Limitation ActCondonation of Delay 22 June 2026· 8 min read

    Under what circumstances can delay be condoned in filing of appeal and applications?

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    The circumstances in which delay is condoned cannot be listed as a closed set, because the test is whether the person asking could fairly be blamed for not acting in time. What can be done is to set out the groups of facts that recur in the reports, and to note for each where the courts have stopped short. Before doing that, the general principle should be stated once. The applicant bears the burden of showing sufficient cause for not filing on the last day and for each stage of delay afterwards (Ramlal, Motilal and Chotelal v Rewa Coalfields Ltd, AIR 1962 SC 361; Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733 : (1981) 1 SCC 495). The second case adds that the cause must be one that arose within the period itself. Events after the period has expired can explain why the delay went on, but the lapse of the period must itself be traced to some cause arising within it.

    The first group is illness or incapacity of the party at the relevant time. Illness is a cause the courts accept when it is real, falls in the relevant period and is supported by evidence, ordinarily a medical certificate. A party who is hospitalised for the last weeks of the period and files shortly after his discharge is the standard example. The courts refuse the plea when it is bare or contradicted, and a claim of illness has been rejected where the party was shown to be going about his business in the same period. A plea of lack of funds is treated the same way: in Ajay Dabra v Pyare Ram (AIR 2023 SC 598), a first appeal filed 254 days late was refused condonation because the appellant was an affluent businessman and could have filed with deficient court fees.

    The second group is the default or mistake of the party's advocate, which is the largest single head. The cases are consistent, though they sort into three kinds. Honest mistakes and bona fide advice are accepted. Concord of India Insurance Co Ltd v Nirmala Devi (AIR 1979 SC 1666) says that legal advice honestly sought and given counts, and an honest mistake in calculating the period has been condoned where the delay was two days and one of them was a Sunday. Where the advocate has not told the party of the order or has said that an appeal is pending when it is not, the party who has done all he could is not penalised: Rafiq v Munshilal (AIR 1981 SC 1400), Devendra Swamy v Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (AIR 2002 SC 2545), and Radha Krishna Rai v Allahabad Bank ((2000) 9 SCC 733) with its delay of 1,418 days. Where the party was told by counsel that the case was pending throughout, as in Sangramappa v Shankarappa (2001 AIHC 484, Kant), the delay of 809 days was condoned. On the other hand, mistaken advice given carelessly and without due care is not a sufficient cause, and neither is the mistake of counsel that rests on ignorance of a well-known rule. A party who is educated or experienced is expected to supervise his own case. In Syed Mujibur Rahman v Abdul Azeez (AIR 2001 Kant 104), a plaintiff living abroad who had not contacted his advocate for a considerable time was held not to have shown sufficient cause for restoration. An example of the line between honest and careless mistake is an advocate who counts the thirty days for an appeal from the date on which the certified copy is received. The period runs from the decree, and the time required for the copy is excluded by section 12(2) only as a deduction, so a counsel who counts it that way has made a mistake about a settled rule and the court is entitled to refuse.

    The third group is the party's own position. An illiterate or rustic litigant, or one who lives in a remote village with no easy access to a lawyer, is treated with more indulgence, and the social and economic condition of the appellant is relevant. But the allowance is not for persons of means who plead ignorance, and the delay has not been condoned where a claim to be a rustic villager was found to be wrong on the facts.

    The fourth group is the Explanation to section 5, that is, a litigant misled by an order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining the period. The group extends to cases where the law was genuinely unsettled, so that a litigant who filed a revision believing it was the proper remedy, or who filed in the wrong court because of conflicting decisions, was given the benefit of the doubt. Closely related is the case of a party who prosecutes in good faith a proceeding in a wrong forum. Section 14 covers this by excluding the time spent where its conditions are met, and where they are not, section 5 may still serve for appeals and applications.

    The fifth group is the occurrence of events outside the party's control. The imposition of curfew in a city is the usual example, and a general strike that actually prevented the step is another. So are the mistakes of the court office, for example where an appeal was presented before the expiry of the period but without typing costs, and the shortfall was noticed only after expiry. For the COVID-19 period, the position now rests on the Supreme Court's own order. In In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation (Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No 3 of 2020, order of 10 January 2022) the Court excluded the period from 15 March 2020 to 28 February 2022 in computing limitation for proceedings generally, and gave a period of at least ninety days from 1 March 2022 where the balance was shorter. That is the Court's exercise of its own power, not condonation under section 5, and it does not help a party whose time had expired before the window opened. In Union of India v Pintoo Kumar Singh (AIR 2023 Pat 83), the judgment was passed on 5 April 2018, the period ended on 5 May 2018 and the pandemic restrictions began only in March 2020, and the plea that the lockdown caused a delay of 1,711 days was rejected because nothing explained the period from May 2018 to March 2020.

    The sixth group is delay by the Government, which gets no formal privilege. Maniben Devraj Shah v Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai (AIR 2012 SC 1629 : (2012) 5 SCC 157) says that the State's applications cannot be allowed as a matter of course on the plea that dismissal would harm the public interest, and State of Maharashtra v Borse Bros Engineers & Contractors (P) Ltd ((2021) 6 SCC 460) says that a different yardstick for condonation cannot be set merely because the Government is involved. The Supreme Court in Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala v K.V. Ayisumma ((1996) 10 SCC 634 : AIR 1996 SC 2750) and State of Haryana v Chandra Mani (AIR 1996 SC 1623 : (1996) 3 SCC 132) accepted that official decisions are slow and that some pragmatism is permitted, but Postmaster General v Living Media India Ltd (AIR 2012 SC 1506 : (2012) 3 SCC 563) drew the line in a case of delay of 427 days: a department cannot rely on the usual explanation of files moving through levels, without showing a bona fide effort and a reasonable explanation. State of Madhya Pradesh v Bherulal ((2020) 10 SCC 654), decided on 15 October 2020 on a delay of 663 days, applied Living Media strictly and imposed costs recoverable from the officers responsible. The Court there described such filings as "certificate cases", meant to obtain a dismissal order from the Supreme Court. Delay was refused in State of Bihar v Abhay Chand ((2000) 9 SCC 292), an appeal under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 filed 830 days late, where officials had not applied for a copy of the judgment for about two years and the Court directed an inquiry and recovery from those at fault. It was refused again in Brijesh Kumar v State of Haryana (AIR 2014 SC 1612), a section 54 appeal filed more than ten years late. On the other side, Delhi Development Authority v Jagan Singh (2023 INSC 620; 2023 SCC OnLine SC 833) condoned the delay of a public authority, although the application was drafted casually, because the land had been put to public use for years. The case illustrates that the particular facts decide the outcome.

    For an illustration of the first group, take a decree passed on 1 January against which a thirty-day appeal lies. Under section 12(1) the day of the decree is excluded and the period ends on 31 January. The appellant suffers a heart attack on 20 January, is in hospital until 5 February, and files on 10 February with the hospital record. The delay is ten days, the whole of it falls within a documented illness, and the court will ordinarily condone it. Without the hospital record the plea would fail.

    In every group the courts condone what the applicant could not help, if he supports it with dates and material, and refuse what shows negligence, inaction or want of good faith.

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