Is Planning a Bank Robbery a Crime? IPC vs. BNS Analysis

The Four Stages of Crime: A Framework

Every criminal enterprise passes through four identifiable stages: (i) intention, (ii) preparation, (iii) attempt, and (iv) commission. As a general rule, the law punishes only from the stage of attempt onwards. Mere intention is unpunishable — the law cannot invade the mind. Preparation, being ordinarily a harmless or at least ambiguous act, is also generally not punishable. However, the law departs from this general rule in cases so grave that it becomes essential to intercept the criminal enterprise at the preparatory stage itself. The facts before us engage all of these principles in a fascinating sequence.

Stage One — Was There a Criminal Agreement from the Start?

The story begins with Dheer making a suggestion in jest that they should rob a bank. Ranjan and Anand, however, took it seriously and immediately agreed. Here the law confronts a nuance that demands honest treatment: can a meeting of minds be constituted when one party does not subjectively intend a serious proposal?

The law of criminal conspiracy under Section 120A IPC (now Section 61 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) requires an agreement between two or more persons to do an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means. The word "agreement" is central. As the House of Lords stated in the classic formulation in Mulcahy v. R — affirmed repeatedly by Indian courts — "A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more but in the agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act by unlawful means. So long as such a design rests in intention only, it is not indictable." The Supreme Court in State (CBI/SIT) v. Nalini (1999) — the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case — reiterated that an agreement between two or more persons to do an illegal act amounts to criminal conspiracy, and that "the illegal act may or may not be done in pursuance of the agreement, but the very agreement is an offence."

At the initial moment of Dheer's jest, the critical ingredient — meeting of minds — is absent on Dheer's part. He was not serious. A unilateral joke, however mischievous, cannot create a bilateral agreement. Ranjan and Anand may have agreed with each other, but Dheer had not yet truly agreed with them. However — and this is the decisive turn in the problem — Dheer's position changes entirely a moment later. When he realises that his friends are serious, and — crucially — when he himself consciously decides to proceed with the plan thinking of the money to be made, he enters into the agreement with full knowledge and intent. The law looks not at how the agreement was initiated, but at whether a genuine consensus ultimately crystallised. By the end of that morning's conversation, all three have agreed to rob the bank. The conspiracy is born at that point.

The Conspiracy: Section 120A/120B IPC and Section 61 BNS

Section 120A IPC defines criminal conspiracy as the agreement of two or more persons to do, or cause to be done, an illegal act or an act which is not illegal but by illegal means. Section 120B IPC prescribes punishment for it. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, both the definition and punishment are contained in Section 61 BNS.

The object of this conspiracy — robbing a bank — is unambiguously an illegal act. Bank robbery constitutes the offence of dacoity under Section 391 IPC (corresponding to Section 310 BNS), since the intent is for five or more persons to commit robbery or for the act to be accompanied by violence or the threat of violence. Even if robbery rather than dacoity is contemplated, robbery is an offence punishable with rigorous imprisonment extending to ten years. A conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, life imprisonment or rigorous imprisonment for two years or more is punishable — under Section 120B IPC and Section 61(2)(a) BNS — in the same manner as if the conspirators had abetted the substantive offence. There is no requirement that any overt act be done in furtherance of the conspiracy to commit an offence; the agreement itself is the crime. The Supreme Court in Ram Narain Poply v. CBI (AIR 2003 SC 2748) stated clearly: "Mere proof of agreement between two or more to do an unlawful act or an act by unlawful means is enough. When two agree to carry it into effect, the very plot is an act by itself."

All three — Ranjan, Dheer, and Anand — are therefore guilty of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B IPC / Section 61 BNS, from the moment Dheer consciously joined the plan.

Stage Two — The Preparation

Over the following week, the three friends purchased masks, arranged sacks, and were on the verge of ordering weapons. This raises the question of which specific provision applies to their preparatory acts.

The general rule — that preparation is not punishable — has an important and directly applicable exception here. Section 399 IPC makes preparation to commit dacoity a standalone punishable offence. It reads:

"Whoever makes any preparation for committing dacoity shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."

Under the BNS, the corresponding provision is Section 311 BNS, which carries the same prescription. The section is specifically designed to intercept dacoity at the preparatory stage itself — recognising that the sheer gravity of organised armed robbery demands that the criminal law intervene before the bank is ever approached.

The essential ingredients of Section 399 IPC are: (i) that the accused made preparations and (ii) that such preparations were for the commission of dacoity. "Dacoity" under Section 391 IPC (Section 310 BNS) requires five or more persons. In the present case there are three persons — which is less than the required five. The question therefore arises: is Section 399 IPC attracted?

Strictly read, if the planned robbery requires five or more persons for the act to constitute dacoity, and only three have conspired, the preparation may more accurately be characterised as preparation for robbery rather than dacoity. However, the conduct of purchasing masks and arranging sacks is clearly preparation for a violent property offence. If more accomplices are intended to be recruited — which is not ruled out by the facts — dacoity remains a possibility. For a conservative analysis, the acts certainly constitute preparation for robbery, which, though not independently punishable as preparation, becomes relevant in the context of the larger conspiracy.

What is decisive here is that the purchase of masks and arrangement of sacks are overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, which lend credence to and corroborate the charge of conspiracy under Section 120B IPC. In State NCT of Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu (AIR 2005 SC 3820) — the Parliament attack case — the Supreme Court observed that acts or conduct of parties which are conscious and clear enough to infer their concurrence to a common design and its execution can establish the existence of a criminal conspiracy. The purchase of masks and sacks is precisely such conduct.

Stage Three — Were They at the Attempt Stage?

The three had not yet ordered weapons and had not gone to the bank. Were their acts — planning, purchasing masks, arranging sacks — an attempt to commit robbery, or still preparation?

The distinction between preparation and attempt has occupied the courts for over a century. The proximity rule, as elaborated in Sudhir Kumar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal (AIR 1973 SC 2655), holds that an attempt requires an act that is "during the course of committing that offence" — it need not be the penultimate act but must go beyond mere preparation. The test formulated in Malkiat Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1970 SC 713) is whether the acts done are such that "if the offender changes his mind and does not proceed further in its progress, the acts already done would be completely harmless." Purchasing masks and arranging sacks is, on its own, potentially harmless — they could theoretically be used for innocuous purposes. The specific criminal intent is what makes them sinister, but that intent is established through the conspiracy.

The accused had not yet ordered weapons. They had not proceeded to the bank. They were interrupted at the preparatory stage. On the facts, they have not crossed the threshold into attempt. Their liability, therefore, rests squarely on the law of conspiracy and preparation — not attempt.

The Specific Offences: A Summary of Liability

Having traced the journey from jest to plan to preparation, the criminal liability of each of the three friends can be stated as follows:

Ranjan and Anand: Both agreed immediately when Dheer made his suggestion, believing it to be serious. Their agreement constituted a criminal conspiracy from the start of their earnest consent. They are fully liable under Section 120B IPC / Section 61(2)(a) BNS for criminal conspiracy to commit dacoity/robbery.

Dheer: Though he initiated the idea as a jest, he consciously joined the plan upon realising his friends were serious, motivated by the prospect of financial gain. His entry into the agreement is voluntary and informed. He is equally liable as a conspirator. The fact that the origin of the idea was a joke provides no legal exemption: what matters is the state of mind at the point of agreement, not the spirit in which the initial suggestion was floated. As the Supreme Court observed in the Nalini case, "Every one of the conspirators need not have taken active part in the commission of each and every one of the conspiratorial acts for the offence of conspiracy to be made out."

All three together: By purchasing masks, arranging sacks, and being about to order weapons, they have performed overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, which corroborate the existence of the agreement. If the plan contemplated five or more persons for the actual execution, they are also guilty under Section 399 IPC / Section 311 BNS for preparation to commit dacoity.

The Role of the Neighbour

The neighbour who informed the police has, in the language of Section 39 CrPC, discharged a civic duty. The law in fact imposes a positive obligation on every person aware of the commission of, or intention to commit, certain serious offences, to inform the nearest magistrate or police officer. The fact that the arrest occurred before the weapons were ordered or the robbery attempted does not diminish the criminal liability already attached by the conspiracy and the preparatory acts.

The Decisive Legal Position

To summarise the legal opinion with clarity: all three friends — Ranjan, Dheer, and Anand — have committed offences under the law. The conspiracy to commit robbery/dacoity crystallised as soon as all three consciously agreed to the plan. Dheer's initial jest does not immunise him once he deliberately entered the agreement with criminal intent. The purchase of masks and arrangement of sacks constitute both corroborating evidence of the conspiracy and potentially preparation for dacoity. The law of criminal conspiracy is designed precisely for such situations — where "the very plot is an act by itself", as the common law so eloquently recognised. The three were rightly arrested, and their prosecution is well-founded under Section 120B IPC read with Sections 395/399 IPC, or equivalently under Section 61(2)(a) BNS read with Sections 310/311 BNS.