"The Law of Limitation is retrospective in its effect." Comment. What are the rules of Limitation in the case of trust?
The statement is true in one sense and misleading in another, and the two senses must be separated.
The rule of limitation is procedural. It does not create or destroy a right of action by itself, and nobody has a vested right to any particular period of limitation. The law that governs a suit is therefore the law in force on the date the suit is instituted, even though the cause of action arose earlier. In that sense a new law of limitation is retrospective, since it applies to claims arising before it came into force. The Privy Council stated the rule in Rama Shah v Lal Chand, AIR 1940 PC 63. The qualification is that the court will not read a limitation provision so as to take away a cause of action that had already accrued and could not be enforced under the new law, unless the Legislature has plainly said so.
The Limitation Act of 1963 contains such express provision in sections 30 and 31. Section 30 deals with suits for which the 1963 Act prescribes a shorter period than the Act of 1908. Such a suit may be brought within seven years from the commencement of the 1963 Act or within the period of the 1908 Act, whichever expires earlier, so that the claimant is given a reasonable time to adjust. A proviso protects the case in which the seven years expires before the old period, and the seven years added to the time already run under the old Act is still shorter than the period under the new Act, for then the suit may be brought within the period under the new Act. Section 31 provides that the Act does not enable any suit, appeal or application to be brought where the period under the 1908 Act had already expired before commencement, and does not affect proceedings pending at that date. A longer period in the new Act therefore does not revive a claim that had already become barred under the old one, and that is the sense in which the law of limitation is not retrospective.
The second part of the question concerns trusts. The general rule of limitation yields to a special rule in section 10, which reads: "Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Act, no suit against a person in whom property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose, or against his legal representatives or assigns (not being assigns for valuable consideration), for the purpose of following in his or their hands such property, or the proceeds thereof, or for an account of such property or proceeds, shall be barred by any length of time." The Explanation provides that any property comprised in a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment is deemed to be vested in trust for a specific purpose, and the manager of the property is deemed to be its trustee.
The section is limited in several ways. It applies only where property has become vested in the defendant in trust for a specific purpose, and not to every fiduciary or confidential relationship. An implied trust or an obligation in the nature of a trust, such as that between partners, is outside it. It protects a suit to follow the property or its proceeds, or for an account, which is the beneficiary's claim to get back what was entrusted, but it does not exempt every claim for breach of trust, for example for damages. And it does not protect against a transferee who has paid valuable consideration, who may plead the ordinary rules. In Pierce Leslie and Co Ltd v Violet Ouchterlony Wapshare, AIR 1969 SC 843, the Supreme Court held that section 10 did not apply because the properties were not vested in the defendant company for the specific purpose of making them over to the plaintiffs, so that the suit was governed by the general residuary period.
The section works together with the rule that a trustee cannot acquire the trust property by adverse possession against the beneficiary, because his possession is referable to the trust and is not hostile to it. In Wali Mohammed Khan v Rahmat Bee, AIR 1999 SC 1136 : (1999) 3 SCC 145, the Supreme Court applied the Explanation to the manager of a wakf property, holding that no period of limitation ran against the recovery of the property from him or from a donee who had given no consideration, and that a mutawalli cannot set up an adverse title, which is the rule stated in Mohammad Shah v Fasihuddin Ansari, AIR 1956 SC 713.
An illustration shows the working of the rule. A, a trustee, holds land for B under a declared trust and enjoys it for many years. B, or his successor, may sue to recover it at any time, and A's heirs, who hold as his legal representatives, are in no better position. If A sells to a purchaser who pays full value and has no part in the trust, the purchaser may rely on the ordinary periods, and an ordinary claim based on a loose family arrangement, where no property is vested in the defendant in trust for a specific purpose, remains subject to the Schedule.
In sum, the law of limitation is retrospective in the procedural sense that it governs suits filed after it commences, but it does not revive barred claims or extinguish accrued ones except as the Act directly provides, and in the case of trusts section 10 removes the bar altogether where its conditions are met, because the conscience of a trustee does not allow him to profit by lapse of time.
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