Limitation ActLegal Disability 26 June 2026· 5 min read

    Once period of limitation starts to run no subsequent disability can stop it." Explain.

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    The statement is section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in popular form. The section reads: "Where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or make an application stops it". A proviso follows, which will be taken up below. The rule has been described as a settled principle of the law of limitation, older than the statute. If limitation has not begun to run, a disability to sue saves the running of time; once it has begun, it cannot be interrupted except in the single instance of the proviso and in the case of a defendant's absence from India.

    The reason for the rule is easiest to see by looking at what the law would be without it. Limitation exists to bring litigation to an end and to protect the person in possession from stale claims. If any event after the cause of action arose could suspend the running of time, the date of the expiry of a claim would depend on the misfortunes of the plaintiff over the years, and no defendant or purchaser could ever be sure that the claim was dead. The Act therefore asks only one question about disability, and it asks it at one moment. Was the claimant under a disability when the period began? If he was, section 6 gives him an extension. If he was not, nothing afterwards helps him. The old authorities added that it would be mischievous to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary disabilities.

    Section 9 is the necessary counterpart of section 6. Section 6 begins with the words "at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned"; section 9 begins with the words "where once time has begun to run". Between them they cover the whole field. Disability present at the start produces an extension, and disability arising later produces nothing. A man who is of full age and sound mind on the day he can sue, and who becomes ill, insane or incapable the following week, has no claim under the section.

    The rule has several consequences that the cases illustrate. Where a decree-holder dies leaving a minor son, time for executing the decree, which started on the date of the decree or the last step in execution, goes on running against the son. The minority of the heir is a subsequent disability. In Kammili Venkataratnam v Kammili Krishna Murthy (AIR 1977 AP 95), an execution petition by the minor son filed more than three years after the decree was barred, although it was filed within three years of his attaining majority. The section governs applications for execution as well as suits (Muthukorakai v Mohammad Madar, AIR 1920 Mad 1 (FB)). On the same reasoning, a minor who comes into a right of suit that accrued to his predecessor cannot start the clock afresh for himself: the predecessor's cause of action began the period, and the successor takes it as it stands.

    Two distinctions have to be kept in mind. The first is the distinction between disability or inability and the absence or destruction of a cause of action. Section 9 deals with a personal disability of someone who already has a right to sue. It does not deal with the case where the cause of action is nullified by later events and then revived. In that case a fresh cause of action may arise and a fresh period may run, and that does not offend section 9 (Midnapore Zamindary Co Ltd v State of West Bengal, AIR 1961 Cal 353). The second is the distinction between an inability to sue and a rule that excludes time. Where the Act itself excludes a period, for instance during a stay or injunction under section 15(1), the exclusion works under that provision and is not an exception to section 9.

    The proviso is a true exception. It says that "where letters of administration to the estate of a creditor have been granted to his debtor, the running of the period of limitation for a suit to recover the debt shall be suspended while the administration continues." The reason is practical: the debtor, having become the representative of the creditor's estate, would otherwise be both the person who owed the debt and the only person who could sue for it. In the same way, section 15(5) excludes the time during which a defendant is absent from India, and the Act contains other specific provisions, such as sections 12 to 15, section 17 on fraud and mistake, and sections 18 and 19 on acknowledgment and part payment. They are not exceptions to section 9 so much as separate rules that the Act supplies in terms, and they have to be shown to apply on their own wording.

    An illustration will fix the rule. A debt of Rs 50,000 falls due to H on 1 September 2023, and the suit is governed by a three-year article. The period runs from 2 September 2023 and ends on 1 September 2026. If H becomes of unsound mind on 1 June 2024, which is within the period, the period still ends on 1 September 2026, and H's guardian or next friend must sue by then. Had H been of unsound mind on 1 September 2023, when the debt fell due, section 6 would have given him three years from the date he recovered.

    The rule is harsh, as the cases admit, but it is deliberate, and the safeguards for a disabled person are the guardian, the next friend, the court's power to appoint a representative under Order XXXII, and the extension in section 6 for those disabled at the start.

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