Trade, Commerce and intercourse shall be free throughout territory of India. Discuss with reference to decided cases.
Object of Article 301. Article 301 provides that trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free. The framers wished the country to function as a single economic unit, since economic unity would sustain political and cultural unity. They also foresaw that different parties with different economic programmes would come to power in different States and that local pressures might lead State Legislatures to protect regional interests without regard to the national economy. Articles 301 to 305 were meant to prevent this. In Atiabari Tea Co Ltd v State of Assam, AIR 1961 SC 232, the Supreme Court said that Article 301 is not a mere platitude or a statement of policy, but embodies the principle that the economic unity of the country is the main support of its political and cultural unity. The Court said the framers kept three considerations in view: free flow of trade, commerce and intercourse, both inter-State and intra-State; regional interests must not be ignored altogether; and the Centre must have power to intervene in a crisis.
The Article derives from section 92 of the Australian Constitution, but it differs in four ways. Section 92 covers only trade "among the States", while Article 301 says "throughout the territory of India" and so covers intra-State trade as well. Section 92 makes trade "absolutely" free and Article 301 does not. Section 92 has no exceptions in the text, while Articles 302 to 305 provide them. And while the restraint applies formally to both the Union and the States, Parliament can relax it by its own legislation, whereas the States remain under the control of the Centre.
What is covered. "Trade, commerce and intercourse" has been read widely. In Atiabari, the Court stressed that the Article covers the movement of trade, which is of the essence of trade, so that "the movement or the transport part of trade must be free". Later cases accept that movement is not the only aspect. In Koteswar v KRB & Co, (1969) 1 SCC 255, an order prohibiting forward contracts was held to be a restriction on trade. In District Collector v Ibrahim, a State order creating a monopoly in sugar for cooperative societies was struck down under Article 301. Price control may also be a restriction. In Fatehchand v State of Maharashtra, the Court held that money-lending to poor villagers was not "trade" for this purpose, and refused to insist on movement as an essential element. Some activities fall outside the Article altogether: gambling and lotteries are not trade or commerce, so a law restricting them does not breach Articles 301 to 304, and a business like liquor, which is treated as inherently noxious, may be heavily regulated.
What "free" means. Freedom does not mean freedom from all regulation. In Atiabari, Gajendragadkar J said that Article 301 protects against restrictions that directly and immediately restrict or impede the free flow of trade. Regulatory measures, such as traffic regulations, the filing of returns and declarations, and rules on loads and lights, are not hit by it, because laws that lay down rules for the orderly conduct of trade are different from laws that interfere with the trade itself. In State of Bihar v Harihar Prasad, a law requiring transporters of goods to make declarations to prevent evasion of sales tax was held to be regulatory. A rule banning the movement of forest produce at night was held to be restrictive and not regulatory. A ban on the movement of paddy out of a few districts was upheld as regulatory in K Ramanathan v State of Tamil Nadu, as it prevented a surplus State from being drained of food. The Court decides whether a measure is regulatory or restrictive.
Taxation. The meaning of freedom in relation to taxes was contested for decades. In Atiabari the majority held by four to one that Assam's tax on goods carried by road or inland waterways directly affected movement and was bad, as the State had not followed Article 304(b). This would have limited the States' taxing powers considerably. Automobile Transport v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1962 SC 1406, qualified it, holding that regulatory measures and compensatory taxes for the use of trading facilities, such as roads maintained by the State, are not restrictions under Article 301, because they facilitate trade. The test was whether traders are getting the use of facilities for their business and paying no more than is required to provide them, without any meticulous test. Later decisions widened the concept of compensatory tax to a "link" or "some connection", but the Constitution Bench in Jindal Stainless Ltd v State of Haryana (Jindal II) restored the Atiabari and Automobile position. Then a nine-judge bench in Jindal Stainless Ltd v State of Haryana, (2017) 12 SCC 1, by seven to two, overruled the compensatory tax theory. The majority held that taxation is a power linked with the State's sovereignty, sourced in Article 246(3) and the State List, and that the freedom in Article 301 is not freedom from taxation. A non-discriminatory tax, one that does not offend Article 304(a), is not an impermissible restriction. Such a fiscal law is to be tested only under Article 304(a), without the requirement of reasonableness or public interest under Article 304(b). Bhushan J took a more nuanced view, that a law which complies with Article 304(a) but also contains restrictions on freedom must obtain the President's sanction. The decision has been criticised as hard to apply because of the plurality of opinions, and its effect on entry taxes was reduced by the omission of Entry 52 of the State List with the 101st Amendment.
Exceptions. Parliament may by law impose such restrictions on trade between States, or within any part of India, as may be required in the public interest [Article 302]. The public interest is presumed, and the Court has treated the restrictions as needing a reasonable nexus with it [Prag Rice & Oil Mills v UOI]. Parliament may not give preference to one State over another or discriminate between States, except to deal with a scarcity of goods, and then by a declaration in the law that is conclusive [Article 303]. A State may, despite Articles 301 and 303, impose on goods imported from other States any tax to which similar local goods are subject, but without discrimination [Article 304(a)], and may impose reasonable restrictions in the public interest, for which a Bill requires the President's previous sanction [Article 304(b)]. In Atiabari, the Assam Act failed for want of that sanction; in Jayeshbhai Kanjibhai Kalathiya v State of Gujarat, a rule banning the movement of sand beyond the State's border was struck down, because the State could not impose such a prohibition under a mining statute that had not been passed with the President's previous sanction. The sanction is needed even for restrictions on purely intra-State trade, and executive orders cannot substitute for a law. Article 304(a) guards against hostile discrimination, not mere differentiation, so incentives for backward areas are not barred. Existing laws are saved by Article 305 until the President directs otherwise. Since the Fourth Amendment, Article 305 also saves State monopolies, whether run by the State itself or by a corporation it controls.
Relation to Article 19(1)(g). Article 19(1)(g) gives citizens the right to carry on any trade or business, subject to reasonable restrictions. One view is that Article 301 protects trade as a whole and not the individual's right, but that view has been called hardly tenable, since section 92 of the Australian Constitution, the model for Article 301, has been held to protect individual rights as well. In practice a restriction is often challenged under both. In District Collector v Ibrahim the Court relied on Article 301 because Article 19 had been suspended while the emergency was in force.
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