The Court passed award in land acquisition on 17.07.1970. Application for certified copy was moved on 31.08.1971, copy obtained on 05.01.1972 and appeal was filed on 19.1.1972. It was barred by time. Land Acquisition Officer filed application to have delay excused alleging that government pleader failed to apply for certified copy due to negligence and fraud. Decide.
The application should be refused and the appeal dismissed as barred by limitation. The problem turns on dates, so they come first.
An appeal against the award of the court under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 lay to the High Court under section 54 of that Act, and it was an appeal against a decree governed by the Code of Civil Procedure and open to section 5 (Collector, Varanasi v Rai Prem Chand, AIR 1992 All 206). The Act has since been replaced by the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, but the facts here belong to 1970–72 and the old Act governs them. The period for an appeal to the High Court from a decree is ninety days under Article 116(a) of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 12(1) excludes the day of the award, so the period began on 18 July 1970 and ended on 15 October 1970. The appeal was filed on 19 January 1972, which is 461 days after that date.
The State relies on the time taken to obtain the certified copy. Section 12(2) excludes the time requisite for obtaining a copy in computing the period for an appeal. But the section excludes time from a period that is running, and it cannot revive a period that has already expired. The application for the copy was made on 31 August 1971, which is more than ten months after the period ended on 15 October 1970, so there was nothing left for section 12(2) to extend. Even if the entire time from 31 August 1971 to 5 January 1972, which is 127 days, were excluded for the sake of argument, the appeal would still be late by more than a year. The real question is therefore the unexplained period from 17 July 1970 to 31 August 1971, a period of 410 days in which the State did nothing, and section 5 asks for an explanation of precisely that.
The explanation is that the Government pleader neglected to apply for the copy and was guilty of fraud. As to negligence, the State is treated like a private litigant under section 5, and Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala v K.V. Ayisumma ((1996) 10 SCC 634 : AIR 1996 SC 2750) allows the courts some latitude for the way official business is conducted but says that the section makes no distinction between the State and the citizen. Rafiq v Munshilal (AIR 1981 SC 1400) protects a party that has done all that it could, and the State cannot say that here, since nothing is said of any step taken by the Land Acquisition Officer or anyone else in the department during those months. The facts resemble those in State of Bihar v Abhay Chand ((2000) 9 SCC 292), where the officials had not even applied for the copy of the judgment for about two years and the delay of 830 days was refused, with a direction for an inquiry and recovery from the officers at fault. Appeals under section 54 have likewise been dismissed as barred, for delays of 514 days in State of Uttar Pradesh v Satya Narain (1995 AIHC 677, All) and 340 days in State of Uttar Pradesh v Khairati Lal (1995 AIHC 1405, All), and one in Brijesh Kumar v State of Haryana (AIR 2014 SC 1612) of far greater length.
As to fraud, the plea is a bare allegation. Section 17 of the Limitation Act, which deals with fraud, applies to the fraud of the opposite party or his agent, and not to that of the applicant's own counsel, who was the State's agent here. In any event fraud must be pleaded with particulars, by whom, when it was discovered and how it prevented the filing, and the application gives none. If the Government pleader did something dishonest, the remedy of the State lies against him, and not against the respondent, whose right to treat the award as final arose when the period expired.
The liberal cases do not help the State. Katiji (AIR 1987 SC 1353) and Chandra Mani (AIR 1996 SC 1623) show how the courts approach a government appeal where the explanation is bona fide, but both assume there is an explanation to weigh. Here nothing is offered for the first thirteen months, and the delay is not a matter of days.
The application under section 5 should therefore be dismissed and the appeal rejected as barred by limitation. In accordance with Abhay Chand, the court could direct an inquiry into who was responsible for the default.
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