Plaintiff/A was inducted as tenant for half portion of suit property on monthly rent of Rs. 300/- w.e.f. 22.12.70 by defendant/B. On 24.12.70, defendant/B executed Agreement to Sell the suit property to plaintiff/A for Rs. 3,75,000/-, out of which Rs. 50,000/- was paid as part payment. It was stipulated that defendant/B will obtain Tax Clearance Certificate within 12 months, after which plaintiff/A shall pay balance consideration within 03 months. On 05.11.77, plaintiff/A filed suit for specific performance. Defendant/B contended suit was barred by limitation. Decide whether suit is barred by limitation.
The suit is barred. The agreement fixed the time by which each side was to act, so the case falls in the first limb of Article 54, and the three years ended in March 1975. The suit was filed more than two and a half years after that.
Article 54 gives three years for a suit for specific performance, running from "the date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused." In Ahmadsahab Abdul Mulla v Bibijan, (2009) 5 SCC 462 : AIR 2009 SC 2193, a Bench of three Judges explained that the date fixed for performance is a definite date, and that in the absence of a fixed date time runs from the plaintiff's notice of refusal. The first question is accordingly whether this agreement fixed a date.
It did, in substance. The agreement was made on 24 December 1970. B was to obtain the tax clearance certificate within twelve months, which brings us to 24 December 1971, and A was to pay the balance within three months after that, which brings us to 24 March 1972. The parties therefore settled the time-table by reference to periods of months running from the date of the agreement, and each of the two steps had an outer limit. It is true that the second period began from the grant of the certificate, which was an act of B, but B's duty was to obtain it within the twelve months, and A's obligation to pay was to be performed at the latest within the three months following that. A date counted in this way can be worked out with certainty from the agreement itself, and so differs from the case of a contract which depends on an event that may never happen, such as the permission of third parties. The outer date for performance was 24 March 1972, which was a Friday. Three years from that date ended on 24 March 1975, which was a Monday. The suit of 5 November 1977 came two years and about seven and a half months later, and is barred under section 3.
Several arguments may be thought of for A, and none of them helps. The first is that the clearance may not have been obtained within the twelve months, so that the time for payment never began. The agreement made it B's duty to obtain the certificate within twelve months, and a failure to do so was a default which was known, or ought to have been known, to A when the year ended. A could not leave the contract in suspense for years by pointing to B's own breach, for the first limb of the article looks at the date the contract fixed, and A had the right to sue as soon as that date passed without performance. If the certificate was in fact obtained late, then the three months for payment would run from the later grant, and the date for performance would be three months after it. To bring the suit of 5 November 1977 within time, performance would have to be due on or after 5 November 1974, which means that the clearance would have to have been granted on or after about 5 August 1974, over two and a half years after the year allowed by the agreement. This would have to be pleaded and proved by A, and the facts do not mention it.
The second argument is that the second limb applies because B never refused performance. That limb is for cases where no date is fixed. Where the first limb applies, the absence of a refusal does not postpone time. A could reach the second limb only if he could show that no date was fixed, which the structure of the agreement denies, or that B refused or extended the time in a way that gave him a fresh date, and no such thing is stated.
The third argument is based on A's position as tenant and the payment of Rs 50,000. Neither affects limitation. A's possession as tenant arises under a different contract and has no bearing on the date for performance of the agreement to sell. The advance of Rs 50,000 was a payment by A towards the price, and it is not an acknowledgment by B of liability which could give a fresh period under section 18, because section 18 requires a written acknowledgment signed by the party against whom the right is claimed and made before the period expires. Nothing of the kind is mentioned. A's willingness to pay the balance would also be an issue for the merits under section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, but it does not touch limitation.
The result is that B's objection must succeed. The suit was filed after the period had ended, and unless A can plead and prove a later date for performance, or a refusal within the three years before 5 November 1977 (that is, after 5 November 1974), it is dismissed as barred.
Two illustrations show the point. In the first, an agreement of 1 March 1980 requires the seller to obtain a clearance in six months and the buyer to pay in two months after that. The outer date is 1 May 1981 and a suit filed on 1 June 1985 is barred. In the second, the same agreement is performed by the seller obtaining the clearance on 1 October 1983, and a payment due on 1 December 1983 is not made. The suit can be filed up to 1 December 1986, but only if the late clearance is proved and is shown to have been accepted by the parties as a variation of the original time.
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