Offence under BNS Section 197 (formerly IPC Section 153A): Promoting enmity between different groups

The Statutory Text: Section 196 BNS (= Section 153A IPC)

Section 196(1) BNS provides:

"Whoever — (a) by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or through electronic communication or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities; or (b) commits any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities, and which disturbs or is likely to disturb the public tranquillity; or (c) organises any exercise, movement, drill or other similar activity intending that the participants shall use or be trained to use criminal force or violence against any religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community and such activity causes or is likely to cause fear or alarm or a feeling of insecurity amongst members of such group, — shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both."

Section 196(2) BNS aggravates the punishment considerably when the same offences are committed in any place of worship or in any assembly engaged in the performance of religious worship or religious ceremonies — the punishment in that case extends to five years' imprisonment, and fine.

The corresponding Section 153A IPC is substantially identical in language. The BNS, however, adds two significant updates: first, the words "through electronic communication" are inserted alongside the traditional mediums of speech, writing, signs, and visible representations — bringing the section firmly into the digital age. Second, clause (c) has been added expressly to penalise the organisation of training or drill activities aimed at preparing groups for violence against other communities — a response to the realities of organised communal mobilisation.

The Object: Why this Section Exists

The origin of Section 153A IPC is rooted in the social history of pre-Independence India, where communal relations between Hindus and Muslims were frequently inflamed by speeches, writings, and publications designed to portray one community as the enemy of another. The provision was enacted to fill a gap in the law: it was no longer sufficient to wait for actual violence to break out before the law intervened. The legislature recognised that the promotion of enmity — the intellectual and emotional preparation for communal conflict — was itself an evil that the law must address.

The Supreme Court in Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (AIR 1962 SC 955) confirmed that Section 153A is a valid exercise of legislative power, falling within the protective scope of Article 19(2) of the Constitution as a reasonable restriction on freedom of speech in the interest of public order. After the Constitution First Amendment of 1951 inserted the words "in the interest of public order" into Article 19(2), any lingering doubt about the section's constitutionality was resolved. The Bombay High Court in Gopal Vinayak Godse v. Union of India (AIR 1971 Bom 56) reaffirmed this position. Section 153A, and by extension Section 196 BNS, is both constitutionally valid and constitutionally necessary.

The Three Grounds of Liability Under Section 196 BNS

The section operates through three distinct, independent clauses, each targeting a different manifestation of the same underlying evil.

Clause (a) — Promoting enmity through words, signs, or representations. This is the most frequently invoked clause and the most conceptually rich. It penalises whoever, by words spoken or written, by signs, or by visible representations — or now, through electronic communication — promotes or attempts to promote disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred, or ill-will between different groups. The grounds on which such promotion may be based are exhaustively and expansively listed: religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste, community, or any other ground whatsoever. This last phrase — "any other ground whatsoever" — is a striking legislative choice: it ensures that no novel basis for communal division escapes the section's reach.

The words "promotes or attempts to promote" make clear that the offence is complete even at the stage of the attempt — actual enmity need not have been successfully promoted. A speech that attempts to stir up hatred between two communities is as much within the section as one that actually succeeds in doing so.

Clause (b) — Acts prejudicial to harmony likely to disturb public tranquillity. This clause extends beyond mere words and representations to cover acts of any kind that are prejudicial to the maintenance of inter-community harmony and that disturb or are likely to disturb public tranquillity. It is a residuary provision of great breadth: even conduct that does not take the form of speech or writing, but that concretely harms the relations between communities, is caught by this clause — provided it has a tendency to disturb public peace.

Clause (c) — Organising or participating in activities for communal violence. This clause, added in the BNS, addresses the organisation of paramilitary or quasi-military activities directed against particular communities. The intent to train participants in the use of criminal force or violence against a religious, racial, or linguistic group — or knowledge of the likelihood that participants will be so trained — is sufficient. The activity need not actually result in violence: it is enough that it causes or is likely to cause fear, alarm, or a sense of insecurity among members of the targeted community.

The Pivotal Role of Intention: What Section 196 Does and Does Not Punish

Perhaps the most important judicial contribution to the understanding of Section 153A IPC / Section 196 BNS is the nuanced treatment of the intention element. Unlike Section 299 BNS (= Section 295A IPC), which expressly requires deliberate and malicious intention, Section 196 BNS does not on its face specify a particular mental element. This has led the courts to develop a careful set of principles about what falls within and what falls outside the section's reach.

The courts have been emphatic that liability under Section 153A attaches not to the thing said or done, but to the manner in which it is said or done. In Lalai Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1971 Cr. LJ 1773), it was held that a fair and rational criticism of religious tenets, couched in restrained language, does not attract Section 153A. Even pointed criticism that questions the rationality of a religion, condemns a religious practice, or advocates social reform does not make a person liable under this section if it is expressed in temperate, dignified, and measured language without any tendency to insult the feelings or the deepest religious convictions of any section of the people. No less a figure than Mahatma Gandhi criticised the Hindu religion for the doctrine of untouchability — yet that criticism was perfectly legitimate because it was sponsored by a purpose of social reform, not communal incitement.

The Allahabad High Court in Azizul Haq Kausar Naquvi v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1980 All 149) held that when an article contained healthy and legitimate criticism of the Islamic religion and intended to bring about reformation in keeping with the modern world, it was not offensive and did not constitute an offence under Section 153A IPC. Similarly, in Shiv Kumar Mishra v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1978 Cr. LJ 701), the court held that purely political views — even those calling upon the poor masses to rebel against the capitalist class — do not attract Section 153A because they are not directed at promoting enmity between religious or community groups.

By contrast, the Supreme Court in Babu Rao Patel v. State (Delhi Administration) (AIR 1980 SC 763) held that it is no defence to a charge under Section 153A that the writing contained a truthful account of past events or was otherwise supported by good authority — if the writing is calculated to promote feelings of enmity, hatred, or ill-will. The historical truth of what is written does not sanitise a presentation that is designed to stir communal passions. The manner and purpose of publication are decisive.

In the same vein, the Supreme Court held in Babu Rao Patel that if a political thesis or historical facts are so presented as to promote feelings of enmity, hatred, or ill-will between different religious groups or communities, Section 153A is attracted — even if the author would describe his work as history or political commentary. The test is not the label the author assigns to his writing, but the tendency and effect of the work on the reader.

The Distinction Between Section 196 BNS and Sedition

Section 153A IPC was expressly enacted to supplement the law of sedition under Section 124A IPC — and it is important to understand how the two differ. Section 196 BNS punishes the stirring up of class or community hatred — an offence against public tranquillity, directed at the horizontal relationship between communities within society. Sedition, by contrast, punishes the exciting of disaffection against the Government — an offence against the vertical relationship between the citizen and the State. Section 196 BNS affects the State indirectly, by disturbing public peace between its citizens; the sedition offence affects the State directly, by undermining the authority of the Government. The two provisions therefore operate in related but distinct fields, and they may occasionally overlap — as when a communal pamphlet also contains seditious exhortations — but they are conceptually separate.

Section 196 BNS and Electronic Media

The express inclusion of electronic communication in Section 196 BNS is one of the most consequential changes from its IPC predecessor. In the digital age, communal hatred can be incited within seconds and spread across the country without the author ever making a public speech or publishing a printed pamphlet. A viral video that depicts members of one community committing violence on another, accompanied by captions designed to incite retaliation; a social media post that attributes crimes to a community on the basis of their religion; a WhatsApp forward that circulates fabricated news about one community attacking another — all of these are capable of promoting enmity between communities on a vast scale. Section 196 BNS, by expressly covering such conduct through the insertion of "electronic communication," ensures that the law keeps pace with the technology of hatred. Under Section 153A IPC, courts had to address electronic offences somewhat awkwardly through the Information Technology Act, 2000; Section 196 BNS resolves this by bringing digital speech directly within its ambit.

The Aggravated Clause: Section 196(2) BNS

The enhancement of punishment under Section 196(2) BNS — applicable when the offence is committed in a place of worship or in an assembly engaged in religious worship — reflects the legislature's heightened concern about the intersection of communal incitement and religious gatherings. A speech that promotes enmity between communities delivered at a religious assembly is not merely one offence being committed in an unfortunate location. It is an offence compounded in gravity: the very occasion of religious devotion is being exploited to fuel communal hatred. The legislature responds by doubling the sentencing exposure from three years to five years, with mandatory fine — and the offence under subsection (2) is cognizable and non-bailable, triable by a Magistrate of the first class.

Section 197 BNS (= Section 153B IPC): The Companion Provision

Since the question also refers to Section 197 BNS, a brief but accurate treatment is necessary. Section 197 BNS corresponds to Section 153B IPC — imputations, assertions prejudicial to national integration. While Section 196 BNS targets the promotion of enmity between communities as such, Section 197 BNS is specifically concerned with attacks on the constitutional and national loyalty of any class of persons. It punishes whoever publishes any imputation that a class of persons cannot, by reason of their religion, caste, or community, bear true allegiance to the Constitution of India; or asserts that a class of persons shall be denied citizenship rights by reason of their religion; or makes or publishes assertions that cause or are likely to cause disharmony, enmity, or ill-will between members of such a class and other persons. The BNS has added a fourth clause — making it an offence to publish false or misleading information that jeopardises the sovereignty, unity, and integrity or security of India. The punishment mirrors Section 196 BNS: up to three years, or fine, or both, elevated to five years with fine if the offence is committed in a place of worship or religious assembly.

Punishment and Classification: A Consolidated View

Both offences are cognizable and non-bailable, triable by a Magistrate of the first class — a classification that reflects the legislature's understanding of their potential for immediate damage to public order.

The Governing Principle

Section 196 BNS and its predecessor Section 153A IPC rest on a single governing idea: that in a pluralist democracy, the freedom to speak and write carries with it a corresponding responsibility not to use that freedom to corrode the foundations of communal peace. The law does not silence disagreement, debate, or even criticism — it does not demand that communities pretend to be identical in their beliefs, or that differences in faith, culture, or practice be concealed. What it forbids, with the force of the criminal law, is the exploitation of those differences to generate mutual hostility — to transform the natural diversity of Indian society into a source of enmity, hatred, and violence. Every country that has witnessed the horrors of communal conflict knows that such violence does not spring suddenly from nowhere: it is cultivated, slowly and deliberately, through precisely the kind of speech and conduct that Section 196 BNS is designed to suppress. The provision is, therefore, not merely a piece of criminal legislation. It is an expression of the constitutional commitment to the idea that India's diversity is its greatest strength — and that those who seek to weaponise that diversity for purposes of hatred have no shelter under the law.