Sarita works in a call centre and reaches office around 10.00 p.m. every night. On 01.03.2012, she was confronted by a gang of drunk hooligans who beat her up severely and ravished her in their car and then threw her off on the road. She mentioned the identity of one of the perpetrators as Rajesh to her colleagues. In the hospital, Sarita breathed her last around 6.00 p.m. the same evening. (i) Under which provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, the statements made by Sarita to her colleagues in the car may be relevant? (ii) Under which provision of the Indian Evidence Act, the statements made by Sarita to her colleagues in the car will not be relevant?

Provisions Under Which the Statement IS Relevant

Section 32(1) IEA / Section 26(a) BSA — As a Dying Declaration

The most powerful and natural home for Sarita's statement is Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which corresponds to Section 26(a) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023. The section makes relevant the written or verbal statement of a person who is dead, made as to the cause of her death or as to the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in her death, in cases where the cause of her death comes into question.

Two features of this provision deserve emphasis here. First, Sarita need not have been under any expectation of death at the time she named Rajesh to her colleagues. The section expressly provides that such statements are relevant "whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death." This marks the most crucial point of departure from English common law, where the expectation of death was an indispensable condition. Under Indian law, a statement made by a victim to her colleagues immediately after an attack — even if she believed she would survive — is admissible under Section 32(1) as long as she subsequently died and the cause of her death came into question.

Second, Sarita's statement naming Rajesh goes directly to the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in her death — namely the attack, the rape, and the injuries she sustained. The Privy Council, in Pakala Narayana Swami v. King-Emperor (1939 66 IA 66), laid down the canonical interpretation: the circumstances of the transaction are not confined to acts committed at the precise moment of death but extend to a series of acts forming part of the same event. Sarita's naming of Rajesh at the very scene of rescue falls squarely within this test. The statement becomes relevant as substantive evidence.

Illustration (a) to Section 32 IEA / Section 26 BSA captures this situation almost word for word: "A dies of injuries received in a transaction in the course of which she was ravished. The question is whether she was ravished by B. Statements made by A as to the cause of her death, referring to the rape, are relevant facts."

Section 6 IEA / Section 4 BSA — As Res Gestae

Sarita's statement to her colleagues is also potentially relevant under Section 6 of the IEA (= Section 4 of the BSA, 2023) as a fact forming part of the same transaction. The principle behind this section — the doctrine of res gestae — brings within the fold of legal relevancy any statement which is so intimately connected with the transaction in question as to form part of it, whether made at the same time and place or at different times and places, provided it is spontaneous and contemporaneous.

Sarita was thrown onto the road, severely beaten and in a state of trauma. When she named Rajesh to her colleagues who presumably came to her aid, this was not a calm, considered narration of a past event — it was an instinctive identification, made while she was still overwhelmed by the horror of what had just happened to her. The Supreme Court in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1952 SC 54) held that an eight-year-old rape victim's spontaneous statement to her mother about her attacker, made immediately after the event and while she was still in shock, was admissible as res gestae under Section 6. That authority maps directly onto the present facts.

Illustration (a) to Section 6 IEA / Section 4 BSA states: "A is accused of the murder of B by beating him. Whatever was said or done by A or B or the bystanders at the beating, or so shortly before or after it as to form part of the transaction, is a relevant fact." Sarita's utterance to her colleagues who arrived at the scene, made while she was still bleeding and in a state of shock, satisfies the test of spontaneity and contemporaneity required under this section.

The critical contrast between Section 6 and Section 32(1) must be noted at this point. Under Section 6, the statement must be spontaneous and contemporaneous to the transaction — there must be no interval sufficient for reflection or fabrication. Under Section 32(1), no such condition of contemporaneity applies; the statement could have been made even some time after the event, as long as it relates to the cause of death or the circumstances of the transaction resulting in death. Sarita's statement to her colleagues satisfies both tests, which means it is independently relevant under two different provisions — first as res gestae under Section 6, and second as a dying declaration under Section 32(1). In Rattan Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh (AIR 1997 SC 768), the Supreme Court recognised that a dying declaration can simultaneously be relevant under both provisions, and both avenues can be pursued by the prosecution.

Section 8 IEA / Section 8 BSA — As a Complaint and as Conduct

Section 8 of the IEA (= Section 8 of the BSA, 2023) makes relevant any fact that is part of the motive, preparation, or conduct of any party — and importantly, the conduct of a victim in making a complaint falls within this provision. The Explanation to Section 8 states that conduct includes statements made to others in circumstances that show the nature of the act done.

More particularly, Illustration (j) to Section 8 addresses this exact situation with precision: "The question is whether A was ravished. The facts that, shortly after the alleged rape, she made a complaint relating to the crime, the circumstances under which, and the terms in which, the complaint was made, are relevant." Sarita's statement to her colleagues — identifying Rajesh as her attacker shortly after the rape and assault — constitutes a complaint within the spirit of this illustration. It is admissible not merely as a dying declaration but as a piece of conduct relevant under Section 8.

The significance of this is that even if, for some procedural reason, the statement could not be proved as a dying declaration under Section 32(1) — perhaps because some technical objection was raised — the prosecution could independently rely on it under Section 8 as the conduct of the victim, which is strong corroborating circumstance of the truth of her version.

Section 157 IEA / Section 160 BSA — For Corroboration

Had Sarita survived and appeared as a witness, her earlier statement to her colleagues would have been relevant to corroborate her testimony under Section 157 of the IEA (= Section 160 of the BSA, 2023). Section 157 provides that in order to corroborate the testimony of a witness, any former statement made by her relating to the same facts, made before any authority legally competent to investigate the fact, may be proved. But even since Sarita is dead and cannot testify, her statement retains its character as substantive evidence under Section 32(1), and its additional value as a corroborative statement under Section 157 arises if any other witness's testimony on the same point needs to be bolstered.

The Provision Under Which the Statement Will NOT Be Relevant

Section 60 IEA / Section 57 BSA — The Hearsay Bar

Now we come to the provision under which Sarita's statement to her colleagues will not be directly relevant — or more precisely, under which the testimony of Sarita's colleagues about what she said to them would ordinarily be inadmissible as hearsay, were it not for the specific exceptions noted above.

Section 60 of the IEA (= Section 57 of the BSA, 2023) provides that oral evidence must, in all cases, be direct. It must be the evidence of a person who himself perceived the fact he deposes to. A witness who comes to court and says "Sarita told me that Rajesh attacked her" is not giving direct evidence of Rajesh's guilt — he is repeating what someone else said. That is classic hearsay, and Section 60 would render it inadmissible as original evidence.

However — and this is the critical analytical point the student must hold onto — the statement is not inadmissible in its entirety. It is inadmissible as original hearsay under Section 60, but it becomes admissible through the specific exceptions created by Sections 6 and 32(1). The provisions discussed above carve out defined categories of hearsay that the legislature has declared relevant. The colleagues' testimony about what Sarita said is therefore admissible not as general oral evidence under Section 60, but only under those specific exceptions. Were it not for Sections 6 and 32(1), the colleagues' account of Sarita's words would remain inadmissible under the ordinary rule that oral evidence must be direct.

The Privy Council stated this principle perfectly in Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor (1956 1 WLR 965): "It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence not the truth of the statement but the fact that it was made."

Illustration (j) to Section 8 itself draws this very line: "The fact that, without making a complaint, she said that she had been ravished, is not relevant as conduct under this section, though it may be relevant as a dying declaration under Section 32, Clause (1), or as corroborative evidence under Section 157." The legislature has thus mapped precisely when the statement walks through the door — and through which door — and when it is kept out.

A Synthesis of the Answer

Sarita's statement to her colleagues is therefore a powerful piece of evidence — relevant under three separate substantive provisions and one corroborative provision of the Act. The only route through which it fails is as direct evidence under Section 60, because the colleagues are reporting what they heard from Sarita, not what they themselves witnessed. The legislature's genius lies in the very illustration (j) to Section 8, which articulates this distinction with crystalline clarity — the statement is not merely gossip passed from person to person, it is the dying voice of a victim of rape and murder speaking directly to the court through the specific gateways the law has thoughtfully opened for her.