P, a Hindu father, appointed B as guardian of his son aged 10 years, ignoring the mother. Effectiveness of father's will.

The Old Law: Father's Absolute Power

Under the Hindu law as administered by courts before 1956, the father's power to appoint a testamentary guardian was practically absolute. He could, by will or even by word of mouth, nominate any person as guardian of his children's person and property and, by that very act, exclude the mother from stepping into guardianship after his death. The mother had no corresponding power at all — she could neither appoint a guardian by will nor complain that a stranger had been placed ahead of her. This was an unqualified extension of the patriarchal authority of the father, and it operated with full vigour until the commencement of the 1956 Act.

Under that old regime, P's will appointing B as guardian, ignoring the mother entirely, would have been perfectly valid and effective. B would have stepped in as testamentary guardian upon P's death, and the mother would have had no legal footing to challenge it.

The Position After the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956

The 1956 Act changed this landscape fundamentally. Section 9, which governs testamentary guardians, is the pivotal provision. Sub-section (1) preserves the father's right to appoint a testamentary guardian by will — so P's appointment of B is not void on its face. However, sub-section (2) immediately qualifies this with a rule that strikes at the very heart of a father's attempt to override the mother. It reads:

An appointment made under sub-section (1) shall have no effect if the father predeceases the mother, but shall revive if the mother dies without appointing, by will, any person as guardian.

The consequence is stark and unambiguous. Section 6(a) of the same Act declares that for a boy or an unmarried girl, the father is the natural guardian, and after him, the mother is the natural guardian. The mother's status as natural guardian after the father's death is now a statutory right — it flows directly from the Act and is not subject to any testamentary manipulation by the father. As explained by Mulla's commentary on Section 9, "a father cannot, after the coming into operation of this Act, appoint a testamentary guardian for his minor children so as to exclude the mother from her right to act as the natural guardian of the children after the father."

The Fate of P's Will: Three Distinct Scenarios

The answer to whether P's appointment of B is effective depends on one critical fact: Does the mother survive P?

Scenario 1 — The Mother Survives P. This is the most natural reading of the problem. P makes a will appointing B as guardian, ignoring the mother. P then dies. Since the mother is alive, Section 9(2) operates directly and with full force: P's appointment of B has no effect. The mother automatically becomes the natural guardian of the ten-year-old son under Section 6(a). B has no role to play whatsoever. P's testamentary intention is suspended — it does not take effect even though it was validly executed. The mother cannot be displaced from her statutory position by any provision in P's will, as the commentary under Section 9 of the Act is categorical: "The father has no power to restrict the powers and status of the mother."

Scenario 2 — The Mother then Dies Without Making a Will. If the mother, having survived P and having acted as natural guardian, then dies without appointing any guardian by her own will, P's appointment of B revives automatically under the second limb of Section 9(2). B would then become the testamentary guardian under P's will. The appointment, which was suspended during the mother's lifetime, springs back to life as though it had never lapsed.

Scenario 3 — The Mother Dies After Making Her Own Will. If the mother, before her death, executes a will appointing some person C as testamentary guardian, then C takes over the guardianship upon her death. P's appointment of B remains permanently eclipsed — it cannot revive where the mother has herself exercised the testamentary power.

Why This Reform Was Made

The logic of Section 9(2) is rooted in the recognition that the mother's status as natural guardian under Section 6(a) is not a derived or secondary right — it is a primary statutory right. A father's testamentary direction, however well-intentioned, cannot operate to whittle down a right that the legislature has expressly conferred. The Act made it clear that the mother, after the father, is the lawful guardian of the minor children, and no testamentary appointment can displace her during her lifetime. P's attempt to "ignore" the mother therefore has no legal effect so long as she is alive.

Practical Result in P's Case

Assuming the mother is alive when P dies — which the problem strongly implies by stating that the will was made "ignoring the mother" — B's appointment as testamentary guardian has no effect under Section 9(2). The mother steps in as natural guardian of the ten-year-old son under Section 6(a). She exercises all the powers of a natural guardian, subject to the restrictions of Section 8 of the Act — meaning she cannot alienate the minor's immovable property without the prior permission of the court. B's appointment remains in a state of suspension, and it can only revive in the contingency described above — i.e., if the mother dies without herself appointing a guardian by will. The welfare of the minor, which is the paramount consideration under Section 13, is best served by this arrangement, since the mother, as the child's surviving parent, is presumptively the most natural and appropriate guardian of a ten-year-old boy.