Limitation ActLimitation of Suits, Appeals and Applications 22 June 2026· 5 min read

    "Limitation bars the remedy but does not destroy the right." Discuss this statement with exceptions.

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    The statement is the settled reading of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 3(1) provides that every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. What the section withdraws is the claimant's access to the court. It says nothing about the debt, the title or the obligation that lies behind the claim, and those continue until some other rule of law brings them to an end. The law punishes the claimant who sleeps, in keeping with the maxims interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt, but it does not confiscate what he was entitled to.

    Several consequences follow from this. The first is that a right which can no longer be enforced by action can still be pleaded in defence. The Act prescribes periods for commencing proceedings and none for taking a defence, and in Punjab National Bank v Surendra Prasad Sinha (AIR 1992 SC 1815) the Supreme Court accepted that a defendant may rely on a right in defence although a suit on that right would be barred on the day it is raised. The familiar example is the mortgagee whose own suit on the mortgage is barred. When the mortgagor sues to redeem, the mortgagee may still retain possession and insist on payment of what is legitimately due to him before he gives it up. It must be added that a set-off or counter-claim stands differently. Under section 3(2)(b) a set-off is treated as a separate suit instituted on the date of the suit in which it is pleaded, and a counter-claim as instituted on the date it is made in court, so a claim already barred on that date cannot be used to obtain a decree. What survives is the power to resist the plaintiff's claim on the same facts, not the power to recover on them.

    A debt that is barred by limitation also remains a debt for other purposes. If the debtor pays it voluntarily, the payment is good and cannot be recalled, and under section 61 of the Contract Act, 1872 a payment that neither party has appropriated goes to the debts in order of time, whether or not they are barred. A fresh written promise is likewise enforceable. Section 25(3) of the Contract Act makes a signed written promise to pay, wholly or in part, a debt of which the creditor might have enforced payment but for the law of limitation a valid contract without consideration. It is an exception to the general rule that an agreement without consideration is void, and it would have no meaning if the debt had perished with the remedy. The same reasoning supports the commonly stated view that a coparcener's right to demand partition is not lost by lapse of time (Mangilal v Saligram, AIR 2009 (NOC) 1273 (MP)), though this holds only while the joint status continues. Once a coparcener has been excluded from the joint family property, a suit to enforce his share is governed by Article 110, which allows twelve years from the time the exclusion becomes known to him, and the excluding members may in the meantime acquire title by adverse possession.

    The real exception to the maxim is section 27, which provides that at the determination of the period limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished. In Prem Singh v Birbal ((2006) 5 SCC 353 : AIR 2006 SC 3608) the Supreme Court treated this as an exception to the rule that limitation ordinarily bars a remedy without extinguishing a right, and it is the only provision of the Act that works in this way. Its scope is narrow. It applies only to a person who could have sued for possession, so an owner who has never lost possession has nothing extinguished. Nor does the section say in whom the extinguished title is to vest, but the courts have held that title to immovable property cannot be left in the air and passes to the person who has been in adverse possession. Suppose that A is dispossessed of his land on 5 June 2005 by B, who holds it as his own. A's suit on title falls under Article 65, which gives twelve years from the time the defendant's possession becomes adverse to the plaintiff. If A takes no step, his right to the land is extinguished at the end of 5 June 2017, and B may thereafter defend any suit by A, or sue himself, as owner.

    A similar result is reached for easements. Under section 25, a person who has openly, peaceably and as of right enjoyed an easement without interruption for twenty years (thirty, if the servient property belongs to Government) acquires a right that is absolute and indefeasible, a position confirmed by section 15 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882.

    Sections 18 and 19 are sometimes listed as exceptions, but they are not. An acknowledgment or part payment gives a fresh period of limitation only if it is made before the existing period has expired. After expiry, the only way to revive a barred debt is a fresh signed promise under section 25(3) of the Contract Act.

    The maxim is accurate as a general statement. Section 3 closes the door of the court and leaves the right alone, which is why the debt can still be pleaded in defence, paid, appropriated or promised afresh. Section 27, and by extension section 25 for easements, is the exception: where the claim is to possession of property, the passing of the period takes the right away with the remedy.

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