State if any offence has been committed in the following cases: (i) A intending to murder B buys a gun and loads it. (ii) A intending to murder B fires a gun at B. (iii) A intending to murder B by poison purchases poison and mixes the same with food, which remains in A's possession. (iv) A serves the poisoned food to B with the knowledge of its being poisoned. (v) A woman, with intention of committing suicide runs towards a well, but there she was caught by a person.

The Line Between Innocence and Crime — Preparation, Attempt, and the Act of Commission

Among the most intellectually demanding questions that criminal law asks is this: at what precise moment does a person's dangerous intention become a punishable offence? A mere wish to commit a crime is beyond the law's reach. The criminal law does not — and cannot — punish thoughts. But somewhere between the first dangerous idea and the completed act lies a territory that separates the innocent from the guilty. That territory is governed by the doctrines of preparation and attempt, codified in Section 307 of the IPC (attempt to murder), Section 309 of the IPC (attempt to commit suicide), and Section 511 of the IPC (general provision for attempts) — provisions mirrored with great fidelity in Section 109, Section 226, and Section 62 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, respectively. To understand how these provisions operate, let us take the five situations given and examine each one with the care they deserve.

The Foundational Framework — Four Stages of Crime

Criminal law recognises four successive stages in the commission of any pre-planned offence. These are: first, the intention to commit the offence; second, preparation — devising and arranging the means necessary for its commission; third, attempt — the direct movement towards the commission after preparation is complete; and fourth, if the attempt succeeds, the commission of the offence itself. The Supreme Court authoritatively summarised this in Abhayanand Mishra v. State of Bihar (AIR 1961 SC 1698): "A person commits the offence of attempt to commit a particular offence when (i) he intends to commit that particular offence, and (ii) he, having made preparations and with the intention to commit the offence, does an act towards its commission, such an act need not be the penultimate act towards the commission of that offence but must be an act during the course of committing that offence."

The first two stages — intention and preparation — are, as a general rule, not punishable under the IPC or the BNS. This is because preparation is often outwardly innocent and capable of explanation. A person might buy arsenic to kill rats, not a rival. He might purchase a gun for self-defence. The law must not be an instrument of oppression by punishing what still resembles innocent conduct. However, once the doer crosses the threshold of preparation and enters the arena of attempt, criminal liability begins. The crucial test, as articulated by the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Yakub (AIR 1980 SC 1111), is whether the act already done is such that "if not prevented by any extraneous cause, would fructify into commission of an offence" — in which case it amounts to an attempt.

Situation (i) — Buying a Gun and Loading It

A, intending to murder B, buys a gun and loads it. No offence is committed.

This situation is directly addressed by an illustration to Section 307 of the IPC (and correspondingly Section 109 of the BNS). The illustration reads: "A intending to murder B by poison, purchases a gun and loads it. A has not yet committed the offence." The act of purchasing and loading a gun, however sinister the intention behind it, remains at the stage of preparation. Preparation consists in devising or arranging the means necessary for the commission of an offence. It does not, by itself, cross into the domain of attempt because the acts done — buying the weapon and loading it — are not yet directed at B, are not in execution of the criminal design upon B, and may still be abandoned. The gun could be put down, B might never be encountered. The law gives A what the Latin doctrine calls locus paenitentiae — room for repentance and withdrawal. The acts done, if A were to simply change his mind and go home, would be completely harmless.

Since preparation is generally not punishable under the IPC or the BNS, A commits no offence in this situation.

Situation (ii) — Firing the Gun at B

A, intending to murder B, fires a gun at B. An offence under Section 307 IPC / Section 109 BNS is committed.

Here, the situation changes entirely. The moment A fires the gun at B — whether the bullet strikes B or misses — A has crossed the Rubicon from preparation into attempt. This too is addressed by an express illustration to Section 307: "A shoots at Z with intention to kill him, under such circumstances that, if death ensued A would be guilty of murder. A is liable to punishment under this section."

Section 307 of the IPC provides: "Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned." The corresponding provision in the BNS is Section 109.

The Supreme Court emphasised in State of Maharashtra v. Balram Bama Patil (1983) that "an attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof." Firing a gun at another person with intent to kill is precisely such an overt act — unequivocal, proximate, and directly aimed at the criminal object. The fact that B may not have been hit does not reduce A's liability. What the court examines is not the result, but whether "the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section" (as held in Harikishan v. Sukhbir Singh, AIR 1988 SC 2127).

A is therefore guilty of attempt to murder under Section 307 IPC / Section 109 BNS.

Situation (iii) — Mixing Poison with Food That Remains in A's Possession

A, intending to murder B by poison, purchases poison and mixes it with food, which remains in A's possession. No offence is committed.

This situation again finds its resolution in a statutory illustration to Section 307 IPC. The illustration reads: "A, intending to murder Z by poison, purchases poison and mixes the same with food which remains in A's keeping. A has not yet committed the offence defined in this section."

The act of purchasing poison and mixing it with food is undeniably a more advanced stage of preparation than merely buying a gun. Yet, so long as the food remains in A's possession and has not been placed before B, the act is still in the realm of preparation. The reasoning is significant: A could still change his mind, destroy the food, discard the poison. The dangerous act has not yet been unleashed in the direction of the victim. There is no contact, no proximity to B, no act directed at or against B. The food and the poison, dangerous though they are, lie within A's own custody and control.

Under both the IPC and the BNS, this amounts to preparation — not punishable as such. A commits no offence.

Situation (iv) — Serving the Poisoned Food to B

A serves the poisoned food to B with knowledge of its being poisoned. An offence under Section 307 IPC / Section 109 BNS is committed.

This is the pivotal moment. The same illustration that excused A in Situation (iii) continues: "A places the food on Z's table or delivers it to Z's servants to place it on Z's table. A has committed the offence defined in this section." The moment A places the poisoned food before B — or in any manner delivers it towards B — the act crosses the line from preparation into attempt. The overt act is now directed unequivocally at B. The criminal design has been set in motion. Whether B eats the food and dies, or notices it and does not eat it, or is saved by medical intervention — A's criminal liability for attempting to commit murder crystallises the moment the poisoned food is served.

This is also the clearest illustration of the proximity rule in action. A, having completed all preparations, has done an act — placing poison before his victim — which, if not prevented, would inevitably result in death. As the Supreme Court observed in Koppula Venkat Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 2004 SC 1874): "An attempt to commit an offence is an act, or a series of acts, which leads inevitably to the commission of the offence, unless something, which the doer of the act neither foresaw nor intended, happens to prevent this."

A is guilty of attempt to murder under Section 307 IPC / Section 109 BNS.

Situation (v) — A Woman Running Towards a Well to Commit Suicide, but Stopped

A woman, intending to commit suicide, runs towards a well but is caught before she can reach it. The answer is nuanced — and critical.

This situation engages Section 309 of the IPC, which punishes attempt to commit suicide with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both. The corresponding provision in the BNS, however, introduces a significant change: Section 226 of the BNS effectively decriminalises the attempt to commit suicide, providing only that whoever attempts to commit suicide shall not be tried and punished unless the court presumes that the act was done without grave and sufficient provocation — a provision primarily linked to the protection of persons attempting suicide due to insanity, mental illness, or extreme distress.

On the specific facts here — a woman who runs towards a well and is caught before reaching it — the leading case directly in point is Ramakka (1884) 8 Mad 5, cited in the sources. In that case, a woman ran to a well stating she would jump into it and was caught before she could reach it. The Madras High Court held that she could not be convicted of an attempt to commit suicide, because she might have changed her mind before jumping into the well. This case is the classic application of the doctrine of locus paenitentiae — the law gives the person room to repent. She had not yet reached the well, had not yet climbed its parapet, had not yet done any act that unequivocally showed she would not stop. The overt act was still ambiguous — consistent with either proceeding to jump or changing her mind.

This must be contrasted with Maragatham (AIR 1961 Mad 498), where a couple, having tied themselves together with a rope, actually jumped into the well. Their child slipped from the woman's hands and drowned. The court held that the act of jumping established the actus reus beyond doubt — it had gone beyond preparation, and locus paenitentiae had ceased to exist once the physical act of jumping had been performed.

The difference, then, lies not in the intention but in the physical proximity and the unequivocal nature of the act. Running towards a well is — on the authority of Ramakka — still preparation, because the act has not become irreversible and the person retains the ability to stop. The crucial moment of attempt is reached only when the person, by a definite and unequivocal overt act, has set in motion a sequence that, absent external interference, would inevitably result in death.

Under the IPC, therefore, the woman in Situation (v) would not be convicted of an attempt to commit suicide. Under the BNS, the position is even more protective — Section 226 BNS presumes that a person who attempts to commit suicide does so due to severe stress and directs that such a person shall be dealt with compassionately and provided rehabilitation and care rather than punishment.

A Comparative Summary

The five situations, placed in order, trace the journey from innocence to guilt with striking clarity:

The illustrations to Section 307 of the IPC — which the drafters of the Code embedded in the statute itself — are among the most pedagogically rich provisions in Indian criminal law. They show, with a precision that few judicial pronouncements could match, exactly where the law draws the line. As the IPC's own illustration teaches us: to buy the gun is not an offence; to fire it at the victim is. To mix the poison is not an offence; to place it before the victim is. And in these four words — placing it before the victim — lies the boundary between the innocent and the guilty, between the preparation and the attempt, between a man who may yet repent and a man whom the law must hold to account.