The power of Parliament to amend the Constitution is limited". Examine this statement critically in view of the Constitution (24th and 42nd) Amendment Acts and Supreme Court decisions in that regard.
The statement is correct as the law now stands, and the history of the Twenty-fourth and Forty-second Amendments shows why.
The conflict over Fundamental Rights. From 1951 a series of amendments curtailed the Fundamental Rights, especially the right to property. In Sankari Prasad (AIR 1951 SC 458) and Sajjan Singh (AIR 1965 SC 845) the Court upheld Parliament's power to amend the Fundamental Rights, distinguishing the "law" in Article 13 from a constitutional amendment made in the exercise of constituent power. Hidayatullah and Mudholkar JJ in Sajjan Singh expressed reservations, and Mudholkar J suggested that every constitution has certain fundamental features that cannot be changed. In Golak Nath (AIR 1967 SC 1643), by six to five, the Court overruled both and held that Article 368 provided only the procedure, that an amendment is "law" under Article 13(2), that "amend" means only minor changes, and that the Fundamental Rights could be amended only by a constituent assembly. The majority was afraid that continued amendments would eventually erode the rights and lead to a totalitarian regime. The reasoning has been criticised, since it inferred non-amendability by a roundabout argument, and the same reasoning would apply to other important features such as adult suffrage.
The early decisions in detail. In Sankari Prasad Singh v Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 458, the First Amendment, which curtailed the right to property, was challenged on the argument that "law" in Article 13 includes a law amending the Constitution, so that an amendment infringing a Fundamental Right would be void. The Court held that the terms of Article 368 are perfectly general and that Fundamental Rights are not immune from amendment. Article 13 and Article 368 were to be harmonised by reading one as qualified by the other. "Law" in Article 13 meant rules and regulations made in the exercise of ordinary legislative power and not amendments made in the exercise of constituent power. In Sajjan Singh v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1965 SC 845, the Seventeenth Amendment, which placed a number of statutes in the Ninth Schedule, was challenged. It was also argued that it affected Article 226, so that the concurrence of half the States was needed. By three to two the Court rejected the argument. In pith and substance the Amendment concerned a Fundamental Right to help agrarian reform, and any effect on Article 226 was only incidental.
In Golak Nath v State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643, eleven judges decided by six to five that Fundamental Rights could not be amended. Subba Rao CJ, for five of the six, treated them as the primordial rights necessary for the development of human personality. He argued that Article 368, as it then stood, laid down only a procedure, as its marginal note suggested, and that the power to amend lay in Parliament's residuary power under Article 248, so that an amendment was "law" within Article 13(2). He asked how Parliament, which could not abridge a Fundamental Right by an ordinary law even if the vote were unanimous, could do so by a two-thirds majority. The Court applied the doctrine of prospective overruling, because a large body of agrarian legislation made between 1950 and 1967 rested on the premise that Parliament could amend those rights. The earlier amendments therefore stood, but for the future Parliament had no power to take away or abridge any Fundamental Right. The five judges in the minority, in three opinions, held that Article 368 itself contains the power and feared that the Constitution would become static.
The Twenty-fourth Amendment (1971). To reverse Golak Nath, the Twenty-fourth Amendment added a clause to Article 13 and to Article 368 declaring that Article 13 does not apply to constitutional amendments, changed the marginal note of Article 368 so that it speaks of the "power" of Parliament to amend and the procedure for it, inserted a clause stating that Parliament may amend by addition, variation or repeal any provision "notwithstanding anything in this Constitution", and made the President's assent to an amendment Bill obligatory, to mark the difference between an ordinary law and an amending law. Kesavananda Bharati upheld the Twenty-fourth Amendment in full. On one view, overruling Golak Nath restored the earlier position, and the Amendment made explicit what was implicit in Article 368. But the Court held that the amending power is subject to the basic structure.
The Forty-second Amendment (1976). After Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain applied the Kesavananda ruling, the Forty-second Amendment added two clauses to Article 368. One provided that no amendment could be questioned in any court on any ground, and the other that there is no limitation whatever on Parliament's constituent power. The Law Minister's justification was that no basic feature of the Constitution was beyond amendment, and that the supremacy of Parliament should be asserted in this field. The first of these, it has been argued, ignores values such as democracy, secularism, the rule of law and federalism, without which the Constitution would be an empty shell. The second overlooks that parliamentary supremacy in practice means the supremacy of the government of the day, since a government backed by two-thirds of the members can carry any amendment it wishes. The Thirty-ninth and Forty-second Amendments themselves showed how the amending power could be abused.
Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain. The Supreme Court applied the basic structure doctrine for the first time in Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299. Clause 4 of the Thirty-ninth Amendment, 1975, was meant to take the election of the Prime Minister and the Speaker out of the ordinary judicial process, to void the High Court decision setting aside Mrs Gandhi's election, and to bar any appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court struck down clause 4. Mathew J held that it destroyed an essential feature of democracy, the resolution of an election dispute by finding the facts and applying the law, and that it violated the separation of powers because a purely judicial function was being exercised by the amending body. Khanna J held that it offended the rule of law and the democratic set-up, since free and fair elections are essential to democracy. Chandrachud J held that it was arbitrary and violated equality, since there was no rational reason for a privileged regime for the election of the Prime Minister. Ray CJ said that validating the election without applying any law offended the rule of law. The Court also took exception to the voiding of a judicial decision, since Parliament could change the law on which a decision rests but could not by itself declare a judgment void. It was also stated that the basic features limit only constitutional amendments, and not ordinary legislation, which is tested by legislative competence and by specific constitutional prohibitions.
Minerva Mills. In Minerva Mills Ltd v UOI, AIR 1980 SC 1789, the Court held clause (4) void because depriving courts of judicial review would make Fundamental Rights mere adornments and make a "controlled" Constitution "uncontrolled". Clause (5) was held void because Parliament, having only a limited amending power, cannot enlarge that power into an absolute one. A limited amending power is itself a basic feature. The Court also struck down the extension of Article 31C by the Forty-second Amendment, which had withdrawn Articles 14 and 19 for all laws said to give effect to Directive Principles, because the balance between Parts III and IV is a basic feature. The amendment of the Preamble, which added "socialist" and "secular", was found unobjectionable.
Conclusion. Parliament's power is wide: it extends to every provision of the Constitution, including the Fundamental Rights, and the Court has not found a closed list of unamendable provisions. But it is limited in two ways: by the procedure laid down in Article 368, and by the basic structure, which the Court enforces through judicial review. The Forty-second Amendment's attempt to remove the limits failed. If the limit had gone, the only restraints would have been political and moral, that is, elections, the composition of the Houses and public opinion.
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