There are many provisions in the Constitution of India which secure independence and impartiality of the Judiciary. Discuss those provisions and refer to important judgements of the Supreme Court.

Mode of Appointment

Article 124(2) provides that every Judge of the Supreme Court is appointed by the President after consultation with such judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts as the President may deem necessary, and Article 217 makes similar provision for High Court judges, requiring consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State, and the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned. The word "consultation" in these Articles became the site of a long constitutional struggle over how much weight judicial opinion should carry in appointments, since a process dominated entirely by the executive would allow the government of the day to pack the higher judiciary with pliant appointees.

In S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, known as the First Judges Case, the Supreme Court initially held that consultation did not mean concurrence, leaving the executive with the final word in appointments and transfers, a reading that left considerable room for political influence over who reached the Bench. This position was decisively reversed in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, the Second Judges Case, where a nine-judge Bench held that the opinion of the Chief Justice of India, formed through a collegium of senior judges, would have primacy, and the executive could depart from it only in rare cases for reasons recorded and communicated back to the Chief Justice. The Third Judges Case, arising from a Presidential Reference, refined the composition of this collegium to include the Chief Justice and the four senior-most judges of the Supreme Court. When Parliament attempted to reclaim a share of this power through the Ninety-ninth Amendment establishing a National Judicial Appointments Commission, the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judges Case struck down both the amendment and the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014, holding that judicial primacy in appointments is part of the independence of the judiciary, itself a facet of the basic structure of the Constitution.

Security of Tenure

Article 124(2) fixes the retirement age of a Supreme Court judge at sixty-five, and Article 217 fixes the retirement age of a High Court judge at sixty-two, giving both a secure and predictable tenure that cannot be shortened at executive discretion. Removal is made deliberately arduous: Article 124(4) permits removal only on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity, through an address by each House of Parliament supported by a majority of the total membership of that House and by not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting, a threshold mirrored for High Court judges by Article 218. This procedure, modelled on impeachment, ensures no judge can be removed simply because a decision proves unpopular with the government, and to date no judge has actually been removed under this mechanism despite a few attempts having been initiated.

Financial Independence

Article 125 fixes the salaries of Supreme Court judges as prescribed in the Second Schedule, and these salaries, along with pensions, are charged upon the Consolidated Fund of India rather than subjected to a fresh vote of Parliament each year. Article 221 makes parallel provision for High Court judges, whose salaries are charged on the Consolidated Fund of the State. This arrangement prevents the legislature from using its power over the annual budget as a lever against sitting judges, since judicial remuneration does not depend on political goodwill renewed year after year.

Bar on Discussion of Judicial Conduct in the Legislature

Article 121 for Parliament and Article 211 for State Legislatures expressly prohibit discussion in either House regarding the conduct of a judge in the discharge of judicial duties, except during a formal motion for removal. This provision shields a judge from being pilloried on the floor of the legislature merely because a ruling displeased the ruling party or the opposition, thereby protecting the decision-making process itself from the chilling effect of political censure.

Power to Punish for Contempt

Articles 129 and 215 declare the Supreme Court and every High Court to be courts of record possessing the power to punish for contempt of themselves. This self-executing authority allows the judiciary to protect its dignity and the efficacy of its orders without depending on the executive to prosecute those who scandalise the court or defy its directions, an authority the Supreme Court exercised, for instance, in punishing wilful disobedience of its orders in various contempt proceedings over the decades, reinforcing that judicial authority need not depend on executive cooperation.

Restriction on Post-Retirement Practice

Article 124(7) bars a retired Supreme Court judge from pleading or acting before any court or authority in India, while Article 220 places a comparable restriction on a retired High Court judge from practising before the High Court from which they retired or before courts subordinate to it. The underlying purpose is to prevent a judge from deciding cases during service with an eye toward future professional prospects before the very institution in which they once sat.

Separation of the Judiciary from the Executive

Article 50, though a directive principle and hence not directly enforceable, obliges the State to take steps to separate the judiciary from the executive in public services, a principle historically aimed at ending the colonial practice of executive magistrates exercising judicial powers. Though placed outside Part III, this Article has shaped legislative reform separating the judicial magistracy from the executive administration and reflects a value the judiciary has repeatedly invoked, including in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, where a thirteen-judge Bench held that the independence of the judiciary and the separation of powers form part of the basic structure of the Constitution, meaning not even a constitutional amendment can be used to dismantle these safeguards.

Bar on Practice and Restriction on Transfer

Article 222(1) permits the President, after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, to transfer a High Court judge to another High Court, a power that could in theory be misused to punish an inconvenient judge but which the Supreme Court, in Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth, held could be exercised without the judge's consent only where done in good faith for genuine administrative reasons, with any punitive or mala fide transfer remaining open to judicial review.

Impartiality Through Fair Procedure and Recusal

Beyond structural insulation, impartiality in individual adjudication is secured through common law principles that Indian courts have absorbed into constitutional practice, most notably the rule against bias, nemo judex in causa sua, requiring a judge to recuse where a real likelihood of bias exists. The Supreme Court applied this rigorously in cases concerning pecuniary or personal interest of adjudicators, reflecting that independence from external pressure is only half the guarantee; impartiality as between the parties before the court is the other, equally vital half.