Right to privacy is now fully recognised as a Fundamental Right in India". Explain.
The Constitution does not use the word "privacy" anywhere in Part III. The right has been drawn by the Supreme Court from Article 21, and from other provisions of the Constitution, including the freedoms in Article 19 and the Directive Principles. Its recognition took more than sixty years, and was settled by a nine-judge decision in 2017.
The framers did discuss some aspects of privacy. In the Constituent Assembly the secrecy of correspondence and the right against search and seizure were discussed at length, but they were dropped on the ground, among others, that including them would hamper criminal investigation and affect many provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As a result, the original Constitution said nothing about the subject.
The early cases denied the right. In M P Sharma v Satish Chandra, AIR 1954 SC 300, a bench of eight judges held that there was no fundamental right of privacy. In Kharak Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 1295, the question came up again. The police had a system of surveillance over a person which included night-time visits to his home. The majority said that the Constitution does not in terms confer any such guarantee, though it held that domiciliary visits at night violated personal liberty. Subba Rao J, in the minority, said that although the Constitution does not expressly declare a right to privacy as a fundamental right, the right is an essential ingredient of personal liberty. The reason for the majority's approach, as the later decision explained, was the view in A K Gopalan that the rights in Article 19 and Article 21 are separate and exclusive of each other.
The next step was Govind v State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 1378. The Court considered the validity of a regulation which allowed surveillance of a person by several measures. It upheld the regulation as a procedure established by law. But the Court accepted a limited fundamental right of privacy as an emanation from Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(d) and 21, with the caveat that the right is not absolute and may be restricted in the public interest. Mathew J said that the right would have to be developed case by case, and that a law infringing a fundamental privacy right must satisfy the test of a compelling State interest.
Several decisions followed. In R Rajagopal v State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1995 SC 264 : (1994) 6 SCC 632, the Court described privacy as the "right to be let alone", covering a person's own life and that of his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child-bearing and education, and it reconciled that with freedom of the press by holding that a newspaper may publish what appears from public records, though it may not go beyond them. In People's Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 568 : (1997) 1 SCC 301, the Court dealt with telephone tapping. It held that a telephone conversation is an important facet of a person's private life, that the right to hold a telephone conversation in the privacy of one's home or office without interference can be claimed as a right to privacy, and that once the right is attracted Article 21 requires that it be curtailed only by a procedure that is just, fair and reasonable. Telephone conversation is also an exercise of freedom of speech and expression, so that tapping not covered by Article 19(2) would violate Article 19(1)(a). The earlier decision in R M Malkani v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 157, had said that the telephone conversations of an innocent citizen would be protected against unlawful tapping, but that the protection is not for the guilty against the efforts of the police to vindicate the law. In State of Maharashtra v Madhukar Narayan Mardikar, AIR 1999 SC 495 : (1999) 1 SCC 57, the Court held that even a woman of easy virtue is entitled to her privacy.
By the time the Aadhaar scheme was challenged, the Attorney General contended that the existence of the right was in doubt because of the decisions in M P Sharma (eight judges) and Kharak Singh (a bench of six). The matter was therefore referred to a bench of nine judges, which delivered judgment in K S Puttaswamy v Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1. Nine judges gave six opinions, and all of them agreed that the right to privacy is a fundamental right under the Constitution.
The leading opinion, by Chandrachud J, proceeded in four steps. First, the decisions in M P Sharma and Kharak Singh rested on the interpretation of Articles 19 and 21 in Gopalan, and that interpretation had been abandoned after R C Cooper v Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564, and Maneka Gandhi. So their basis no longer existed. Second, Govind and the cases after it had proceeded on the footing that the right exists. Third, privacy is a constitutionally protected right which emerges primarily from the guarantee of personal liberty in Article 21, and elements of it also arise from other facets of freedom and dignity guaranteed by Part III. Fourth, privacy is not absolute. A law that interferes with it must satisfy a standard of fair, just and reasonable procedure and, in the words of the opinion, any invasion of life or personal liberty must meet a threefold requirement: legality, meaning the existence of a law; need, defined in terms of a legitimate State aim; and proportionality, which ensures a rational connection between the object and the means adopted to achieve it. The Court made clear that it was not attempting an exhaustive list of the entitlements that make up privacy.
The other judges added their own approaches. Chelameswar J described privacy as having three facets: repose, sanctuary and intimate decision, and he took Article 21 as the base of the right. Bobde J described privacy as the ability to choose and specify, both what to do and whom to include in one's circle, and treated the just, fair and reasonable standard of Maneka Gandhi as the test. Nariman J traced the right to Article 21 and the other freedoms in Part III. Sapre J found its source also in the Preamble's references to liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship, and to fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual. Kaul J said that privacy is the key to freedom of thought and set out a four-part test: the action must be sanctioned by law, it must be necessary in a democratic society for a legitimate aim, the interference must be proportionate to the need, and there must be procedural guarantees against abuse.
Puttaswamy has since been applied in many fields. In Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1, the Court held that the right to privacy includes the right to a self-determined sexual orientation, and said that sexual privacy is part of the right. It overruled the earlier decision in Suresh Kumar Koushal and held section 377 of the Indian Penal Code unconstitutional to the extent that it penalised consensual sexual relations between adults. In Joseph Shine v Union of India, (2018) 2 SCC 189, the Court struck down the offence of adultery, observing that treating adultery as a crime would be an intrusion into the extreme privacy of the matrimonial sphere. The right to marry a person of one's choice has been held to be a part of Article 21 (Laxmibai Chandaragi B v State of Karnataka, (2021) 3 SCC 360), and the Court has also treated reproductive choice as part of a woman's right to privacy, dignity and bodily integrity (Suchita Srivastava v Chandigarh Administration, (2009) 9 SCC 1).
The statement in the question is correct in its main point. After Puttaswamy there is no doubt that privacy is a fundamental right. Two cautions are needed. The first is that the right is not absolute. A law that limits it must pass the tests of legality, legitimate aim and proportionality, so the right can be restricted when the tests are met. The second is that the judges in Puttaswamy gave different reasons and different standards of review, and the Court did not set out a final catalogue of what falls within privacy. The scope of the right in particular situations, for example as against private parties, or when it comes into conflict with other rights such as the right to a fair trial, is being settled case by case.
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