What are legal disabilities? How do they affect the question of limitation prescribed for institution of suit?
The Limitation Act recognises three legal disabilities, and they are found in section 6(1): minority, insanity and idiocy. They share one feature. Each is a personal incapacity to conduct legal proceedings, and each exists at the moment the cause of action accrues. Poverty, ignorance of the law, illness, absence from the place of the court, and ignorance of the right itself are not disabilities for this purpose, even though they may be real obstacles. The law does not go beyond the three named conditions, and the question to be asked is whether the claimant was in one of them when time began to run.
Minority is the commonest of the three. A minor is a person who has not attained majority under the Indian Majority Act, 1875, which sets the age at eighteen, or at twenty-one if a court has appointed a guardian of his person or property. The Explanation to section 6 adds the child in the womb. Insanity and idiocy are the other two. The Act does not define them, and the language is dated; the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 now speaks of mental illness. For limitation, the test is functional. The question is whether the person was so affected by unsoundness of mind, or by congenital mental deficiency, that he could not manage his own affairs and bring proceedings at the time the period began, and the claimant has the burden of proving that he was.
The effect on limitation is found in sections 6, 7, 8 and 9 read together. Under section 6, a person who was under disability when the prescribed period began to run may institute the suit or make the application for execution within the same period after the disability has ceased. Where he was affected by two disabilities at the start, or took on a second before the first ended, he gets the same period after both are over. If the disability lasts until his death, his legal representative may sue within the same period after the death, and if that representative is himself under a disability, the same rules apply to him. If the person dies after his disability has ended but within the extended period, the legal representative has the same period after the death.
Section 7 deals with joint claimants. Where one of several persons jointly entitled to sue is under disability, the effect turns on whether a discharge can be given without his concurrence. If it can, then time runs against all of them, so that the disability of one gives nobody any extension. If no such discharge can be given, time does not run against any of them until one of them becomes capable of giving the discharge without the others, or until the disability has ceased. The Explanations make the section work in practice: it applies to a discharge from every kind of liability, including a liability in respect of immovable property, and the manager of a Mitakshara Hindu undivided family is deemed able to discharge without the concurrence of the others only if he is in management of the joint family property. In Sarda Prasad v Lala Jumna Prasad (AIR 1961 SC 1074) the Supreme Court held that a manager can take delivery of possession under a partition decree on behalf of the minor members, so that time for execution runs against the minors as well. The same conclusion would not follow for a mother or other guardian, since a guardian who needs the permission of the court under Order XXXII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot give a discharge as of right.
Section 8 is the check on all this. The extension given by section 6 or 7 is not to run for more than three years from the cessation of the disability or the death of the person affected, and the section also excludes suits to enforce rights of pre-emption. Because it limits only the extension, a minor still has the benefit of whatever is left of the ordinary period if that period is longer. Bailochan Karan v Basant Kumari Naik (AIR 1999 SC 876 : (1999) 2 SCC 310) rejected a claim that a minor could sue for possession within twelve years of attaining majority; the Court held that the most the minor had was three years from the cessation of the disability.
Section 9 completes the scheme with the rule that once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to sue stops it. The result is that disability protects only the person who is under it at the outset. A man who is of sound mind when his cause of action arises, and becomes insane the next day, gets nothing from section 6.
To put the whole matter in one picture, a person of sound mind and full age must sue within the period in the third column of the Schedule. A claimant under legal disability at the start may wait until the disability ends, and then has the same period, subject to the three-year ceiling on the extension. A claimant who becomes disabled after time has started has no concession at all.
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