Plaintiff was given employment by Respondent in 1985. Promoted as Vice President in 1986. Services were terminated by one month's notice vide letter dated 12.4.1991. Plaintiff filed suit on 6.6.1994 claiming termination was invalid. Respondent contends suit is barred by limitation as services were terminated vide notice dated 12.4.1991 and three years period expired on 11.4.1994. Whether respondent is correct in computing period from date of notice?
The respondent is wrong in the method of reckoning but right in the result. Time did not begin on the day the notice was given, because the plaintiff had no complete cause of action until the termination took effect. Yet even if it is counted from the effective date, the three years ended in the middle of May 1994, and a suit filed on 6 June 1994 is out of time.
A suit to declare that a termination of service is invalid is a suit for a declaration. Article 58 of the Schedule applies to a suit "to obtain any other declaration" and gives three years from "when the right to sue first accrues". If one takes the view that the suit does not fall within a specific article, the residuary Article 113 applies, which gives three years for "any suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule" from "when the right to sue accrues". Whichever article is chosen, the period is three years and it begins when the right to sue accrues, so the choice does not alter the result here. The important question is when a right to sue accrued to the plaintiff.
The right to sue arises when there is a clear and unequivocal threat to the plaintiff's right, or an infringement of it, which gives him a cause of action. The plaintiff here complains that his service was wrongly terminated. A notice that service will end after one month announces a future termination, but it does not itself end the service. During the month, the plaintiff was still employed, and had he sued on the first day he would have been challenging an act that had not yet taken effect. The injury, on which the claim rests, occurred when the employment came to an end at the expiry of the notice. The respondent has therefore taken the wrong starting point in counting from 12 April 1991. This is not to say that the date of the notice can never matter: if the letter itself had ended the employment at once, for instance by terminating with immediate effect and offering a month's pay in lieu, the date of the letter would be the date of the cause of action. That is not the case here, because the letter gave one month's notice.
The next step is to say when the month expired. A notice dated 12 April 1991 and given, as we may assume, on that day, ran for a month, so the services ended on or about 12 May 1991. This assumes that the letter was received on the day it was dated; if it was received later, the date of cessation shifts by the same number of days, and the plaintiff must prove the later date. The date 12 May 1991 was a Sunday, which does not matter, as the termination takes effect whether or not the day is a working day. Under section 12(1) of the Limitation Act the day from which the period is reckoned is left out, and the three years then run to 12 May 1994 (on a stricter count, to 11 May 1994). The day was a Thursday. The suit was filed on 6 June 1994, which is about twenty-five days after the last day, so it is barred under section 3 unless some provision of the Act extends or excludes the time.
Nothing in the facts suggests such a provision. Section 4, which carries a period over to the day the court reopens, helps only if the last day fell on a day on which the court was closed, and even then the extension would stop at the day of reopening, which would not reach 6 June. There is no suggestion of a legal disability under section 6, of an acknowledgment under section 18 or of a fraud under section 17. Section 14 would exclude the time spent in good faith in prosecuting another proceeding in a court without jurisdiction, but there is no mention of one. If the plaintiff had in fact pursued a representation or a departmental remedy, that would not in itself stop time, since the Act excludes time only in the cases which it lists.
My conclusion is that the respondent's objection is correct in outcome and wrong in its reasoning. The date of the notice is not the starting point; the date of termination is. That date gives a last day of about 12 May 1994, and the suit of 6 June 1994 is barred. For the suit to be in time the termination would have to have taken effect on or after about 6 June 1991, which means that the letter dated 12 April 1991 would have to reach the plaintiff nearly four weeks late, and the plaintiff would have to prove it. On the facts as stated there is no such case, and no ground for excluding time has been shown.
Two short illustrations bring out the principle. An employer gives an employee a notice on 1 February 1990 that his service will end on 28 February 1990. The cause of action to challenge the termination is linked to 28 February, so the three years end on 28 February 1993, not on 1 February. Where an employer on 1 February 1990 dismisses an employee with immediate effect, paying a month's wages in lieu, the cause of action is complete on 1 February, and the three years end on 1 February 1993.
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