Circumstantial Evidence: Can Ranjit Kumar be Convicted?

Circumstantial Evidence and the Conviction of Ranjit Kumar

The short answer to the question is this: the four circumstances taken individually are not sufficient to convict Ranjit Kumar, but if properly proved and linked into a complete chain, they may form a strong foundation for conviction — provided the chain admits of no reasonable hypothesis consistent with his innocence. This answer requires careful navigation of the law of circumstantial evidence, the relevancy provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and its successor the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), and the expert opinion provisions — all read in light of the leading decisions of the Supreme Court.

The Governing Framework: Circumstantial Evidence

When there is no eye-witness — as in Ranjit Kumar's case — the prosecution must rely entirely on circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence consists of facts from which the court is invited to draw a logical inference about the existence of the main fact in issue: who killed Amritpal?

The Supreme Court in the landmark decision of Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1952 SC 343) laid down the bedrock principle: in cases resting on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn must first be fully established, must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, and must exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with innocence.

This formulation was elevated to its most celebrated form by the Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1984 SC 1622), which declared the Panchsheel — five golden principles — of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence:

The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.
The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused.
The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency.
They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved.
There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused, and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.

These five principles govern the analysis of every circumstance raised against Ranjit Kumar.

Analysing Each Circumstance

First: The Prior Threat — Motive and Conduct (Section 8, IEA / Section 7, BSA)

The fact that Ranjit Kumar had threatened Amritpal a few days before the killing is directly relevant under Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Section 7 of the BSA, 2023), which makes any fact relevant if it shows the motive for, or preparation for, or previous or subsequent conduct in relation to any relevant fact. The threat establishes motive, which is a cornerstone of circumstantial evidence in murder cases. A motive does not prove guilt — many people who make threats never act on them — but its presence is a significant circumstance that lends colour to the other evidence.

The illustration in Section 8 itself captures the point elegantly: when A is tried for the murder of B, the fact that A had a quarrel with B before the murder is relevant as showing motive. In our case, the threat to Amritpal is precisely such prior conduct — it demonstrates that Ranjit Kumar bore ill will toward the deceased and had expressed it in the form of a threat. However, the court must bear in mind the time gap between the threat and the killing. A threat made years before may lose its force, but a threat made "a few days before" retains immediate relevancy and probative value.

Second: The Cartridge Found at the Scene — Material Evidence

The recovery of a cartridge near the cot of the deceased Amritpal is real or material evidence. By itself, a spent cartridge only establishes that a firearm was discharged in the vicinity. It does not identify who fired it. Its true significance emerges only when linked with the third circumstance: the pistol recovered from Ranjit Kumar's house. Standing alone, the cartridge is no more than a circumstance that death was caused by a firearm. It must be read as part of the chain, not as an independent pillar of conviction.

Third: The Recovery of the Pistol — Discovery under Section 27, IEA / Section 23, BSA

The recovery of a pistol from Ranjit Kumar's house is a significant circumstance, particularly if it was discovered following information furnished by the accused while in police custody. Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (the proviso to Section 23 of the BSA, 2023) provides that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of an offence while in the custody of a police officer, so much of the information as distinctly relates to the fact discovered may be proved.

The basis of this provision was classically stated by the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor (AIR 1947 PC 67) — the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events. If a fact is discovered in consequence of information given by the accused, the discovery itself guarantees the truth of the information. However, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that the recovery must be from a place exclusively within the knowledge of the accused. If the pistol was recovered from an open place accessible to all, the discovery loses its significance. Moreover, mere possession of a pistol does not automatically link it to the crime — the fourth circumstance is what forges this critical link.

It is also essential that the recovery be witnessed by independent witnesses and duly recorded in a panchnama. As was cautioned in Megha Singh v. State of Haryana (AIR 1995 SC 2339), discrepancies in the depositions of police witnesses regarding the number of cartridges recovered and the absence of independent witnesses can undermine confidence in the recovery evidence.

Fourth: The Expert Opinion of the Firearm Expert — Section 45, IEA / Section 39, BSA

This is perhaps the most important of the four circumstances in the chain. Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Section 39 of the BSA, 2023) makes the opinion of a person specially skilled in any science or art relevant when the court has to form an opinion on a question of science or art in which the expert has special skill. Ballistics — the science of firearms and projectiles — is squarely within this domain.

The firearm expert's opinion that the cartridge found near the cot of the deceased was fired from the specific pistol recovered from Ranjit Kumar's possession is a critical piece of expert evidence. It does what neither the cartridge nor the pistol could individually achieve: it links the murder weapon to the accused. As the textbook illustration in the sources puts it — the ballistics expert who says that the markings on the bullet recovered from the deceased's body are similar to the markings on the bullet test-fired from the accused's gun, is saying that the same gun was used in the murder. That evidence, when corroborated by the discovery of the gun in the accused's possession, creates a powerful inference of guilt.

However, expert opinion is not conclusive — it is advisory. The court is not bound by it, though it carries great weight in a case turning entirely on circumstantial evidence. The expert must be examined in court under Section 45 and must be subjected to cross-examination. Merely producing a report without examining the expert is insufficient, as affirmed in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Edward Samuel Chareton (2001 Cr LJ 1356 HP), which held that the report of a scientific officer has no evidentiary value unless the signatory is examined.

Are the Four Circumstances Sufficient? The Crucial Test

Individually, none of the four circumstances conclusively proves that Ranjit Kumar murdered Amritpal. A threat shows animosity, not guilt. A cartridge shows a firearm was used. A pistol in possession raises suspicion. An expert opinion links the pistol to the cartridge. But together, they weave a chain:

Ranjit Kumar threatened Amritpal → a few days later Amritpal was shot dead → a cartridge was found near the scene → a pistol was recovered from Ranjit Kumar → the expert established that this pistol fired that cartridge.

The question is whether this chain is complete — whether it excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Here lies the crux of the difficulty. The defence can raise several plausible hypotheses: that the pistol was planted; that the cartridge at the scene came from a different weapon; that the threat was empty bluster common to quarrels; that the expert's methodology was flawed. If any one of these hypotheses is not excluded by the chain of circumstances, the benefit of doubt must go to the accused.

The Supreme Court in KV Chacko v. State of Kerala (2001) 9 SCC 277 laid down that the circumstances must form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else. In the absence of last seen together evidence, any forensic link between the accused and the scene of crime, or an admission of any sort, the chain in Ranjit Kumar's case may carry dangerous gaps.

There is also the issue of motive versus identity. A prior threat proves that Ranjit Kumar had a reason to harm Amritpal. It does not establish that he was at the scene of the crime. The prosecution must close this gap. If there is no evidence — even circumstantial — placing Ranjit Kumar at or near the scene, the chain is broken between motive and act.

The Missing Links: What Weakens the Case

An instructive parallel is found in R v. George (2002 EWCA Crim 1923), where circumstantial evidence sufficed because multiple strands — a particle of firearm discharge, fibres, association with firearms, and a flawed alibi — independently converged on guilt. In Ranjit Kumar's case, the prosecution has a threat (motive), a cartridge (act), a pistol (instrument), and an expert link (instrument-to-act). But the chain lacks:

Evidence of presence at the scene — nothing places Ranjit Kumar at Amritpal's residence on the fateful night.
Absence of alibi falsification — if the accused offers a credible alibi, the prosecution cannot break it with only the four cited facts.
Gap in the last-seen doctrine — the Supreme Court in Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana (2013 Cr LJ 3183) has emphasised that where a case turns on circumstantial evidence and there is no "last seen together" evidence, the chain must be even more complete.

The Judicial Conclusion

If the four circumstances are proved beyond reasonable doubt as individual facts, and if the chain they form is read cumulatively to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence — particularly if the accused offers no explanation under Section 313 CrPC (now Section 351, BNSS, 2023) as to how a pistol that fired the bullet found near the dead body of Amritpal came to be in his house — the case for conviction becomes considerably stronger. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an unreasonable or evasive explanation by the accused under Section 313, or a false defence, can itself be used as a circumstance against him, as reiterated in G. Parshwanath v. State of Karnataka (AIR 2010 SC 2914).

But if the chain carries the gaps identified above — no evidence of presence, no corroboration of the threat by independent witnesses, a recovery that was not made from a location exclusively within the accused's knowledge, and an expert opinion challenged on methodology — the court, following the time-honoured wisdom of Reg v. Hodge (1838 2 Lewin 227), must guard against the temptation of the human mind to adapt circumstances to one another, fill in missing links, and forge a connected whole that the evidence does not truly support.

The answer, therefore, is this: the four circumstances, as they stand, are necessary links in the chain but are not, by themselves, sufficient for conviction unless the chain is complete, the gaps are bridged by proof, and the accused's explanation is non-existent or false. The prosecution must close the gap between motive and act. If it does, conviction is warranted. If it does not, the scales of justice must tip in favour of Ranjit Kumar under the venerable principle that between the probability of guilt and the certainty required for conviction, there lies a great distance — and that distance is precisely where the presumption of innocence resides.