Constitutional LawUnion and State Judiciary 03 August 2026· 5 min read

    There are many provisions in the Constitution of India which secure independence and impartiality of the Judiciary. Discuss those provisions and refer to important judgements of the Supreme Court.

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    An independent judiciary is the guardian of the Constitution and of the Fundamental Rights. If judges can be appointed, paid, moved or removed at the will of the executive, the courts cannot be expected to decide against the government. The Constitution therefore protects the judges at each stage of their careers: how they are appointed, what they are paid, how long they stay, how they may be removed, and what they may do afterwards. The independence of the judiciary is treated as the sine qua non of democracy, and the Supreme Court has said that an independent and efficient judicial system is one of the basic structures of the Constitution.

    Appointment. Judges of the Supreme Court are appointed by the President under Article 124(2), after consultation with the Chief Justice of India (and, for the Chief Justice, with such judges as the President thinks necessary). Judges of the High Courts are appointed under Article 217(1). The Constitution chose a middle course. Unlike countries in which appointments are made by the executive alone, it requires prior consultation with the judiciary. The Supreme Court has strengthened this. In Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 268 : (1993) 4 SCC 441 (the Second Judges case, decided by nine judges), the majority held that the opinion of the Chief Justice of India has primacy in appointments, and that the opinion is not his individual view but is formed collectively with the two senior-most judges of the Supreme Court, with the views of senior judges of the High Court also considered. If the recommendation is reiterated after due consideration with the unanimous agreement of the judicial consultees, the executive is bound by it. The Court overruled the view in S P Gupta v Union of India that gave primacy to the executive, saying that it is the judiciary that screens the working of the executive and the legislatures through judicial review, so the executive cannot be the final voice on who sits on the bench. The Court also explained that a well-established convention that appointments were made with the concurrence of the Chief Justice had become part of constitutional law. Ahmadi J and Punchi J dissented, saying that this amounted to rewriting the Constitution.

    A later attempt to replace this system by the National Judicial Appointments Commission under the Ninety-ninth Amendment failed. A Constitution Bench held by 4:1 that the amendment, and the Act made under it, were unconstitutional, because primacy of the Chief Justice and the collegium is an integral part of the independence of the judiciary, which is part of the basic structure. Chelameswar J dissented.

    Qualifications and salary. The Constitution fixes the qualifications of judges (Article 124(3)), so that the executive cannot choose just anyone. Salaries, allowances, leave and pension are regulated by law of Parliament and cannot be varied to the judge's disadvantage after appointment (Article 125 for the Supreme Court and Article 221 for the High Courts). In the case of a High Court Chief Justice, it has been held that pension and other benefits cannot be altered to his disadvantage after appointment.

    Security of tenure and removal. A Supreme Court judge holds office until the age of 65, and a High Court judge until 62. The judge can be removed only by the President on an address by both Houses of Parliament, supported by a majority of the total membership and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting, on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity (Article 124(4) and (5)). The word "proved" means that the charge must first be investigated by an impartial body, and the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, lays down the procedure: a motion signed by 100 members of the Lok Sabha or 50 members of the Rajya Sabha, and a committee of a Supreme Court judge, a High Court Chief Justice and a distinguished jurist, which frames definite charges and gives the judge a reasonable opportunity of being heard. A judge cannot be removed by a mere executive order.

    After retirement. A retired Supreme Court judge cannot plead or act in any court or before any authority in India (Article 124(7)). A permanent High Court judge is barred from practising in any court or before any authority in India except the Supreme Court and other High Courts (Article 220).

    Transfers. The power to transfer a High Court judge from one High Court to another is exercised by the President after consulting the Chief Justice of India (Article 222), and the courts have required that it be exercised only in public interest after full and effective consultation. This is discussed separately.

    Lower courts. The independence of the subordinate judiciary is secured by Articles 233 to 235, which give the High Court a major say in the appointment of district judges, require consultation with the High Court for the appointment of other judicial officers, and vest control over the subordinate courts in the High Court. In State of Bihar v Bal Mukund Sah, these Articles were held to form a complete code insulated from the legislature's power to regulate public services. Article 50 of the Directive Principles also directs the State to separate the judiciary from the executive.

    These provisions together build a framework in which judges are chosen with the judiciary's voice, protected in pay and tenure, removed only after a fair and difficult process, and made to leave the bar after retirement, so that they are able to decide without fear or favour.

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