortgage money, as section 62 of the Transfer of Property Act provides for the mortgagee's duty to give up possession, and so time begins only then. The Court disapproved an earlier decision, Prabhakaran v Azhagiri Pillai, (2006) 4 SCC 484, which had taken the contrary view. It did not say in terms that Sampuran Singh was wrong. It distinguished that case on the ground that there the possession remained with the mortgagor and the mortgage was not a usufructuary one. The point for B is therefore clear. If B can show that the mortgage of 1893 was one in which possession was delivered to the mortgagees, which is what section 59 required for an oral mortgage and which the claim for "possession by way of redemption" suggests, then the line of reasoning in Singh Ram is open to him, and A cannot simply say that time ran out in 1953. The same case limits the ground on which A can rely. A would have to show that the mortgagor kept possession throughout, or that there were facts that made the case one like Sampuran Singh.

    The merits of the contentions can now be stated. A's contention that limitation began in 1893 is correct if the right to redeem accrued on the execution of the mortgage, and on that footing the suit is barred, as the sixty years ended in 1953 and the transfer of 1960 neither acknowledged the right nor started time afresh. B's answer is that the mortgage was usufructuary and no time was fixed for redemption, so that time has not begun to run, and the objection should not be decided at the outset on the assumption that it began in 1893. The preliminary objection, which is a question of law, can succeed only if the facts needed to decide it are admitted or apparent from the plaint. Here the nature of the mortgage is the fact in dispute, so the court should first find what kind of mortgage it was. On the basis of the traditional view, which is the one taken in Sampuran Singh and the earlier decisions, the suit is barred. It must be added that after Singh Ram this conclusion is safe only if the mortgage was not a usufructuary one.

    Two illustrations are given in the same terms. A land is mortgaged orally in 1900 with possession left with the mortgagor, and no date for repayment is fixed. The right to redeem accrued in 1900, the sixty years ended in 1960, and a suit in 1970 is barred. In the second, the land is mortgaged in 1900, the mortgagee takes possession and enjoys the produce in lieu of interest, and no date for redemption is fixed. On the principle in Singh Ram, time begins when the mortgagor pays, tenders or deposits the money, and a suit for redemption is not barred merely by the length of the mortgagee's possession.

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