Offence under BNS Section 299 (formerly IPC Section 295A): Deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs

The History Behind the Section

Every important legal provision has a story, and the story of Section 295A IPC — now Section 299 BNS — is particularly illuminating. The section entered the statute book in 1927, directly as a consequence of a celebrated and deeply controversial case decided by the Lahore High Court — known popularly as the Rangila Rasul case (Rajpaul v. Emperor, AIR 1927 Lah 590).

The accused had published a pamphlet entitled Rangila Rasul — The Amorous Prophet — in which he described the sexual conduct of the Prophet Mohammed in terms that Muslims across the country regarded as profoundly offensive and insulting. He was convicted by the Magistrate under Section 153A IPC — the provision that punishes promoting enmity between religious groups. However, the Lahore High Court quashed the conviction, holding that Section 153A IPC was intended to prevent attacks on a community as it exists in the present time, and was not designed to punish polemical attacks on a deceased religious leader, however scurrilous and offensive in character. The court acknowledged the lacuna clearly: the excoriation of religious feelings was precisely the kind of conduct that the law should address, but no express provision existed to address it.

It was to fill this very gap that Section 295A was inserted into the Indian Penal Code by the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1927. The legislature thus created a provision specifically designed to punish the deliberate, malicious insult to religion or religious beliefs of any class of persons — extending protection not merely to living communities but to their founders, sacred texts, and religious beliefs. Section 299 BNS is the faithful heir to this provision, with one notable addition: offences committed through electronic means — recognising the realities of the social media age — are now expressly brought within its ambit.

The Statutory Text

Section 299 BNS reads:

"Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of citizens of India, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or through electronic means or otherwise, insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both."

The corresponding Section 295A IPC is identical in language, differing only in the absence of the phrase "or through electronic means" — a gap that the BNS has rectified. The punishment remains the same at three years. The offence is cognizable and non-bailable, triable by a Magistrate of the first class — a classification that reflects the seriousness with which the legislature views deliberate insults to religious communities.

The Object of the Section

The object of Section 299 BNS, as the sources confirm, is to punish what may be called an aggravated form of insult to religion. Every insult to a religion is not a crime — the law has always drawn a sharp distinction between legitimate criticism and malicious outrage. What the section targets is not the scholar who disagrees with a theology, the reformer who advocates change in religious practice, or the sceptic who expresses disbelief. It targets the person who, with a cold, calculated, and malicious intention, sets out to outrage the religious feelings of a community — who insults, not to illuminate, but to wound; not to reform, but to degrade.

The Supreme Court, while upholding the constitutional validity of Section 295A IPC in the landmark judgment of Ramji Lal Modi v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1957 SC 620), stated with precision that the section penalises only the aggravated form of insult to religion when it is perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of a class. Insults to religious feelings offered carelessly, or without deliberate and malicious intent, do not come within the scope of the section. The section is thus not a general prohibition on all offensive speech about religion — it is a narrowly crafted provision targeting a specific, aggravated evil. The Court further held that such a restriction was a reasonable restriction on the freedom of speech and expression, well within the protection of Article 19(2) of the Constitution, being a law enacted in the interest of public order.

The Three Ingredients

The section rests on three ingredients that must coexist before liability can attach.

First — Deliberate and Malicious Intention to Outrage. This is the heartbeat of the section — without it, no offence is committed no matter how offensive the words or conduct may appear. The courts have examined these words with considerable care, and their conclusions are instructive.

In Ramlal Puri v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1971 MP 152), the court held that the intention to outrage religious feelings must be both deliberate and premeditated. Only a cold, calculated, and malicious attack on religious feelings is punishable under this section. If a book gives an objective picture based on historical facts, it will not come within the mischief of the section. The test to be applied is: is the complaint that of an abnormal or hypersensitive person, or that of an ordinary man of ordinary common sense? The latter standard governs. If an ordinary reasonable person would regard the act as a gross, wilful, and malicious insult to his religion, the section is attracted. If only a person of abnormal sensitivity would be offended, it is not.

In King v. Nag Shew Hpi (AIR 1939 Rang 199), the court drew an important distinction between deliberateness and malice: an act may be deliberate without being malicious, since it may be reckless without being intentional. For a charge under the section, the prosecution must show insult for the sake of insulting — with an intention that springs from malice alone. This is a demanding standard, and deliberately so.

The Allahabad High Court in Baba Khalil Ahamad v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1960 All 715) made a vitally important observation about the meaning of "malicious" in this section. The court held that malice here has not been used in the popular sense of personal ill-will or enmity against specific individuals. It is sufficient if an injurious act was done voluntarily without a lawful and just excuse — in such a case, malice may be presumed. The court further stated that the judge must determine the accused's intention not from the accused's own declarations about his purpose, but from the nature of the language he used and the circumstances in which the work was published. A self-serving claim that "I did not intend to offend" is therefore not a complete answer — the court will look at what any reasonable person would understand the act or writing to mean.

Second — Insult or Attempt to Insult the Religion or Religious Beliefs of a Class. The section is directed not at an individual but at a class of citizens of India. This is a critical and fundamental distinction from Section 302 BNS (= Section 298 IPC), which punishes wounding the religious feelings of any person — a specific, identified individual. Section 299 BNS operates at the communal level: it protects classes of citizens from collective insult to their religion or religious beliefs.

The insult may be directed at the religion itself — its tenets, its practices, its sacred texts — or at the religious beliefs of the class. The medium through which the insult is delivered is expressly and broadly defined: words either spoken or written, signs, visible representations, or electronic means. The addition of electronic means in Section 299 BNS is a significant updating of the law: the platform has changed — from pamphlets and public speeches to social media posts, YouTube videos, and messaging applications — but the essential evil is identical, and the law has adapted accordingly.

The section also punishes not only the completed insult but also the attempt to insult. This makes the section considerably broader in its reach: even if the intended class of persons did not actually come to feel outraged — perhaps because the publication was intercepted before distribution, or because the speech was stopped before completion — the offence is already complete at the stage of the attempt.

Third — The Act Must Be Against Citizens of India. The section specifically protects any class of citizens of India. This is a notable limitation: the class whose religious feelings are protected must consist of Indian citizens. The word class means a body of persons sharing a common characteristic — and even a very small community qualifies, provided there is a recognisable principle of classification. As held in the context of Section 298 BNS, even two persons forming a distinct group can constitute a class for this purpose.

The Constitutional Touchstone: Ramji Lal Modi

The constitutionality of Section 295A IPC was directly challenged before the Supreme Court in Ramji Lal Modi v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1957 SC 620). The petitioner — printer and publisher of a magazine called Gaurashak (Cow Protector) — was convicted under Section 295A for publishing an article with content that outraged Muslim religious feelings. He challenged the provision as an infringement of his fundamental right to freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court rejected the challenge and upheld the constitutional validity of the section. The Court reasoned that the section is enacted in the interest of public order — because deliberate insults to the religion of a class of citizens have a direct tendency to disturb the peace and tranquillity of society and to lead to communal friction and violence. Such a restriction, the Court held, falls squarely within the protective ambit of Article 19(2), which permits reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order. The Court was at pains to emphasise, however, that the section only punishes the aggravated form of insult — not every criticism or offensive statement — and it is this narrowness of scope that saves it from being an unconstitutional restriction on free speech.

In Sant Das Maheswari v. Babu Ram Jodoun (AIR 1969 All 436), the Allahabad High Court similarly confirmed that Section 295A IPC — and by extension Section 299 BNS — does not in any way prohibit the mere profession, practice, or propagation of a religion. What it makes punishable is the deliberate and malicious outrage of religious feelings. The provision does not therefore conflict with the rights guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.

Judicial Application: What Falls Within and Without the Section

The courts have produced a substantial body of case law that illustrates, with considerable granularity, where the line falls between punishable conduct and legitimate expression.

In Ambalal (1929 Cr. App. Nos. 17 and 18), the court held that a violently abusive and obscene attack on the founder or prophet of a religion might amount to an attempt to stir up hatred or enmity against the persons who follow that religion. To attribute to the Mohammedan religion the teachings of a heretic — contrary to orthodox Islamic doctrine — in a scurrilous and insulting manner, done deliberately and maliciously, would fall within Section 295A IPC. The key, as always, is the deliberate and malicious purpose.

In Kali Charan Sharma v. King Emperor (AIR 1927 All 654), the Allahabad High Court held that a book depicting the life of the Prophet Mohammed in a way that promoted feelings of enmity between Hindus and Mohammedans was punishable under Section 153A IPC — and would equally attract Section 295A if the deliberate and malicious intention were established.

By contrast, a fair, rational, and temperate criticism of religious tenets — even if ultimately negative in its conclusions about a religion — does not attract the section. In State of Maharashtra v. Ganpat Vasudeo Behera (1978 CLR 178), it was held that when an article contained healthy and legitimate criticism of the Islamic religion and intended to bring about reformation in keeping with the modern world, it was not offensive and did not amount to an offence under Section 153A IPC. The same principle applies with equal force to Section 295A / 299 BNS.

The section, as the court in Ramlal Puri expressed it, requires something more than the mere causing of offence. "If the words used caused persons to feel insulted but were only such as might possibly wound and in fact did so, then there is no offence under this section; if the words used were bound to be regarded by any reasonable man as grossly offensive and provocative, and were maliciously intended to be regarded as such, then an offence is committed."

Section 299 BNS and Electronic Media: A Critical Addition

The most significant departure of Section 299 BNS from its predecessor Section 295A IPC is the express inclusion of electronic means as a mode of committing the offence. The amendment reflects the profoundly changed landscape of public communication. In the era of social media, a post on Facebook that mocks a religious prophet, a YouTube video that depicts a sacred text in a blasphemous manner, or a WhatsApp message that deliberately circulates an image insulting to the religious sentiments of a community — all of these can now directly attract Section 299 BNS, provided the other ingredients of deliberate and malicious intention are established. The addition is not merely cosmetic — it closes a gap that prosecutors and courts had struggled with under Section 295A IPC, where electronic publication was somewhat awkwardly accommodated through the Information Technology Act, 2000.

The Distinction Between Section 299 BNS and Section 302 BNS

Since both provisions deal with insult to religious feelings, the distinction between them is a question that arises frequently and deserves a clear answer.

The distinction was stated with force by the courts: under Section 299 BNS, the prosecution must show insult for the sake of insulting, with an intention which springs from malice — a higher bar than that under Section 302 BNS, which requires only deliberate intention to wound. The word "outraging" in Section 299 BNS is a stronger word than "wounding" in Section 302 BNS — it conveys a more severe and calculated assault on religious sentiment.

A further structural difference is that Section 302 BNS requires the words to be uttered in the hearing of the person whose feelings are being wounded, or an object to be placed in the sight of that person. Section 299 BNS requires no such immediate, person-to-person delivery — it operates on the broader canvas of publication, broadcast, or dissemination to a class of persons.