Once period of limitation starts to run no subsequent disability can stop it." Explain.

Once the Period of Limitation Starts to Run, No Subsequent Disability Can Stop It"

This proposition is one of the most fundamental and inflexible rules in the entire law of limitation. It expresses, in a single sentence, the principle that Section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1963 embodies — a principle that serves as the necessary counterweight to the generous protection that Sections 6 and 7 afford to persons under legal disability. Without Section 9, the doctrine of legal disability could become an instrument of perpetual postponement. With it, the law ensures that the extension of limitation on account of disability is available only to those who were incapacitated from the very beginning — not to those who became incapacitated midway through a period that had already started running against them.

The Statutory Foundation: Section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1963

Section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides:

"Where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or make an application stops it."

The section then carries a proviso:

"Provided that, where letters of administration to the estate of a creditor have been granted to his debtor, the running of the period of limitation for a suit to recover the debt shall be suspended while the administration continues."

The main rule is unqualified in its terms. The word "no" — "no subsequent disability or inability" — admits of no exception and no qualification except the proviso. The courts have construed this section with equal strictness: once the clock of limitation has been set in motion, it runs to its conclusion regardless of anything that happens to the person holding the right to sue.

The Relationship Between Section 9 and Sections 6 and 7

Section 9 cannot be understood in isolation — it must be read in the context of Sections 6 and 7, which are the provisions dealing with legal disability. Sections 6 and 7 offer a fresh period of limitation to persons who were under a recognised disability — minority, insanity, or idiocy — at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, that is, at the moment the cause of action accrued.

Section 9 defines precisely the outer limit of this protection. The benefit of Sections 6 and 7 is available only when the disability existed at the commencement of the period. Where the disability arises after the period has already started, Section 9 applies, and the running of time is not interrupted.

The distinction the Act draws is therefore this:

• Disability at the accrual of the cause of action → Section 6 applies → fresh period from cessation of disability, subject to Section 8's ceiling of three years.

• Disability arising after the period has already begun → Section 9 applies → time continues to run; no interruption, no extension.

This construction gives each provision its full and proper operation without overlap or conflict. Section 6 is not rendered redundant by Section 9, and Section 9 is not swallowed up by Section 6. They operate in different fields.

The Cases That Illuminate the Rule

The most significant category of cases to which Section 9 applies is the case of succession — where the right to sue vests in an adult who dies without suing, and his heir is a minor. Courts have with great consistency held that the minority of the heir does not stop the running of time that had already commenced against the adult predecessor.

In a well-known Orissa High Court decision (AIR 1960 Ori 49), the plaintiff's father had a cause of action that accrued in 1917. The father died without suing, and the plaintiff inherited the right. The plaintiff was a minor at the time of his father's death. When the plaintiff attained majority, he sought to file suit, claiming the benefit of Section 6 on the ground of his minority. The court rejected this claim entirely. Since the cause of action had accrued in 1917 to the plaintiff's father — who was not under any disability — time began running then. The subsequent minority of the heir did not arrest that running. Section 9 was clear: where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability stops it.

The same principle has been applied consistently across a wide range of factual situations. Where a cause of action accrued to an adult father in respect of joint family property, and that father died leaving minor sons, the minor sons could not invoke Section 6 — time was already running when their right arose, and Section 9 prevented any interruption. Where a cause of action accrued to an adult mother who died without suing and her minor daughter inherited the right, the daughter's minority could not stop the clock.

The Scope of "Subsequent Disability"

Section 9 uses the phrase "subsequent disability or inability." The scope of "subsequent disability" covers all three forms of recognised legal disability under Section 6 — minority, insanity, and idiocy — where they arise after the period has begun. The word "inability" is broader still: it refers not merely to legal disability but to any other form of inability to sue — illness, absence, poverty, imprisonment, ignorance of the cause of action, or any other misfortune. None of these circumstances, if they arise after the period has begun to run, can stop it.

Courts have consistently held that Section 9 is absolute in this respect. The fixation of periods of limitation is bound to be to some extent arbitrary and may at times result in hardship. But in consideration of such provisions, equitable considerations are out of place. There is no discretion, no equitable jurisdiction, and no inherent power in the court to halt the running of time once it has commenced. The mandatory command of Section 3 — to dismiss every proceeding filed after the prescribed period — and the absolute rule of Section 9 together leave no room for equitable intervention.

The One Exception: The Proviso to Section 9

Section 9 carries a single statutory exception: where letters of administration to the estate of a creditor have been granted to his debtor, the running of limitation for a suit to recover the debt is suspended during the continuance of the administration. The reason for this exception is immediately obvious — it would be absurd to expect the debtor, in his capacity as administrator of the creditor's estate, to sue himself for the debt. The law recognises the practical impossibility of this position and suspends time during the period of the administration.

This proviso is narrow and specific. It does not extend to any other situation. It does not create a general principle that impossibility of suing suspends limitation. The principle lex non cogit ad impossibilia — the law does not compel the impossible — has been attempted before courts as a basis for suspending limitation where practical impossibility existed. Courts have held firmly that this general principle cannot prevail against the express provisions of Section 3 and Section 9 of the Limitation Act, any more than principles of equity can prevail against the provisions of statutory law.

The Distinction Between Initial Disability and Subsequent Disability

The most important practical application of Section 9 lies in the distinction between initial disability and subsequent disability. This distinction runs through the entire structure of the disability provisions of the Act.

Initial disability is the disability that exists at the moment the cause of action accrues — the disability that was present "at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned." This disability attracts Section 6, and the person under it receives the benefit of a fresh period from the cessation of the disability, subject to Section 8.

Subsequent disability is any disability that arises after the cause of action has accrued to a capable person — whether it arises in the original holder of the right or in a successor to that right. This disability falls squarely under Section 9, and it produces no interruption, no extension, and no indulgence. Section 6 applies only to cases of initial, not subsequent, disability.

The One Internal Exception: Section 6(2)

There is one carefully limited exception within the framework of the Act itself to the rule of Section 9. Section 6(2) provides:

"Where such person is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, affected by two such disabilities, or where, before his disability has ceased, he is affected by another disability, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after both disabilities have ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time so specified."

The second limb of Section 6(2) creates a limited exception to Section 9: where a person was already under a recognised legal disability at the accrual of the cause of action, and a second recognised legal disability supervenes before the first has ceased, the period runs only after both disabilities have ended.

The logic of this exception is sound. If the first disability was already in place when the cause of action accrued — meaning Section 6 was already engaged — and a second recognised disability follows before the first ends, the person has never, from the moment of accrual, had the legal capacity to sue. To apply Section 9 mechanically in such a case and say that the supervening insanity does not stop the time that was "running" under Section 6 would be to defeat the very purpose of Section 6.

But this exception is narrow and precisely circumscribed. It applies only where:

• The first disability was a recognised disability under Section 6 that existed at the accrual of the cause of action.

• The second disability is also a recognised disability under Section 6 — minority, insanity, or idiocy.

• The second disability arose before the first disability had ceased.

Outside this narrow compass, Section 9 operates with full and unqualified force.

Illustrations

Illustration I — Classic Application of Section 9 (Succession to Minor Heir)

A has a cause of action for recovery of money against B. The cause of action accrues on 1 January 2010. A is a fully capable adult. The prescribed period is 3 years, expiring on 1 January 2013. A dies on 1 July 2011 without filing suit. His sole heir, C, is a minor aged 12 at the time of A's death. C attains majority on 1 July 2017.

Can C invoke Section 6 and file suit within 3 years of attaining majority?

No. The cause of action accrued on 1 January 2010 to A, who was not under disability. Time began running against A from that date. On A's death in 2011, C inherited the right to sue — but he also inherited the limitation that was already running. C's minority, arising after the period had already started running against A, is a subsequent disability within the meaning of Section 9. The period expired on 1 January 2013. Any suit filed after that date is barred, irrespective of C's minority.

Illustration II — Insanity Arising After Accrual

D has a cause of action against E for money lent on 1 June 2015. The prescribed period is 3 years. On 1 January 2016 — six months after the cause of action accrued — D becomes insane. He is declared of sound mind only on 1 June 2020, well after the period expired on 1 June 2018.

Can D invoke Section 6 on recovery of his sanity?

No. D's insanity arose on 1 January 2016 — six months after the cause of action accrued and the period started running. This is a subsequent disability. Section 9 applies: the running of the period was not stopped by D's insanity. The period expired on 1 June 2018. D's suit after 2018 is barred.

Illustration III — Section 9 and the Minor Transferee

F is a minor when a cause of action accrues to him on 1 January 2010 — Section 6 is engaged. Before attaining majority, F transfers the property in dispute to G, an adult. G brings a suit after F attains majority, claiming the benefit of F's minority to extend the limitation period.

G cannot claim this benefit. Section 6 confers a purely personal privilege. It does not enure for the benefit of assignees or transferees. The sale to G means G acquired the right subject to the limitation already running. F's personal privilege cannot be borrowed by G.

Illustration IV — The Exception Under Section 6(2)

H is a minor aged 10 when a cause of action accrues on 1 January 2010 — Section 6 is engaged. H would attain majority on 1 January 2018. But in 2015, before H attains majority, H becomes insane. H recovers from insanity on 1 January 2023, by which time he is well past 18.

Here, both disabilities existed — minority was the initial disability, and insanity was the subsequent disability that arose before the first disability ceased. Section 6(2) applies as an exception to Section 9. The period runs from 1 January 2023 — when both disabilities ended. Section 8 gives H three years from 1 January 2023. H must file suit by 1 January 2026.

Compare this with Illustration II above, where the insanity arose after an adult person's cause of action had accrued. There, Section 9 applies without any exception. In Illustration IV, Section 6(2) creates the exception precisely because the initial disability was already in place when the cause of action accrued.

Illustration V — The Proviso: Debtor as Administrator

J lends money to K on 1 January 2015. The prescribed period for a suit on a simple money loan is 3 years, expiring 1 January 2018. J dies intestate in 2016 without having sued K. K applies for and is granted letters of administration to J's estate in February 2016. The administration continues until December 2018.

Under the proviso to Section 9, the running of the period of limitation for the suit to recover the debt is suspended during the continuance of the administration — because K, the debtor, is also the administrator of J's estate. He cannot sue himself. The period, which would normally have expired in January 2018, is suspended from February 2016 to December 2018. Once the administration ends, the unexpired portion of the period resumes.

The Deeper Rationale

The rule expressed in Section 9 rests on considerations of public policy that are as important as the considerations that justify the disability exception in Section 6. The law of limitation is founded on the principle that transactions must at some point become final — that defendants must be protected from stale claims — and that social order requires the eventual settlement of disputes. These interests are served by the absolute rule of Section 9.

If subsequent disability could stop time already running, the law of limitation would be reduced to near-nullity. Every right that passed by inheritance or transfer to a minor or lunatic would carry with it an indefinite deferral of the limitation period. Every adult who fell ill or became insane after the accrual of a cause of action would be excused from the general duty of diligence. The certainty and finality that the law of limitation is designed to provide would be systematically undermined.

Section 9 prevents this outcome with a rule that is firm to the point of harshness, but which is justified by the overriding demands of public policy. The harshness, where it exists, is the price that the law charges for the benefits of a predictable, certain, and universal system of limitation — a system that, in the celebrated words of the courts, is founded on the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium — it is for the general welfare that there be an end to litigation.