State briefly the law relating to exclusion of time in legal proceedings under the Limitation Act.

Exclusion of Time in Legal Proceedings Under the Limitation Act, 1963

The Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes fixed periods within which suits, appeals, and applications must be instituted. But the mere prescription of a period does not complete the legislative design — the Act must also provide for the manner in which that period is to be computed. Part III of the Act, comprising Sections 12 to 24, constitutes a complete code of computation. Among these, Section 12 is the most universally applicable provision — it governs the exclusion of certain days in the computation of every proceeding, whether a suit, an appeal, or an application.

The principle animating Section 12 is of elementary justice: a party ought not to be penalised for time that the law itself requires him to spend, or for a day on which his cause of action has barely come into being and which he could not reasonably have used for any legal purpose. The section is not a concession — it is a statutory command, and courts are under a positive duty to apply it whether or not a party has specifically prayed for its benefit.

Section 12: The Statutory Text

Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides:

Sub-section (1): "In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned shall be excluded."

Sub-section (2): "In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be excluded."

Sub-section (3): "Where a decree or order is appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed, or where an application is made for leave to appeal from a decree or order, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment shall also be excluded."

Sub-section (4): "In computing the period of limitation for an application to set aside an award, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded."

Explanation: "In computing under this section the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order, any time taken by the court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy thereof is made shall not be excluded."

Sub-section (1): Exclusion of the Day from Which the Period Is Reckoned

Sub-section (1) is universal in its application — it applies to every suit, appeal, and application without exception. The day on which the cause of action accrues, or the day from which the period of limitation begins to run, is not counted as part of the limitation period. The count begins from the following day. This is the ancient principle dies a quo non computatur in termino — the first day is not counted in the term.

In a matter under the Factories Act, where a complaint was required to be filed within three months of the date when an offence came to the knowledge of the inspector, the courts held that the day on which knowledge was acquired is to be excluded in computing the period. In the matter of election petitions under the Representation of the People Act, the day on which the election results are declared is similarly excluded in computing the period for filing the petition.

Illustration I

A cause of action for recovery of money arises on 1 January 2023. The prescribed period is three years. In computing the period, 1 January 2023 is excluded. The period begins from 2 January 2023 and expires on 1 January 2026. A suit filed on 1 January 2026 is within limitation.

Sub-sections (2) and (3): Exclusion in Appeals, Revisions, and Reviews

Sub-sections (2) and (3) operate specifically in relation to appellate and revisional proceedings — they do not apply to suits. In computing the limitation period for an appeal, revision, review, or an application for leave to appeal, three things are excluded:

First — the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced.

Second — the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence, or order appealed from.

Third — the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment on which the decree is founded.

These exclusions rest on a practical reality: before an appeal can be filed, the appellant must obtain a certified copy of the judgment and decree. This is not an act of dilatoriness — it is a statutory requirement. The time consumed in this process is therefore time that the law itself compels the appellant to spend, and it would be unconscionable to count it against him.

The Supreme Court in India House v. Kishan N. Lalwani (AIR 2003 SC 2084) held that Section 12(2) does not require any prayer or application on the part of a party for the exclusion of the time spent in obtaining copies — the exclusion is mandatory and it is the duty of the court to exclude such time in computing the period of limitation. The Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Maharaja Narain (AIR 1968 SC 960) further held that a plain reading of Section 12(2) shows that the time required to obtain a copy of the decree or order has to be excluded — there is no justification for restricting the scope of that provision.

Section 12 applies to proceedings under special or local laws as well, by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Act. The Supreme Court in Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel (AIR 1964 SC 1099) confirmed that the provisions of Section 12 are applicable for computing the period of limitation prescribed by any special or local law. It has been held to apply to appeals under the Hindu Marriage Act, to revisions under various State tenancy laws, and to applications under the Motor Vehicles Act.

Illustration II

A decree is passed against X on 10 January 2023. The period for appeal is 30 days. X applies for a certified copy on 10 January itself. The court prepares and delivers the copy on 25 January 2023 — a preparation period of 15 days. The following are excluded from the computation of the 30-day period:

• 10 January 2023 — the day of pronouncement (Section 12(2)).

• 15 days from 10 January to 25 January 2023 — the time requisite for obtaining the copy (Sections 12(2) and 12(3)).

X therefore has 30 clear days running from 25 January 2023. His appeal must be filed by 24 February 2023.

The Explanation: The Critical Limit on Exclusion

The Explanation to Section 12 imposes a vital qualification on the scope of the exclusion. Any time taken by the court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy was made shall not be excluded. A litigant who waits passively without applying for a copy, hoping to have the decree drawn up first, cannot claim the benefit of that preparation period.

The legal position from 1 January 1964 is unequivocal: a party must apply for a copy of the judgment and decree within the period of limitation prescribed for the appeal. If he does not apply but waits beyond the prescribed period of limitation on the ground that the court is still drawing up the decree, his application for a copy is itself beyond limitation, and any appeal filed subsequently cannot be within time.

The Supreme Court in Jagat Dhish Bhargava v. Jawahar Lal Bhargava (AIR 1961 SC 832) settled the governing rule: the time taken by the court in drawing up a decree after a litigant has applied for its certified copy shall be treated as part of the time taken for obtaining the certified copy of the decree — and is therefore excludable. The time before the application — where the litigant delayed — is not. The applicant must establish that he was vigilant and actively pursuing the matter throughout the period claimed.

Illustration III

Y's appeal period is 90 days from the date of the decree, 1 January 2023. Y applies for a certified copy only on 15 February 2023 — 45 days after the decree. The court prepares the copy on 1 March 2023 — 14 days after application. Y files the appeal on 15 March 2023.

Under the Explanation to Section 12, the 45 days before the application (1 January to 15 February) are not excluded. Only the 14 days of preparation time (15 February to 1 March) are excluded, as those elapsed after the application. Y's appeal is therefore out of time.

Sub-section (4): Exclusion in Arbitration Applications

Sub-section (4) provides that in computing the period of limitation for an application to set aside an arbitration award, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded. An award, like a judgment, cannot be meaningfully challenged without first obtaining a copy — and the time required for that purpose stands excluded. The same principle of prompt application applies here: the party seeking to set aside the award must apply for a copy without delay, and only the time taken by the tribunal in preparing and delivering the copy after such application can be excluded.

The Time Requisite: Scope and Meaning

The expression "time requisite for obtaining a copy" has been the subject of extensive judicial construction. It has been held to mean the time that is properly required — the time between the date of the application for the copy and the date on which it is ready and available for collection. It is immaterial on which date the copies were actually collected — what matters is when they were ready.

Where the court makes a mistake in the certified copy and time is spent in having the copy corrected, that additional time is also excluded. A mistake committed by the court cannot prejudice the litigant. Where the judgment is pronounced on the last working day before a court vacation and no application for a copy can be made until the court reopens, the vacation period is treated as part of the time requisite and is excluded — since it represents time during which no application could have been made.

Where a common judgment governs two appeals filed by the same appellant, and a copy of the judgment is filed with one appeal only, the time for obtaining a copy can be excluded for both appeals. Where an application for a copy is dismissed in default and is subsequently restored, the period during which the application remained dismissed is not automatically excluded — the litigant must account for that period separately.

The Supreme Court in Udayan Chinubhai v. R.C. Bali (AIR 1977 SC 2319) made clear that under Section 12(2), read with the Explanation, a party cannot get the benefit of excluding the period between pronouncement of judgment and the signing of the decree if he made the application for a copy only after preparation of the decree.

Scope and Limits of Section 12

Section 12(1) applies to all suits, appeals, and applications. Sub-sections (2) to (4) apply only to appeals, applications for leave to appeal, revisions, reviews, and arbitration applications — not to suits. The distinction is important: in a suit, only the starting day is excluded; in an appeal or revision, the day of judgment and the time for obtaining copies are additionally excluded.

Section 12 does not apply to execution applications. It does not apply to applications under Section 72 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. It does not apply to applications for setting aside ex parte decrees — in such cases, the benefit of Section 12(2) is not available since the section expressly restricts itself to appeals, revisions, reviews, and applications for leave to appeal.

Section 12 does not require an application — it is the court's own duty to apply it. But the benefit of Section 12 cannot be claimed if the application for a copy itself was made after the expiry of the limitation period. Where a party applies for a copy to the wrong authority, no benefit can be claimed under Section 12(2).

Section 12 in Combination with Other Provisions

Section 12 does not operate in isolation. The periods of exclusion derived from Section 12 and from Section 14 — which excludes the time spent before a court without jurisdiction — are additive. They are both added to the prescribed period of limitation. Where the prescribed period together with the periods excluded under Sections 12 and 14 expires during a vacation, the appeal may be filed on the day the court reopens under Section 4.

The integrated operation of Section 12 with the rest of Part III ensures that the period of limitation prescribed by the Schedule represents the period available to a capable, diligent, and unimpeded litigant — excluding those periods which, by the operation of the law itself, were not available to him for the purpose of filing his proceeding. This is the true design of Section 12, and it must be given its full effect, liberally construed, and applied by courts as a matter of duty rather than of grace.