Constitutional LawRight to Freedom of Religion 29 July 2026· 8 min read

    Secularism in many a time mistaken as non-religious". Explain the concept in the light of freedom of religion.

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    It is often thought that a secular State must be a State without religion, or one that is hostile to it. That is a mistake. Secularism in India does not mean the absence of religion. It means that the State is neutral between religions and that every person is free to follow his own. The word is not defined in the Constitution. It was added to the Preamble by the Forty-second Amendment in 1976, but Article 25 already referred to secular activity, and the Constitution had always protected freedom of religion. The concept is elastic, and the courts have shaped its meaning from case to case.

    Not the American wall. In the United States the First Amendment is understood to build a wall between State and religion. The Indian model is different. The involvement of the State in religious matters is not objected to as such; what the Constitution forbids is discriminatory treatment of one religion in favour of another. The State is in fact bound to give added protection to religious minorities and to communities with tribal status. In S R Bommai v Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1918, a nine-judge Bench held secularism to be a basic feature of the Constitution. Sawant J said that religious tolerance, equal treatment of all religious groups and protection of their life, property and places of worship are an essential part of the secularism in the Constitution. Jeevan Reddy J said that citizens are free to profess, practise and propagate any religion, but from the point of view of the State the religion or belief of a person is immaterial, and all are to be treated equally. The Court went further and held that a State Government pursuing unsecular policies acts against the constitutional mandate and is amenable to action under Article 356. In M Ismail Faruqui v Union of India, Verma J described secularism as one facet of the right to equality, "the central golden thread" in the fabric of the Constitution, and pointed to Articles 14 to 16, 25 to 30, 44 and 51A as provisions that promote it and, by implication, prohibit a theocratic State. A secular State does not extend patronage to any religion; it is neither inclined nor disinclined towards any.

    How the State may engage with religion. Because the State is neutral and not hostile, it can deal with religion in different ways without violating secularism. In Aruna Roy v Union of India, the Court held that secularism is not endangered if the basic tenets of all religions are studied, because value-based education helps the nation to fight fanaticism, violence and corruption. In Santoshkumar it held that teaching Sanskrit as an elective subject is not against secularism. The Constitution itself contains Article 290-A, an exception to the bar in Article 27 on using tax money for any religion, which charges annual payments on the Consolidated Funds of Kerala and Tamil Nadu for the maintenance of Hindu temples and shrines in territories transferred from Travancore-Cochin in 1956. The Court has also upheld orders to keep communal peace. In State of Karnataka v Praveen Bhai Togadia, (2004) 4 SCC 684, it upheld an order restraining a person from entering a district and from taking part in any function there for fifteen days, saying that when speeches or actions are likely to trigger communal antagonism, prohibitory orders must be passed to avert it. In M P Gopalakrishnan Nair v State of Kerala, AIR 2005 SC 3053, the question was whether Ministers who were communists and atheists could nominate members of the committee managing the Guruvayur temple. The Court answered in the affirmative, stressing that the word "Hindu" is comprehensive and gives the widest freedom to people of all opinions and beliefs.

    Religion has to be understood widely. Freedom of religion protects more than belief in God. In Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments v Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282, a seven-judge Bench said that religion is a matter of faith for individuals and communities and is not necessarily theistic; Buddhism and Jainism do not believe in God or a first cause. It has been argued that non-believers also have a claim to the freedom. A religion has its basis in beliefs and doctrines, but also in rituals, observances, ceremonies and modes of worship, which may extend to food and dress. The guarantee in Article 25(1), freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion, therefore covers these as well. It is given to every person, and not only to citizens. Freedom of conscience, in the words of the Madras High Court in the same case, is the minimum of religious liberty, and would mean little unless it could be put into practice and expressed.

    The Court has also made it clear that the freedom is not about the economic or other secular activity around religion. Article 25(2)(a) permits laws regulating economic, financial, political or other secular activity associated with religious practice, and Article 25(2)(b) permits laws for social welfare and reform and for throwing open Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all sections of Hindus. In Shirur Mutt the State argued that secular practices associated with religion are not an essential part of it. The Court rejected the argument: offerings of food to the idol at fixed hours, periodical ceremonies and the daily recital of sacred texts are all matters of religion, even though they involve spending money, employing priests or using marketable commodities. It added that a denomination has complete autonomy under Article 26(b) in deciding which rites and ceremonies are essential according to its tenets, and no outside authority may interfere. Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388, repeated that religious practices are as much part of religion as belief, and that the State cannot restrict them under the guise of administering a trust.

    Where the freedom stops. The freedom is equally subject to public order, morality, health and the other provisions of Part III, so it cannot be used to resist reform or to harm others. The Madras High Court in Shirur Mutt observed that practices such as sati or "criminal religion" cannot be protected, and the Supreme Court has said that polygamy is not an integral part of religion, so that monogamy can be introduced as a reform under Article 25. In Sri Venkataramana Devaru v State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255, a denominational temple (the Mulki temple) belonged to the Gowd Saraswat Brahmins, who claimed the right to exclude other Hindus as a matter of religion under Article 26(b). A five-judge Bench held that Article 25(2)(b), which is wider than Article 25(1) and deals with the rights of communities, controls Article 26(b). Reading it the other way would make clause 25(2)(b) useless for denominational temples, while reading Article 26(b) subject to it gives effect to both, so the right to enter a temple for worship prevailed, though the denomination kept its right in other religious matters. In a dispute between Shia and Sunni Muslims over graves on Shia property, the Supreme Court ordered the graves to be shifted in the interest of public order, saying that religious freedom is subject to public order, though it suspended the order for ten years while an alternative scheme was tried. It has also protected customary religious rights: in Gulam Abbas v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 1268, the State could not interfere with the established right of the Shia community to carry out religious ceremonies on a piece of land. And arbitrary withholding of travel documents so that pilgrims could not go on Haj has been held to violate Article 25.

    Religion is also kept out of politics. The Representation of the People Act, 1951 makes it a corrupt practice to seek votes in the name of religion, and this has been held not to be inconsistent with Article 25, since the Article does not protect the creation of hatred among groups of people practising different religions. In Abhiram Singh v C D Commachen, (2017) 2 SCC 629, a majority of four to three held that an appeal for votes on the basis of religion, caste or language is a corrupt practice whether the religion is that of the candidate, his opponent or the voters; Chandrachud J dissented, finding the majority view in tension with Article 19(1)(a). That decision overruled Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo v Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte, AIR 1996 SC 1113, on the scope of section 123(3), but did not disturb its statement that "Hindutva" and "Hinduism", unless the context shows otherwise, indicate a way of life of the people of India and not only the practice of the Hindu religion.

    Thus secularism is a balance. The State does not prefer any faith, and it does not forbid religious belief. It protects the believer, the non-believer and the follower of a minority faith alike, and at the same time it regulates the secular side of religious life and works for social reform. To call it "non-religious" is to confuse neutrality with hostility.

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